Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o' clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT

London Transport (Fares)

Mr. Dubs: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he has received any representations from London Transport concerning the current legislation affecting London Transport fares.

The Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Mr. Reginald Eyre): My right hon. Friend has discussed the whole position with both London Transport management and unions. It is now two months since he asked the GLC to prepare urgently a balanced plan for meeting London's transport needs more effectively and cheaply within the substantial resources available. When this has been done he will be able to consider whether the implementation of such a strategy requires any clarification in the law.

Mr. Dubs: Is it not a fact, however, that London Transport has made the strongest possible representations to the Secretary of State because, as a result of the Law Lords' decision, it is unable to exercise its present management functions? In particular, London Transport does not know whether it would be legal to make capital investment at present. Therefore, is it not utterly frustrated and desperate for legislation?

Mr. Eyre: There is a misunderstanding. As I made clear in the recent debate on London Transport, its position is secure. Considerable resources are available to the GLC, and it is up to the GLC to produce the balanced plan to which I have referred. Large fare increases or large service cuts are not necessary.

Mr. Sims: Is my hon. Friend aware that some hon. Members are becoming fed up and impatient with the GLC's failure to react to the Secretary of State's invitiation? Will my hon. Friend assure us that if action is not taken soon by the GLC, my right hon. Friend will step in and take action himself?

Mr. Eyre: I fully understand my hon. Friend's comments. There is widespread support for removing responsibility for London Transport from the GLC.

Mr. William Hamilton: Where?

Mr. Eyre: We have been examining urgently a number of ideas. My hon. Friend will know that we are awaiting the report of the Select Committee on Transport, which is expected soon. My right hon. Friend is determined to have a better deal for London, and will act as necessary.

Mr. Jay: May I remedy this misunderstanding? Is it not clear that by sitting around and doing nothing while London Transport sinks into chaos the Secretary of State for Transport is failing to carry out the job for which he is paid?

Mr. Eyre: The right hon. Gentleman must appreciate the responsibility that rests on the GLC. My right hon. Friend wrote again to the leader of the GLC on 10 May reminding him of the need to produce for London this realistic and balanced transport plan that takes account of the substantial resources that are likely to be available, and to provide better bus and tube services by targeting resources more effectively. My right hon. Friend said that he would be glad to hear from the leader of the GLC about how work on the plan was proceeding. Now it is up to the GLC to respond.

Mr. Wheeler: When did my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State last meet the leader of the GL C to discuss London Transport, and when will something be done about the overmanning and inefficiency that lead to high fares which London people find quite unacceptable?

Mr. Eyre: My hon. Friend will forgive me if I cannot reply exactly to the first part of his question, but thy, last meeting took place about six or seven weeks ago. I emphasise to my hon. Friend the importance of the correspondence that my right hon. Friend has had with the leader of the GLC. All the matters to which he has referred with regard to the conduct of transport in the city are matters for London Transport, on which we are urging it to discharge its responsibility fully.

Mr. Booth: Will the Under-Secretary confirm that London Transport has estimated that the fare increases it has been forced to make will result in a 17 per cent. drop in bus passengers and a 12 per cent. drop in tube passengers, and that that points to London Transport being forced to operate only a skeleton transport service for a largely stay-at-home London population?

Mr. Eyre: Fares are too high, but that is the fault of the GLC for the crazy circumstances that it has produced. The reports of loss of patronage and services from the GLC are exaggerated, because it is mainly bringing scheduled services into line with those needed.

Petrol (Lead Content)

Mr. Jim Marshall: asked the Secretary of State for Transport how many recent representations have been made to him expressing concern over the use of lead in petrol.

The Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Mrs. Lynda Chalker): The Department received 82 letters in the first four months of 1982.

Mr. Marshall: The Minister will appreciate that I am somewhat surprised at the small number of letters received, but I am sure that she is aware that there is immense public concern over this issue. Is she able to give an assurance that her Department will support: the complete removal of lead from petrol if the three surveys commissioned by the Medical Research Council, at the Government's request, support the view that even low lead levels in petrol are dangerous to children?

Mrs. Chalker: I understand and fully appreciate the concern about lead in petrol, but we must take account of


the fact that by 1985 we shall have reduced by two-thirds the current level of lead in petrol. That is the greatest reduction that there has ever been, and no other European country is going further than that.
We shall look most carefully at the research being done by the Medical Research Council as well as at all the other research. However, I remind the hon. Gentleman that the cost of going below 0·15g per litre of lead in petrol is not only very high but will require a complete change—not just a change in the manner of refining—with which our motor car industry and many other aspects of industry will find it exceedingly difficult to cope. We must look into the whole position, not simply straight reports.

Mr. Clinton Davis: Is it not a fact that in the United States an option is available? Consumers there can use leaded or unleaded petrol, and the cost argument does not seem to carry the same weight with the American authorities as it does with this Government? Are not the Government held captive by the representations of the oil companies?

Mrs. Chalker: No. The position is different in the United States, as I think the hon. Gentleman is aware. First, for many years the American Government have sought to deal with pollutants other than just lead in petrol. About half the petrol sold in the United States is lead free, and the average amount of lead in their petrol is 0·13g per litre. In dealing with other forms of pullutant, the United States car manufacturers have completely changed their exhaust systems in a different way from our manufacturers, and that is why this is much more complicated than hon. Members sometimes suggest.

Heavy Lorries

Mr. Foulkes: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he will make a further statement on the Armitage committee report proposal on heavy lorries.

The Secretary of State for Transport (Mr. David Howell): I hope to do so shortly.

Mr. Foulkes: An essential element of the Armitage report was the speeding up of bypass construction and the creation of new bypasses. In written replies to me the Secretary of State for Scotland has said that there will be no such speeding up in Scotland and no new bypasses in the Scottish programme. If the Secretary of State for Transport is foolish enough to allow these juggernauts on to the roads of England, will he ensure that they stop at the border?

Mr. Howell: The overall commitment to more bypasses has substantially increased——

Mr. Foulkes: Not in Scotland.

Mr. Howell: —and during the next two years more than 220 new communities will be bypassed with projects now about to start. I believe that that is part of the Armitage approach, as are steps to ensure that vehicles are improved, and that there is improved control over where they go, to keep them away from villages and high streets, and improved enforcement. Those changes are widely needed and they will be welcomed by those who suffer from the effects of heavy goods vehicles.

Mr. Adley: Does not my right hon. Friend sometimes feel that those who have studied Armitage least are most

vociferous in their objections to the overall proposals? Will he take every opportunity to stress that there is an overall package in Armitage that has substantial environmental advantages for our people as well as the oft-quoted disadvantage of heavier lorries?

Mr. Howell: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who is entirely correct. The Government and the Armitage report propose that a serious problem—that of the impact of heavy goods vehicles on the environment—which has got worse over the years, should now be gripped and tackled comprehensively by improving the vehicles, improving the control over where they go, improving enforcement and by other measures. I am sure that that is needed. It should have been done before, and I believe that it is overdue.

Mr. Sheerman: Is the Minister satisfied that, along with the move towards heavy lorries, if that is inevitable, safety standards will be maintained? Has he concerned himself with braking standards for these larger vehicles; with under-run guards side and rear; and with the fact that it will be far more difficult for a young driver of 21 to move straight to 38-tonne and 40-tonne vehicles?

Mr. Howell: I am concerned with all the specific issues that the hon. Gentleman raised. As to the heavier payload on existing containers, I know the hon. Gentleman realises that we are not talking about, nor would we tolerate, larger trailer containers. We are talking about a larger payload on the existing trailers, but with improved braking and standards for side and under-run guards. I believe that that is very necessary.

Mr. Moate: Why should it be necessary, in terms of competition, for the United Kingdom to have heavier lorries or heavier axle loadings than West Germany?

Mr. Howell: In practice, axle loadings throughout Western Europe are similar. Indeed, in many countries they are higher than here. If there is to be a heavier payload on existing trailers—we certainly shall not tolerate larger ones—it is better spread over five axles than over four.

Mr. Stott: Notwithstanding what the hon. Member for Christchurch and Lymington (Mr. Adley) said about the important recommendations in the Armitage report, will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that in their written submissions to him the local government organisations have not changed their view despite the publication of his White Paper? Will he also confirm that their view is that the British road system is already pathetically inadequate to cope with the existing number of heavy lorries and that his proposals to increase lorry weights will seriously worsen an already bad situation?

Mr. Howell: The local authorities have developed their views and recognise the urgent need to tackle the heavy lorry problem, not to duck it as the hon. Gentleman seems to be suggesting and which I believe would be wholly wrong. Heavy goods vehicles damage roads and bridges, but there will be no question of additional damage in any heavier payload or any heavier maximum weight. Nevertheless, the damage from heavy goods vehicles already exists, and that must be tackled vigorously.

Passenger Transport Executives (Efficiency)

Mr. Neubert: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what criteria he uses to assess the efficiency and


productivity of passenger transport executives in major conurbations; and how London Transport compares in these respects.

Mr. David Howell: Detailed comparisons of relative LT performance would require large-scale analysis, but I understand that in 1980 LT bus costs, for example, were 40 per cent. higher than those of the passenger transport executives, and its vehicle miles per staff employed were far and away the lowest compared with PTEs, municipal operators and the National Bus Company.

Mr. Neubert: Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is all too easy to talk about cheaper fares and increased grants without too much thought about where the cash will come from? Will he ensure that in any conclusions he reaches on London Transport the highest priority is given to the control of costs and an improvement in efficiency, otherwise public subsidies will be no better than in a bottomless bucket?

Mr. Howell: Fares in London are certainly too high, but my hon. Friend is correct. There is ample scope for the GLC to get fares down and to increase efficiency, given the very large subsidy that it already receives, and has received in the past, and given the enormous opportunities, one of which I have indicated in my answer, for cutting costs and increasing efficiency. Having recently visited various European cities to see their transport systems, I am absolutely convinced that the GLC has plenty of opportunity to cut costs, increase efficiency and reduce fares if only it takes that opportunity.

Mr. Dobson: We understand from press statements that the Secretary of State is considering the possibility of, in effect, renationalising London Transport and taking it away from the GLC. In those circumstances, does he intend to fund and subsidise London Transport in the future entirely from the taxpayer so that, unique among all the conurbations, the ratepayers of London would no longer make a contribution to keeping fares down?

Mr. Howell: A number of proposals have been made, including ones by the chairman of London Transport, for a reorganisation of the relationship between the GLC and LT and possibly a divorce between the two. I have indicated that the Government are also considering those proposals and the possibilities of a new transport structure. However, the first requirement is that, instead of merely asking for the law to be restored and rates again to go up, the GLC should get on with the opportunities available to it. If it does not, as was said earlier, more fundamental changes will have to be considered.

Mr. Anthony Grant: Do not these figures demonstrate that the GLC is incapable of running London Transport? Is it not essential not merely to take London Transport away from the GLC, but to abolish that ridiculous body?

Mr. Howell: My hon. Friend tempts me on to wider questions. The issue of whether there should be a separate transport authority, possibly both rate and tax-funded, or whether it should continue to be part of the GLC, is now on the table. The Select Committee on Transport is looking at this, and I look forward with the greatest interest to its proposals.

Mr. Anthony Grant: Get rid of the GLC. That is the answer.

Mr. Booth: If the Secretary of State feels strongly about the efficiency of the London Transport Executive, as compared with other transport authorities, will he fairly acknowledge that on the test of passenger journeys made per mile, operated, on the latest figures available. London Transport is more efficient than any metropolitan county? Is this not a much more appropriate way of examining the efficiency of authorities than the sort of yardstick quoted by his hon. Friends?

Mr. Howell: One has to examine the passenger cost per mile, which is £1·97 in London compared with £1·42 in the other PTEs and £1·26 in the other municipal bus companies. One has to examine low bus miles per staff employed. A number of indicators need to be examined, but whichever way the right hon. Gentleman turns them—upside down or sideways—he will find that, basically, London Transport is relatively inefficient and that there is substantial room for improvement.

Motorway Repairs

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he will study the efficiency of motorway repair arrangements with the aim of reducing the length of motorway lane not in use and the associated accidents.

Mrs. Chalker: We are constantly reviewing repair techniques and methods of traffic management during motorway maintenance work to minimise the risks and delays to road users and to obtain the best possible value for money.
For example, we have recently changed the crossovers so as to improve safety and reduce delay at those points.

Mr. Roberts: I welcome the steps that the Minister is taking, but does she realise that the road transport industry, while accepting the need for repairs and for the safety of those involved in the repair work, feels genuine concern about some of the costs and accidents that may arise from our complex repair system?

Mrs. Chalker: I am aware of the hon. Gentleman's facts, but it is important that we take those steps by lengthening the coning and the crossover—measures that bring safety. The hon. Gentleman is right, in that the cost of accidents is one of the heavy costs that would otherwise have to be borne.
I am looking further at the speed limits that are deployed at the approach to coned-off areas during motorway maintenance work. I hope that we can reach a more appropriate solution than we have. We have always at the forefront of our minds the need to try to protect, and to have the greatest safety at these changing points.

Mr. Higgins: Is my hon. Friend aware that problems arise not only on motorways? On Monday 2 May, al the junction of the A20 and the A222, hundreds of cars and thousands of people were held up by a dozen or so cones. They reduced the traffic from two lanes to one, although there was no need for them, and they could have been removed and replaced in a matter of two minutes. Will my hon. Friend hold a full investigation into the case, and in particular into why Sidcup police station did nothing? Will she treat this as a typical example of the unnecessary delays that occur?

Mrs. Chalker: I shall look into the incident that my right hon. Friend has described, but of which I did not have


notice. There are obviously occasions when something stupid happens, as in the incident described by my right hon. Friend. I shall make sure that all steps are taken to reduce human error, whether it is the failure to indicate use of the hard shoulder, or something else.

Mr. Latham: Is my hon. Friend aware that drivers between London and Leicestershire gloomily contemplate one long stretch of roadworks as they drive along the M1? Will my hon. Friend particularly consider the occasional occurrence when long stretches of road are coned off although no work is going on, no plant or materials are stored and there is no indication of any intended activity?

Mrs. Chalker: There are probably two reasons for the frustration that every motorist feels, as I do, on driving up the M1. First, we are extending the two-lane section to three-lanes, and the work on that is proceeding on target. Secondly, lanes appear to be, but are not, coned off unnecessarily. Often when no work seems to be going on on the motorway the carriageway is drying out after repairs. It would be a waste of taxpayers' money if we were prematurely to allow traffic back on to it. It would simply mean further repairs to those sections well in advance of when they should be necessary.

Road Construction

Mr. Knox: asked the Secretary of State for Transport how much has been spent on new road construction in the past three years at constant prices.

Mrs. Chalker: At average 1980–81 prices, motorway and trunk road capital expenditure in England was £440 million in 1979–80, £407 million in 1980–81 and £452 million in 1981–82. The corresponding figures for local roads are £414 million, £429 million and £343 million. In both cases the 1981–82 figures are estimates.

Mr. Knox: As it is the Government's aim to improve the competitiveness of British industry, and as a better road system would contribute to that, does my hon. Friend not think that we should be spending far more on new road construction than we have in recent years?

Mrs. Chalker: In 1981–82 we carried out far more work than was anticipated, because of the lower tendering prices, and in 1980–81 we opened 75 miles of motorway and 97 miles of new trunk roads. In the past two years we have started 62 miles of new motorway and 91 miles of new trunk roads. We shall do all that we can within our budget to make sure that motorway and trunk road building goes ahead as speedily as possible.

Mr. Eastham: While the Minister is busy trying to pat herself on the back for the success of the road programme, is she aware that in my home city of Manchester road maintenance in 1981–82 was cut by 22·5 per cent. in real terms as against 1975, and that the roads are falling to pieces? When will the Government find some money for the roads in Manchester?

Mrs. Chalker: Many local authorities last year underspent the money that was allocated to them for their road programmes. It is up to individual local authorities to decide their priorities. Overall, the transport supplementary grant was highly favourable to most local authorities, and some had a 100 per cent. grant.

Mr. Dykes: What has happened to the idea of using private money for road construction?

Mrs. Chalker: We are discussing that further, and there are excellent possibilities. We may be able before long to use private capital in road building.

Channel Tunnel

Mr. Teddy Taylor: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he is yet in a position to announce a decision on the Channel tunnel.

Mr. Adley: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he is now in a position to make a statement on the Channel tunnel.

Sir Albert Costain: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he is now in a position to make a statement about the Channel tunnel.

Mr. David Howell: The joint Anglo-French report has been submitted to both sides. Discussions with the French Government are continuing.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall call first the three hon. Members whose questions are being answered.

Mr. Taylor: Does the Secretary of State agree that there is no near or projected need for a Channel tunnel and that none of the groups that have put forward schemes has done so without wanting some direct or indirect subsidy, guarantee, or indirect support from British Rail, the Common Market or the British Government? Will my right hon. Friend at least give an assurance that British taxpayers' money will not be used to support this white elephant, which seems to be supported only by contractors, consultants and fanatical supporters of the Common Market?

Mr. Howell: I can give my hon. Friend the firm assurance that the Government are committed to private finance. The Government believe that if a decision is taken in principle to go ahead with a Channel fixed link, it should be done without recourse to public funds.

Mr. Adley: Will my hon. Friend make it clear that he gives due weight, and nothing more, to those who, for political or even commercial, reasons, are mounting campaigns against the Channel tunnel? In the light of his discussions with the French Government, does my right hon. Friend feel able to assure them that when and if Her Majesty's Government reach a decision to proceed, they will be able not only to carry the House with them but to sustain the project? To make this possible, and in order to avoid the problems that occurred on the last occasion, will my right hon. Friend confirm that it would be advantageous to have political support as broad as possible across the political divide when he makes his decision?

Mr. Howell: Any giant project, particularly one based on agreement between two Governments, requires broad political support. I accept what my hon. Friend said. The first matter to be decided is whether there is to be a fixed link and, if so, which type.

Sir Albert Costain: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that had the previous scheme not been cancelled by the then Labour Government, the tunnel would have been open next year at a cost much less than is estimated for a single-bore tunnel? Is he aware that Folkestone in my constituency has had to put up with indecision for 15 years? Has not the time arrived for some finality?

Mr. Howell: I recognise the need not to repeat the long delays and uncertainties of past years when this issue was being discussed. My hon. Friend is correct in saying that uncertainty benefits no one. It leaves ferry operators or those who would invest in a fixed-link, if there was one, with doubts about the decisions that they should take. I recognise the need to reach a decision. I shall try to meet it.

Mr. Donald Stewart: Is the Secretary of State aware that this would be another piece of grandiose lunacy like Concorde, which never produced anything? I put to the right hon. Gentleman the suggestion that I made to his predecessor: that the parts of the tunnel already dug should be blocked with a Concorde at each end and cemented over.

Mr. Howell: I am aware of the right hon. Gentleman's broad approach to this project.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: Irrespective of whether one is for or against the project, can the right hon. Gentleman supply me with information about the dangers should the tunnel be blown up by terrorists? I seem unable to obtain this information from his Department or any other Department. I am especially concerned about the possibility of the flooding of Dover and the surrounding area. No one seems able to say whether it would be easy to send a car loaded with petrol into the tunnel and blow it up or to estimate the damage that would be caused.

Mr. Howell: Any final decision, if there were to be a project and construction of a tunnel, would have to take account of safety and defence considerations. The relevant Departments would be responsible for seeing that they were enforced.

Mr. Moate: Is it not of immense significance that the Cairncross report, commissioned by the Government to advise them, concluded that there was no overwhelming case for a fixed link? Does my right hon. Friend not detect the distinct odour of a very dead duck? Would it not be better to forget the whole project before wasting more time or money upon it?

Mr. Howell: All odours and sentiments and, of course, the economic analysis and report of Sir Alec Cairncross have to be taken into account by the two Governments and by those Governments individually in reaching a final decision in principle.

Mr. Bagier: Without going into the merits or demerits of the argument, will the right hon. Gentleman say whether he agrees with his hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Sir A. Costain)? Is it not about time that the right hon. Gentleman reached a decision? Does he agree that every conceivable argument has been put forward and that the prevarication that he seems to be practising is not fair to the House?

Mr. Howell: I hope to reach a decision as soon as possible.

Mr. John Wells: Is my right hon. Friend aware that uncertainty is causing great anxiety in the county of Kent, especially in respect of the completion of the M20 road link? People do not know whether they are coming or going. Does he agree that the delays and uncertainties of the preliminary work on the road link are most unsatisfactory? Will my right hon. Friend accept my assurance that the people of Kent are less worried about

the possibility of a Channel tunnel fixed link now than at the time of the previous proposals? Is he aware that British Rail and the other consortia have put forward their plans much more thoughtfully and tactfully?

Mr. Howell: I note my hon. Friend's assurances. He is correct in saying that the uncertainty connected with a great project of this kind, when it is first brought forward, is debilitating. That is why I am anxious that we should reach a decision.

British Rail (Subsidy)

Mr. Flannery: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he has recently discussed the amount of subsidy for British Railways in the current year with the chairman of the British Railways Board.

Mr. David Howell: I meet regularly the chairman of the British Railways Board to discuss this and other matters of mutual interest.

Mr. Flannery: Does the Secretary of State realise that the complete inadequacy of investment in the railways by this Government is bound to run down the railways and that it seems to be deliberate policy by the Government to get rid of the railways? Does he think that we can stand idly by while this is happening? Many areas—it is certainly the case on the line between St. Pancras and Sheffield—suffer with old rolling stock, late trains and all the inadequacies that flow from low investment. Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that this is bound to cause trouble among railway workers? All the excuses put forward about, flexible rostering and so on are completely inadequate when one considers the serious lack of investment.

Mr. Howell: The hon. Gentleman's remarks about Government policy towards the railways are without foundation. It is the board that decides on investment. The considerable resources made available to the board by the Government or the resources that it can generate internally provide the finance for investment. If the board can control its costs, get rid of restrictive work practices and make its inter-city business profitable, it will have the investment to proceed towards building the modern railway that we all want to see. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will join everyone else in wishing to see that progress achieved. However, this depends a great deal on the railways and the unions.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the size of the PSO grant depends to a great extent on the size of the total network that the railways are asked to operate? Is the size of the network one of the matters under consideration in the current review of British Rail?

Mr. Howell: The review that I have announced, which is being led by Sir David Serpell, will look at the options and finances of British Rail. It will also consider whether the very large grant, which is £100 million more in real terms than at the end of 1980 will buy a worthwhile return for the taxpayer in terms of the services that the taxpayer and the ratepayer want for this large sum of money.

Mr. Cook: Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that during the past couple of months he has announced two separate cuts in the PSO grant, one of £15 million in real terms and the other of £6 million in real terms? Does


he further recognise that there is no point in putting a passenger service obligation on British Rail to maintain the present size of the network if he then denies it the money to run trains on those lines?

Mr. Howell: The hon. Gentleman's arithmetic is wrong. The passenger service obligation grant for 1982–83 is £100 million more in real terms than the original application for grant for 1981. It is correct that during 1981 a unique record-high increase in the social grant was made to British Rail. The figures for 1982 maintain very nearly that unique high level. Any suggestion that there has been a massive cut in the grant is wholly wrong.

Mr. McNally: Is the Minister aware that it is shabby of him to shuffle off responsibility on to the unions and the British Railways Board? Is he further aware that in my region the north-south bypass at Manchester, which would link Scotland and London via Manchester, and the link into Manchester international airport are imaginative projects that could go ahead with a fair wind from the Department?

Mr. Howell: I hope that the hon. Gentleman is not condoning the continuation of restrictive practices that are damaging to British Rail and are widely recognised to be damaging by many of those working on the railway. If the hon. Gentleman has the interests of a modern and well-invested railway at heart, he should approach the matter in a slightly more even-handed way than he has with his supplementary question.

Mr. Neil Thorne: Will my right hon. Friend give the taxpayer the comfort of an assurance that he will not consider giving any more grants to British Rail unless and until it accepts at all levels, both management and workers, that it must adopt modern working practices? Is my right hon. Friend aware that the taxpayer is heartily sick and tired of being told that the workers are prepared to work only on their terms?

Mr. Howell: I believe that the British Railways Board, many responsible people working on the railways and the unions recognise that it is essential to achieve higher productivity and to adopt modern practices. The Government wholly back the board and all other interested parties in achieving those changes.

Mr. Stott: Is the Secretary of State aware that 2,000 constituents of mine who work in the Horwich locomotive works have contributed to productivity agreements, the like of which the railway industry has not seen? Is he further aware that the constituents of my hon. Friends the Members for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Foster) and for Swindon (Mr. Stoddart) have done exactly the same thing? The right hon. Gentleman should be aware that if he and the board close those railway workshops, with job losses of 5,000 and the deaths of three towns, the Opposition and the industry will not be prepared to put up with it. It is the responsibility of the Secretary of State and of British Rail to ensure that sufficient finance is forthcoming to keep those workshops open.

Mr. Howell: The loss of jobs through closures is a serious matter for all the communities mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. Everyone must recognise the social implications when these changes occur. The decision to close the workshops and to rationalise railway workshops generally is for British Rail. The board has reduced its orders for wagons—an example that will interest the hon.

Gentleman—not because it cannot afford them, which would be the implication of giving more money for investment, but because it does not need them. Modern wagons last longer, can be moved faster and can carry more freight than old wagons. The demand no longer exists for these workshops. It is with great regret, but nevertheless with realism, that British Rail has decided to take that course. I believe that it is right to do so, but I fully recognise the social and unemployment implications.

Motorway Construction

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: asked the Secretary of State for Transport how many miles of dual three-lane motorway were in the course of construction at the latest available date.

Mrs. Chalker: About 44 miles are at present under construction in England.

Mr. Wainwright: Is the hon. Lady satisfied that we have sufficient road mileage to meet the country's needs? Is she aware that there are many unemployed road construction workers? Will she look into the quality of roads? Are we to have more roads, such as the M1, on which every day many miles are being repaired and motorists have to use the hard shoulder because there are only two lanes open, and sometimes only one?

Mrs. Chalker: I fully understand the hon. Gentleman's anxiety, but the House and the country must recognise that the M1 and other early motorways were built over 20 years ago with a life expectancy of 20 years. The greater volumes of traffic now mean that those motorways must be resurfaced in a structural way so that they will last longer. We are strengthening the motorways that are being repaired to give them another 20 years of life.
Repairing motorways cannot be avoided. Every country has to face the problem. We must make sure that, as the hon. Gentleman said, we have good quality roads that will last longer and cause less disruption. I am devoted to doing that.

Mr. Hal Miller: Is my hon. Friend aware of the need to connect the Midlands with the ports to give our industries a chance to compete? What is being done to bring forward the construction of new connecting motorways?

Mrs. Chalker: I believe my hon. Friend knows that we had hoped to start work on the important M42 Bromsgrove section before the end of this year. This now depends on the successful outcome of a legal challenge on the side road orders. I assure my hon. Friend that, whether it is his section of the M42 or any of the other sections that connect Birmingham with the ports, we shall move as quickly as we can. However, the public consultation and inquiry system is a safeguard in road building that we should not lightly give up.

Mr. Dormand: Will the Minister tell the House how many miles of cycleway are under construction? Does the fact that she recently gave me £1 to join the all-party friends of cycling demonstrate the importance of this subject? Will she transfer some of the considerable resources from three-lane motorways to cycleways in view of their great importance to cycling in this country?

Mrs. Chalker: I fully accept the importance of cycleways. Some very imaginative new schemes have


come from the consultation paper issued by my predecessor some months ago. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the exact mileage, for which I apologise, but I can assure him that, where local authorities share my acceptance of the importance of cycleways and forward sensible recommendations in their transport policies and programmes, we shall do our best to assist them in the building of cycleways.

Paddington-Reading Line (Electrification)

Mr. Durant: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he has yet received proposals for the electrification of the Paddington-Reading railway line.

Mr. Eyre: No, Sir, and I would not expect to receive any before the British Railways Board submits its 10-year programme of schemes for the electrification of potentially profitable main line routes.

Mr. Durant: Bearing in mind the age of some of the diesel units on this line, will my hon. Friend do his best to speed up development, because it is important that such key lines have capital investment as soon as possible? At the same time, will my hon. Friend urge the train drivers to accept Lord McCarthy's proposal so that we can at least have more efficiency in the railway system?

Mr. Eyre: I understand that there has recently been a major programme of refurbishment on the diesel units.
The principle applying to this line and to other main line routes is that, if the main line from London through Reading is potentially profitable and the board can demonstrate a sound financial case for electrification, I should expect it to be included in the 10-year programme that I hope to receive in about two months.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a constituency question.

M3 Motorway

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: asked the Secretary of State for Transport when he expects to be in a position to make a decision on the route of the final section of the M3 motorway.

Mrs. Chalker: Consultants are investigating the improvement of the trunk route south of Bar End, Winchester, and I expect their report by the end of this year. We must then allow time for the further statutory procedures that will be needed, but I hope that we can reach a decision in 1984.

Mr. Mitchell: Does the Under-Secretary accept that her reply shows a sense of complacency and that we shall have a marvellous motorway that ends in the middle of nowhere? Is the hon. Lady aware that the Winchester bypass is completely blocked, that it has become a danger spot, that it cannot cope with the existing volume of traffic and that there are massive hold-ups? Will the hon. Lady speed things along as quickly as possible?

Mrs. Chalker: I am anxious to speed this matter along. The hon. Gentleman knows that the M3 Popham to Bar End part of the work will proceed in the autumn of this year. But a problem exists in the section known as the Bar End to Compton section. This difficult route, which runs between meadows and a chalk hill, is now being investigated by independent consultants. We are

investigating all possible solutions, but the hon. Gentleman will know that this is the most difficult part of the whole route. There have been considerable protests at the public inquiry. We must get the right solution as soon as possible.

Mr. Viggers: Is my hon. Friend aware that the motorway box formed by the M3, the M27 and the A3(M) is vital to the planning of all road networks in Hampshire and crucial to all who travel in the county? As substantial progress has been made by the Government, will she continue to give the M3 top priority?

Mrs. Chalker: After the M25, the M3 has one of the highest priorities. I fully accept the difficulties in completing those sections of motorways in the South. We shall take remedial steps in the meantime to improve the Hockley crossroads and so on, but we cannot proceed faster than we are permitted to do by the public inquiry and the difficulties ensuing from that final section of road that I mentioned to the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Mitchell).

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL SERVICE

Trade Union Discussions

Mr. Canavan: asked the Minister for the Civil Service what subjects she expects to discuss at her next meeting with trade union representatives of the Civil Service.

The Minister of State, Treasury (Mr. Barney Hayhoe): Manpower reductions in the non-industrial Civil Service.

Mr. Canavan: Has the Minister seen the report in The Guardian today of a leak from the Megaw committee of inquiry to the effect that the principle of pay comparability between civil servants and those doing similar jobs in the private sector should be eroded and the suggestion that the role of trade unions in pay negotiations should be reduced? If that report is true, will the Minister tell Megaw to ditch such provocative proposals now, otherwise we will be heading for a confrontation like last year's Civil Service strike?

Mr. Hayhoe: I have seen those purely speculative reports, but I will certainly not intervene in any way on the basis of them.

Mr. Eggar: Can my hon. Friend confirm that time off for trade union duties in the Civil Service is currently costing the country over £14 million a year? Has he noted the recommendations of the Select Committee on the Treasury and Civil Service that more control should be exercised over how trade union officials carry out their duties in Government time? Has he any additional statement to make on that matter?

Mr. Hayhoe: I have, of course, noted the Select Committee's recommendations, and I can confirm to the House that a new agreement has been made with the trade union side of the National 'Whitley Council which defines this whole area more precisely than did the previous agreement. It also provides for greater overall control and for the accountability of union representatives for their time spent on industrial relations and trade union duties and activities. Therefore, the agreement takes account of the Select Committee's recommendations.

Mr. Alan Williams: In view of the worrying points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. Canavan), will the Minister tell us when he expects to receive the Megaw report? When the hon. Gentleman next meets the trade unions, will he explain to them why the Top Salaries Review Body report, which was received on 1 April, was not implemented at the same time as the recommendations on the pay of doctors, dentists and the Armed Forces? That seems to imply that the Government are considering a modification of the recommendations. If so, will the hon. Gentleman give a guarantee that he and his fellow Ministers will discuss the situation with the unions before announcing any final decision?

Mr. Hayhoe: The right hon. Gentleman would not expect me to comment on purely speculative reports about the work of the Megaw committee. As far as I am aware, the committee is on schedule to make its report by midsummer. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be making an announcement on the TSRB report very soon.

Mr. Marlow: While the majority of right hon. and hon. Members would be happy to accept a pay increase of only 4 per cent., they would be very reluctant to do so if senior civil servants, such as principals and assistant secretaries, were to receive an increase above that level. Can my hon. Friend assure the House that senior civil servants will not be offered a pay increase of more than 4 per cent., thereby increasing still further the differential between them and hon. Members?

Mr. Hayhoe: It would be wise for my hon. Friend to await the report of the TSRB. However, in view of his comments, it is worth noting that the TSRB group is receiving about 5 per cent. in cash below the level of the 1980 award, whereas hon. Members are receiving the full value of that 1980 award.

Redundancies

Mr. Cryer: asked the Minister for the Civil Service how many redundancies among staff for whom she is responsible have occurred in the past 12 months.

Mr. Hayhoe: More than 3,000 industrial and non-industrial civil servants were made redundant in 1981.

Mr. Cryer: Is it not disgraceful that the Minister has taken responsibility for putting 3,000 people in the ever-swelling dole queues created by his Government? Is not that attitude symbolised by the sacking of 26 prizewinning, film-making civil servants in the COI? Is not the Government's attitude to sack them, come what may? The Minister will have seen that the director of the COI film and television department, Mr. Arthur White, has said that the decision to sack those film makers would have been made whatever the position. Is that not a complete and utter disgrace?

Mr. Hayhoe: I have frequently acknowledged the quality of the work done by the directors, production assistants and editors at the COI who have been made redundant, but the hon. Gentleman and the union concerned, the ACTT, have been involved in a campaign of deliberate deception and misrepresentation about this matter. Privatisation will save about £100,000 a year, and it makes good management sense. The hon. Gentleman knows the facts. I hope that he will abide by them and will cease misrepresenting the position.

Mr. Chapman: As the Civil Service's annual percentage turnover, measured by those who leave the service on reaching retirement age or voluntarily transfer to non-Civil Service jobs, is in double figures, can my hon. Friend give the House an assurance that the planned reduction in the number of civil servants by 100,000 over five years can be achieved with no, or at least very few, forced redundancies?

Mr. Hayhoe: I can give my hon. Friend the assurance that we shall be seeking to achieve our manpower targets with as little redundancy as is required. I can give him the news that the reduction in the size of the Civil Service now amounts to just under 66,000, which implies a full-year saving on the Civil Service pay bill of just under £½ billion. That is a very substantial achievement.

Mr. Alan Williams: But is not the figure of redundancies given by the Minister a severe underestimate? Is not the real redundancy level being concealed by the enforced retirement at 60 of specialists and professionals who entered the Civil Service late in their careers on the tacit understanding that they would be able to stay until they were 65? Will not the Government's policy make it more difficult for us to have the exchange of experience between industry and the Civil Service that all previous Governments have declared is required?

Mr. Hayhoe: I acknowledge that a number of people between 60 and 65 who wish to stay on in the Civil Service have been asked to retire. That is fully in accordance with the terms and conditions of their employment.

Dispersal Policy

Mr. Foulkes: asked the Minister for the Civil Service what further proposals she is considering with regard to Civil Service dispersal from London.

Mr. Hayhoe: None, Sir.

Mr. Foulkes: In relation to the transfer of 1,400 jobs in the Ministry of Defence to the Anderston site in Glasgow, can the Minister confirm that the building will be ready by the end of 1985 and that by that time the Ministry will have identified the jobs that are to be transferred?

Mr. Hayhoe: As the hon. Gentleman knows, that is primarily a question for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. However, I assure him that, following the Select Committee's recommendations, when it became clear that the use of the Anderston site instead of the St. Enoch site would make the dispersal possible a year earlier, it was proceeded with. Although it is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, the posts are, as far as I am aware, being identified and that dispersal will go ahead as planned.

Mr. Anderson: In view of the changed and much worse employment conditions, is it not time that the Government reconsidered their dispersal policy as part of the total regional policy? Areas that have come to expect a supply of Government jobs are not receiving them and there is no other source for meeting the major employment needs of those areas outside London.

Mr. Hayhoe: A dispersal policy is expensive and the need to contain public expenditure prevents any further initiative in that direction. However, I assure the hon.


Gentleman that when it comes to the location of new Government work, or the relocation of work for operational reasons, the pressing needs of particular areas will be given full consideration.

Mr. Dormand: In view of the disastrous unemployment situation in the Northern region, why does the Minister not transfer Civil Service jobs to the North? The Government frequently tell hon. Members who represent Northern region constituencies that they must wait until there is an upturn in the economy. Is not this one way in which the Government can act direct to provide jobs for the region?

Mr. Hayhoe: The Government announced their dispersal plans and programme on 26 July 1979. We are sticking to those plans, and it is right that we should do so, despite considerable pressure from the Departments and individuals concerned.

Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall take points of order after the statements.

Business of the House

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a short business statement.
The business tomorrow will now be a debate on the Falkland Islands, on a motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Following representations through the usual channels, the Chairman of Ways and Means has agreed that the opposed private business due to be taken at 7 o'clock tomorrow, that is, the Greater London Council (General Powers) (No. 2) Bill, may be taken at 10 o'clock.

Sir Hugh Fraser: It is a mistake to arrange a further debate on the Falkland Islands when the country and the Government are entering a period of extremely delicate negotiation and when there is clearly a movement of our troops and the task force. To indulge in a debate without a specific statement of policy being demanded of the Government must be a major mistake, and I hope that the Government will reconsider the question.

Mr. Biffen: I hear what my right hon. Friend says. The House might like to reflect upon the fact that it is almost two weeks since we last had a debate on the Falklands crisis. The constructive way in which the House has attended the subject in the four debates hitherto has been central to the national debate which must take place on this matter.

Mr. John Silkin: The Opposition are grateful to the Leader of the House for arranging the debate. It is right that the House should be able to express its opinion at reasonable intervals on what is after all a fast-moving picture.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Hon. Members will have an opportunity tomorrow to express their opinions on whether there should have been a debate. Therefore, I shall call one more hon. Member from either side and move on to the next statement.

Mr. John Stokes: I have frequently told my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House that constant statements and debates do not help our diplomatic efforts and are probably tiresome and offensive to those in the task force. Today I hear rumours that Downing Street is full of cameras and talk of a sell-out. If there is a sell-out, no debate will be necessary; something much graver will be required.

Mr. Biffen: I obviously cannot comment on my hon. Friend's latter remarks.
Once again, I should like to share with the House the observation that since the original debate on the Falklands

crisis we have had four debates and eight statements over five to six weeks. I think that we have struck a reasonable balance.

Mr. Dafydd Wigley: Will the Leader of the House reconsider his intention to have the debate on the motion for the Adjournment? Will he give those hon. Members who have grave misgivings about the Government's policy an opportunity to express them on a substantive motion?

Mr. Biffen: There are situations in which words are as significant as votes.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: All these issues can be raised tomorrow.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I refer to an earlier remark that you made? As always, it was made with all sincerity and honesty. You said that hon. Members would have an opportunity to express their opinions tomorrow. With the greatest respect, I know that it is always a difficult task to select speakers. I have no interest to declare. I do not want to take part in the debate. I never have taken part in debates on the Falklands crisis. Such debates affect the constituents of all hon. Members and yet, because of custom, Privy Councillors are invariably called first. They make their speeches, walk out and do not return until the closing speeches. The same regulars take part.
May I ask the Chair to bear in mind that in such national debates Mr. Smith, Mr. Black and Mr. Brown are entitled to speak. [Interruption.] This is not a joking matter. I do not want to take part. Constituents ask why they always hear Mr. X or Mr. Y but not their own representatives.

Mr. Speaker: I am fully cognisant of the matters that the hon. Gentleman raises. I shall bear them in mind and do my best, as I always do. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will help me, because I want to move on to the next statement.

Mr. Lewis: rose——

Mr. Speaker: I shall take this point of order because it arises out of the earlier statement.

Mr. Lewis: May I conclude, Mr. Speaker, by asking you not to call those who have taken part in each of the previous debates? I emphasise that I do not want to take part, but I ask you to call those hon. Members who have tried to speak in the four previous debates.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that we can now do credit to ourselves as a House and move on. There will be a debate on the Falkland Islands tomorrow and I shall try to call those who have not spoken in previous debates. It is true that there are some who have spoken in every debate. That is because they are spokesmen for their respective parties. That applies not only to the major parties in the House but to the minority parties.

Council of Agriculture Ministers

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Peter Walker): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement to the House about the Council of Agriculture Ministers meeting in Brussels on 10 to 11 May.
The Council continued its discussion of the Presidency proposals on a number of major elements in the 1982–83 price fixing. After further Commission proposals, all member States that had previously maintained reserves withdrew them, with the exception of the United Kingdom.
In the absence of further improvements, the United Kingdom maintained our specific reserves on parts of the package in addition to our overall reserve that the agricultural and budget elements of the mandate of 30 May must be agreed in parallel. I explained why important British interests were involved in this and that we could not agree to take decisions on this matter except by unanimity.
The next meeting has been provisionally arranged for 17 May.

Mr. Norman Buchan: I welcome the statement by the French Foreign Minister that the support for Britain over the Falkland Islands has no relation to our support or otherwise of the common agricultural policy's budgetary proposals. The Minister will be aware that we shall support him in resisting a further price increase. We opposed the 9 per cent. increase because it was too high. The figure now talked about is 10·5 or 10·7 per cent. We oppose that also.
Will the right hon. Gentleman deny the widespread belief that he would accept the price increases if a satisfactory solution were found to the total budgetary package? I hope that he will accept that we believe that agricultural problems—like the Falkland Islands—are a separate issue? Does he accept that? Finally, I assure the Minister that, like him, we would not accept a price policy imposed on Britain by a majority vote.

Mr. Walker: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. He has welcomed the French Foreign Minister's statement that there is no link between the Community's attitude towards the Falkland Islands and the negotiations. My colleagues in other Councils of Ministers have not met any Minister from any Community country who has mentioned, inferred or implied that there should be such a link. It would be monstrous if the Community's foreign policy were to be affected by other negotiations. In probably the toughest and most detailed part of the negotiations, no Minister, of any description, has ever suggested that there is any such linkage.
As regards overall price fixing, we continue with a number of reserves. The hon. Gentleman mentioned 10·5 and 10·7 per cent. The current average is probably 10·6 per cent. The figure varies greatly from one commodity to another. Ultimately, the overall package will be decided by what we consider to be in the interests of the British consumer and the British farm industry. We shall have to decide the final form of the package on a combination of those two.
The hon. Gentleman pledged his party's support to the principle that it would be wrong to impose on Britain, or

any other member State, an agreement that was considered to be against its national interest. I welcome that support. The Community has operated on that basis since 1966 and it would be disastrous to depart from that practice now.

Mr. Buchan: I think that the Minister has omitted to deal with one point. Will he give an assurance that he will on no account accept the figure that he has now defined as 10·6 per cent. merely to gain agreement on the total budgetary package?

Mr. Walker: No, I shall not give that assurance, because it depends on the total balance of the package and on what we obtain, to the benefit of British consumers, on such matters as the butter subsidy and the beef and sheep premium schemes. Like my predecessors, I shall have to judge the total balance.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall call those hon. Members who have indicated their wash to ask questions. We shall then move on.

Mr. David Steel: Will the Minister be extremely careful about the official Opposition's warm embrace for this tiny statement? Is he aware that there will be considerable dismay in the farming community over the fact that there is still no settlement: of agriculture prices? Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware that this Bench would not accept trying the wider budgetary problems to this settlement? Does he realise that there is a feeling among our European partners that, having renegotiated the terms of our membership once, we appear to be determined to do so annually?

Mr. Walker: I am shocked and surprised to hear that the Liberal Party should be happy to agree a price fixing—with all its costs—without any idea of Britain's contributions to those costs. That is an utterly irresponsible policy. In the 30 May mandate statement our Community partners agreed that the agriculture and budget policies should be agreed in parallel. Therefore, the United Kingdom is not demanding something to which all the other Community countries have objected. The United Kingdom is demanding that Community countries should keep to the agreement of 30 May. I was interested to hear that the Liberal Party would agree to a price fixing without any knowledge of Britain's costs.

Mr. John Spence: From what date will the new prices apply to British farming? Will they apply from the beginning of the financial year, or from the date of agreement?

Mr. Walker: All previous Presidents—and presumably the same will happen this year—have made the date of application the date of the agreement, and it is not backdated.

Mr. Nigel Spearing: Will the Minister confirm that the reserve procedure that he mentioned is not a Treaty provision but comes within the Luxembourg arrangement of yore? If so, does he agree that the recent proposals from various quarters that we should revert to pure Treaty majority voting should be resisted by the Government?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. The hon. Gentleman is correct in saying that the Treaty did not envisage that situation. It arose in 1966, when the Community came to a standstill.


Nothing happened for six months, until the agreement was thrashed out. Since 1966, and, therefore, prior to Britain's membership of the Community, that has been the basis of operation. Several other member countries strongly share my belief that it would be disastrous to move away from that situation.

Mr. Peter Mills: Given the Council's sometimes difficult stance on such matters, will my right hon. Friend make it clear in Brussels that he must be free to adjust, change or reserve his position?

Mr. Walker: Yes, Sir. Yesterday the Commission suggested that as nine countries had agreed that should be taken as what is described as an agreed point and that it should be approved or disapproved at a subsequent meeting. That would mean that one could either approve or disapprove of the package, but one could not open it to discuss the individual items. Naturally, the United Kingdom strongly resisted that. No such approach had previously been made in the history of the Community. However, I am glad to say that as a result of our resistance the Commission dropped that proposal.

Mr. Ron Leighton: This year, will the Minister adhere to the promises made in the Conservative Party's election manifesto by not agreeing to price increases for those goods in structural surplus?

Mr. Walker: I notice that the Labour Party's current position on the price fixing is that it desires a nil increase in all areas with a surplus—throughout the Community and not necessarily in the United Kingdom—and a 4 per cent. green pound revaluation. If the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) had been taken up, it would have meant a reduction in British farm incomes of one-third of last year's figures. That would have been disastrous for employment prospects in many of our industries.

Mr. Tony Marlow: As the House is full of admiration for my right hon. Friend's robust defence of British interests so far, and as it is also full of admiration for and awe at my right hon. Friend's clarity of expression, and as the Conservative Party and Government gave a commitment to the British people that they would not accept from Europe price increases for commodities in structural surplus, will my right hon. Friend explain—beyond doubt and peradventure—what that means? Does it mean no price increase, no price increase above the average European rate of inflation, or no price increase above the British rate of inflation? Over what month is that calculated?

Mr. Walker: My hon. Friend has taken an interest in these matters and will know that under this Government prices in Europe for items in surplus and not in surplus have not increased in real terms. Throughout Europe there have been substantial reductions in farm incomes because in the past four years—including the proposals for this year—the average increase has been 6·5 per cent. That is way below the inflation rate in Europe.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: Is the Minister aware that Social Democrats share the concern expressed by the leader of the Liberal Party—[Interruption]—about the undeniably adverse effect on farm incomes of indefinite delay in reaching a price

settlement, particularly for commodities that began their marketing year on 1 April? As the farming community has suffered a massive loss of relative income under the right hon. Gentleman's stewardship and that of his predecessor, will he at least give that aspect of the matter some attention? Will he also tell us the position with regard to the clawback in the sheepmeat regime?

Mr. Walker: After last week's local government election results, I welcome the growing support of the Social Democrats for the Liberal Party. I am equally surprised that the Social Democrats join in alliance on the question of price fixing, saying that Britain should agree to price fixing without knowledge of the budgetary cost. I consider such a policy completely irresponsible. If the hon. Gentleman thinks that by mentioning the impatience of farmers to have price increases he gains some political advantage, I am glad to say that the leaders of the farmers unions show much more responsibility than he does.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: My right hon. Friend will not want to reveal his bargaining hand, but will he tell the House, in this desperately important constitutional matter, what options are open to the Government? If Ministers ignore the Luxembourg compromise and go ahead with a farm price increase by a majority vote? What is the sense of having further substantial increases for some commodities, such as sugar, where there is wild over-production?

Mr. Walker: I remember the latter point being put to me the year before world sugar prices rose to levels way beyond Community prices. This is an area in which stability of supply is important, and the years show violent variations.
As for the first part of my hon. Friend's question, I believe that if that were to happen it would be very much against the interests of Europe and the Community. In my period as a Minister at the Council of Ministers I have seen France, Italy, Greece, Ireland and Denmark—almost every country in the Community—protected by the Luxembourg accord, whereby one cannot impose upon any member State something that is against its national interests. I believe that it would be dangerous for the Community to depart from that position.
I am not prepared to speculate on how the Government might react if it were to do so. I believe that after reflection and thought the Community should not and would not embark on that course.

Mr. David Myles: Following the answer that my right hon. Friend gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Think and Malton (Mr. Spence), does he realise that farmers both in this country and the Community find it intolerable that they, who have not held up negotiations in any way, should be denied retrospective payment, while trade unionists, possibly by obstructive attitudes, can obtain retrospective payments?

Mr. Walker: I believe that the difficulty both of administration and of backdating throughout the Community is understood. There have been many occasions when farm prices have been fixed after the end of the previous marketing year. It is possible for Ministers to consider the fact that prices will be available for only nine or 10 months as opposed to 12 months. Backdating of payments would be impracticable and I do not believe it could be done.

Mr. Gavin Strang: Is the Minister aware that it is monstrous that the Council should suggest that the agricultural price package should be carried by a majority vote? There are no circumstances in which the Government could accept that. Is he aware also that, even with a satisfactory budget statement, the proposed price increases are wholly unacceptable? For example, an increase of about 11 per cent., taking into account the reduction in the co-responsibility levy for milk, where there is a structural surplus which costs the Community over £2,000 million annually, is ridiculous. If the Minister accepts the price proposals, does that not mean that the Government have abandoned any hope of reforming the CAP during the lifetime of this Parliament?

Mr. Walker: The one person from whom I shall not accept that sort of statement is the hon. Gentleman. As a Minister in a Government who increased prices on average by far more than I have done, and who saw surpluses reach record levels and the cost of the agricultural budget soar to new heights, I will not take lectures from him on that topic. He knows that milk is one sector where the price mechanism tends to result in people trying to get higher yields and increasing their dairy herds and not reducing the surplus. As he knows, the price of liquid milk is not affected by the settlement.

"Treachery" (Parliamentary Use)

Mr. Tam Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In the light of the notice given to the Clerk Assistant and the Clerk of the House and the references given to you, Mr. Speaker, relating to November 1956 and the decision of Mr. Speaker Morrison in relation to the hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Sir B. Brain), I wonder whether you have any observations on the parliamentary use of the word "treachery"? It seem, to some of us that the nearest we have come to meriting the tag of treachery is to ask questions about the advice given on the Falklands in relation to the chief of the air staff. Such questions do not constitute treachery even if they be generalised. As you realise, in the light of the present atmosphere and what was said generally, the tag of treachery has been attached to those of us who have asked questions about the air staff.

Mr. Speaker: I have had a very careful look at Hansard. It has completely confirmed my view that no personal charge of any kind was made against any hon. Member in the House yesterday. Although, of course, I agree with Mr. Speaker Morrison's ruling in 1956 which led to a great deal of argument, it has no relevance to what happened in the House yesterday. I invite hon. Members to read Hansard.

British Rail (McCarthy Report)

Mr. Leslie Spriggs: May I raise a point of order with you, Mr. Speaker, with a view to obtaining your advice concerning the impossibility of BackBenchers raising matters relating to the recent McCarthy report on flexible rostering? You will appreciate that we did not reach question No. 12. May Back-Benchers expect to be able to deal with that report in relation to flexible rostering?

Mr. Speaker: With regard to questions today, Back-Benchers could have helped themselves. There were some very long questions and sometimes there were long answers. I allowed a good run of questions on financing for British Rail because there was considerable interest in the subject on both sides of the House. I can only advise the hon. Gentleman, who is well experienced and who has been here a long time, that there are various avenues open to him to raise the matter of the McCarthy report. I know that he will avail himself of one of them.

Mr. Spriggs: Had I raised the matter of the McCarthy report during Question Time I am afraid that you, Mr. Speaker, would have ruled me out of order.

Mr. Speaker: I was not suggesting that. I was suggesting the various means that are available to hon. Members without stating them—or the hon. Gentleman may think that I am making a promise to him. There are various ways in which he can raise the matter.

Questions to Ministers

Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. During transport questions you ruled that question No. 10, in the name of the hon. Member for Reading, North (Mr. Durant), concerned a constituency matter. I do not put the question to you in any critical sense, but I wondered on what basis you so ruled, as the question related to the passage of a rail line through nine parliamentary constituencies. It also dealt with the question of electrification, which affects every constituency, because electrification has a specific effect upon the investment programme of British Rail.

Mr. Speaker: Not on that question, it did not. The question dealt with the electrification of the Paddington to Reading railway and I was dealing with the hon. Member for Reading, North (Mr. Durant). Obviously his constituents were the people mainly concerned. I do not often explain my reasons, but those were my reasons on this occasion.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I cannot deal further with that point.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I call Mr. Stallard.

Fuel Standing Charges (Exemption for Pensioners)

4 pm

Mr. A. W. Stallard: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to exempt pensioners from payment of standing or other fixed charges in connection with the provision of gas, electricity and water.
A number of attempts have been made to bring to the attention of the House the need for further assistance with fuel and water bills for elderly people. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) tried to amend the water charges provisions. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) tried earlier this year to inititiate a debate on these matters. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Rooker) introduced an Opposition debate on fuel bills in January this year, and many other points were raised in a further Opposition debate on fuel charges and pensioners on 4 February last. In addition, on 25 January, the then Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, the hon. Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker), promised to look again at standing charges. The House awaits with interest the outcome of the joint review by the DHSS and the Department of Energy.
This Bill is another attempt to deal with the problem, but for a clearly defined group of people who are suffering more hardship, particularly in winter, from the heavy burden of standing and other fixed charges. It is well known that many pensioners over-economise on fuel. A report by the Electricity Consumers Council about elderly consumers towards the end of last year found that
it seems likely that they are not heating their homes to an adequate standard.
We know that more than 600 pensioners die annually from hypothermia-related complaints, but the number who die from other cold-induced illnesses may well run into thousands. The report also stated that pensioners often spend less on fuel in winter than other consumers spend on it in summer, although we know that pensioners need more fuel than most. They are less likely to have insulated homes or central heating. Lone pensioners have less money than couples, but their heating requirements may be just as great as they still need to heat one living room and one bedroom. Moreover, there are more lone pensioners who are very elderly, and they probably need even more heat than the others. They are also more vulnerable to the lack of liaison between the various fuel boards and the DHSS and the various other authorities involved in fuel schemes.
It may help if I mention a few examples. Citizens advice bureaux throughout the country and certainly in London monitor such cases very carefully. They cite the following instance:
Client, aged 69, accrued large electricity bill which he could not pay. Supply disconnected. Board would accept nothing other than full payment.
There should have been liaison before disconnection took place. There should also have been information about alternative methods of payment, but there was none. Another case is described as follows:
Client is 66 years old pensioner with an income of £40 a week, including Supplementary Benefit. Electricity bills normally paid by weekly voucher payments. Recent payments not sufficient to meet consumption and so left owing £16·25. At

the end of March she was issued with a threat of disconnection, but no attempt was made to inform her of alternative payment arrangements.
The London CAB mentioned a pensioner recently disconnected for arrears of £52, although she had successfully applied to the DHSS for fuel-direct assistance. The London Electricity board was unaware of that arrangement. Again, there was a lack of liaison. Although £5·20 per week was being paid from her pension, the supply was disconnected. As the House knows it takes a month to obtain reconnection, often resulting in the DHSS, the electricity board, the CAB and even the Member of Parliament becoming involved in the argument. Those instances show how vulnerable pensioners are. None of us has any doubt that the position will be worse next winter, in view of the price increases that we know are about to be imposed.
The position on water charges is even worse. It is not even understood in the House, let alone outside. because there is a confusing variety of systems of charging. Different rates are charged in different parts of the country and varying methods of payment are available in different areas. As yet, there- is no agreed code of practice for the water industry. There is also no rebate in the existing repayment scheme. Low-income consumers are particularly badly hit by the direct billing of water charges because of the lack of rebate under the scheme.
I am told that some water authorities offer the option of metered water, but the cost of installing the meter must be borne by the consumer and may be between £30 and £80. The consumer must also find the plumber, which may be an onerous task. Then there is still a standing charge—as yet unspecified—and the unit charge, which is also not clear. The National Consumer Council has said that pensioners and others in need may find their bills rising as a result of switching to meters, so there is not much joy to be had from pursuing that.
We know, too, of the many thousands of citizens who are in trouble with the water board and have been cut off due to misunderstandings" big bills or confusion about charges. One such example was reported in a Wessex newspaper when there was a furore about the issuing of 13,000 summonses at the end of one quarter for nonpayment of water rates. One in 23 of all ratepayers received a summons, after which they had to pay not only the water rates but £14 in costs due to the summons. This occurred because the water authority had changed the format of its final notice. Previously, the final notice had been printed in red, as elsewhere, but the authority had changed the notice so that there was no real intimation except in the small print that this was the last notice and thereafter the consumer would be liable to further action. When this was pointed out, after the hon. Member for Dorset, West (M. Spicer) had raised the matter, a spokesman for the water authority was quoted as saying:
We do recognise that it might have been better if the notices had been printed in red. We now recognise that it was probably wrong to print them in blue, but we were trying to be as gentle as possible. Next year we will print them in red.
I imagine that it was examples of that kind that the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) had in mind when at a recent Tory Party conference in Brighton he expressed his anger and concern, saying:
One of my big conceals is that those entrusted with representing the interests of the community are faceless and anonymous".


The right hon. Gentleman went on to develop that there, and I hope that he will support this Bill and other attempts to do something about the problem.
The purpose of the Bill is therefore to amend the Gas Act 1972, the Electricity Act 1947 and the Water Act 1973, so as to exempt pensioners from paying standing charges and other fixed charges. It provides that boards and authorities should give special treatment to a particular section of society—elderly people, who really need it. I do not ask the boards and authorities to find the money, as clause 4 empowers the Secretary of State to refund to the gas corporation, the area electricity boards and the water authorities the cost of exempting pensioner households from standing charges out of moneys provided by Parliament.
There are those who say that we simply cannot afford this. I and many of my hon. Friends would dispute that. We believe that we must get our priorities right, and many other countries make themselves afford it. We need look no further that our near neighbour the Republic of Ireland which makes exemptions similar to those sought in the Bill.
The Irish Government provide a free electricity allowance of 300 units for every two weeks of the six winter months and 200 units for every two weeks of the six spring and summer months, as well as exemption from standing charges and free television licences. No one could say that that is a far richer economy than ours. Therefore, we should examine that scheme and perhaps copy it.

Mr. David Winnick: It is about time that we did.

Mr. Stallard: If time permitted, I could give scores of examples of hardship that have been brought to my notice over a long period. A consumer in Bolton had a bill of £1·76 and a standing charge of £6·40. Another consumer, in a case raised by the hon. Member for Fife, East (Mr. Henderson), had a bill of £8·79 and a standing charge of £7. Every hon. Member could raise examples from his or her constituency.
I pay tribute to those voluntary organisations such as Age Concern, Help the Aged, the National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux, Child Poverty Action Group and others who are pressing for a comprehensive fuel scheme. The purpose of my Bill is to bring action now before consumers have to climb the next rung in the ladder of fuel and water charges threatened for next winter. The Bill seeks to relieve pensioners of three great fears. They are the fear of the big bill, the fear of the summons and the fear of being cut off from a necessary and vital service. I hope that the Bill will receive the unanimous support of the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. A. W. Stallard, Mr. George Foulkes, Mr. Ken Eastham, Mr. Andrew Bowden, Mr. Frank R. White, Mr. Bob Cryer, Mr. Thomas Cox, Mr. Dennis Skinner, Mrs. Ann Taylor, Mr. Andrew F. Bennett, Mr. David Winnick and Mr. Frank Dobson.

FUEL STANDING CHARGES (EXEMPTION FOR PENSIONERS)

Mr. Stallard accordingly presented a Bill to exempt pensioners from payment of standing or other fixed charges in connection with the provision of gas, electricity and water: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 14 May and to be printed. [Bill 127.]

Orders of the Day — Criminal Justice Bill

As Amended (in the Standing Committee), further considered.

New Clause 29

REDUCTION OF SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT BY PERIODS SPENT IN CUSTODY

'In section 67(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (computation of sentences of imprisonment passed in England and Wales) after the word "arose" there shall be inserted the words "or by reason of his having been so committed and having been concurrently detained otherwise than by order of a court".'—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Patrick Mayhew): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause gives effect to our undertaking to remove an anomaly in the counting of periods spent in custody on remand towards the length of prison sentences. We had this in mind before the introduction of this Bill and the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) prompted discussion of the point in Standing Committee.
The anomaly arises in this way. Section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 provides for periods spent on remand in custody by order of a court before trial or sentence to go towards reducing the length of any prison sentence imposed. However, the terms of section 67 mean that if the prisoner is subject at the same time to remand in custody and to detention under other powers, for example, those under the Immigration Act 1971, the period on remand covered by such detention does not automatically count towards a reduction of sentence. That anomaly, which arises simply from the restricted wording of section 67, has been dealt with up to now case by case by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy where appropriate. That is a cumbersome and unsatisfactory method of dealing with the problem and in accordance with the commitment that I gave in Committee, we now bring forward this clause by way of an amendment to section 67 to ensure that remand time, whatever other detention may be in force concurrently with it, always automatically reduces the sentence imposed. I commend the new clause to the House.

Mr. Robert Kilroy-Silk: I welcome this new clause, which provides that time spent in custody on remand by a defendant who has been recommended for deportation should count towards any later custodial sentence. It brings the law into line with what happens in all other cases of defendants remanded into custody.
As the Minister has pointed out, the new clause has been brought forward today following the assurance that he gave me in Committee, in response to a similar clause that I had tabled. I recognise the anomaly and I am pleased to see that the Minister has also recognised and tried to eliminate it. I warmly welcome the fulfilment of the commitment that he gave in Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time and added to the sill.

Mr. George Cunningham: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I did not raise this point at the beginning of the debate on the Bill because I realised that Mr. Speaker was leaving the Chair and that it might be confusing. I should be grateful if you would allow me to do so now. On the Order Paper you will find new clause 41, tabled by me yesterday, which relates to the appointment of special coroners. Since that clause was tabled only yesterday, it would, of course, be unheard of for it to have been selected for discussion today. However, may I draw to your attention that recent events in the past week make that subject matter especially important? If time permits, may I ask that consideration should be given to including that new clause in the list of those that might be discussed at a later stage?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatherill): As the hon. Gentleman knows, I am not responsible for selecting the new clauses that are debated on Report. However, I should warn him that, after a quick consideration of his new clause, I believe that it is out of order. I shall examine the matter and speak to the hon. Gentleman about it later.

New clause 30

RESTRICTION ON IMPOSING CUSTODIAL SENTENCES ON PERSONS UNDER 21 NOT LEGALLY REPRESENTED

`(1) A magistrates' court on summary conviction or the Crown Court on committal for sentence or on conviction on indictment shall not—
(a) make a detention centre order under section 2 below;
(b) pass a youth custody sentence under section 4 below;
(c) pass a sentence of custody for life under section 6(2) below; or
(d) make an order for detention under section 53(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, in respect of or on a person who is not legally represented in that court, unless either—
(i) he applied for legal aid and the application was refused on the ground that it did not appear his means were such that he required assistance; or
(ii) having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and had the opportunity to do so, he refused or failed to apply.

(2) For the purposes of this section a person is to be treated as legally represented in a court if, but only if, he has the assistance of counsel or a solicitor to represent him in the proceedings in that court at some time after he is found guilty and before he is sentenced, and in subsection (i) and (ii) above "legal aid for the purposes of proceedings in that court, whether the whole proceedings or the proceedings on or in relation to sentence; but in the case of a person committed to the Crown Court for sentence or trial, it is immaterial whether he applied for legal aid in the Crown Court to, or was informed of his right to apply by, that court or the court which committed him.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to take the following:
New clause 3—Legal representation of persons under 21 (custodial sentences)—
'No court shall pass any custodial sentence on a person under 21 years of age who has not been legally represented unless it appears to the court that there are good reasons why legal representation is not necessary. In these circumstances the curt should state the reasons for its opinion.'.


New clause 4—Social inquiry reports on persons under 21 (custodial sentences)—
'No court shall pass any custodial sentence on a person under 21 years of age unless the court has considered a social inquiry report, that is to say a report about him and his circumstances made by a probation officer or by a social worker of a local authority social services department, unless it appears to the court that there are good reasons why a social inquiry report should not be considered in a particular case. In these circumstances the court should state the reasons for its opinion.'.
New clause 23—(Legal representation during consideration of sentence)—
`No court shall pass a sentence on a person under 21 years of age who is not legally represented during consideration of sentence unless the court has first satisfied itself that such person has had the opportunity of being legally represented and has declined to accept such opportunity.'
New clause 24—(Legal representation during consideration of custodial sentence)—
'No court shall pass any custodial sentence on a person under 21 years of age who is not legally represented during consideration of sentence unless the court has first satisfied itself that such person has had the opportunity of being legally represented and has declined to accept such opportunity.'
Government amendments Nos. 41 and 42.

Mr. Mayhew: During the debate on this issue in Committee, I undertook to see what could be done to secure legal representation for all young offenders who receive custodial sentences. The new clause tabled in my name fulfils that undertaking.
This provision should not be seen as the young offender's only hope of legal help. It is more in the nature of a legislative backstop for those few offenders who have not, in the ordinary course of events, had any legal representation before they come to be sentenced. A court may grant criminal legal aid where it is in the interests of justice to do so and the defendant's means are such that he requires assistance in meeting his legal costs. Therefore, in practice, the vast majority of offenders who are in danger of losing their liberty are granted legal aid.
The Government were impressed with the arguments put forward in Committee and share the concern that lies behind the three new clauses tabled by Labour Members. We re-examined the existing provision in section 21 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. That provides that an offender must be legally represented on the first occasion on which he receives each sort of sentence. The Government's amendments remove from the section references to young offender sentences and make fresh provision for them in a new clause.
Under that clause, a young offender is entitled to legal representation on each occasion on which he receives a custodial sentence, regardless of his previous custodial history. It also extends to juveniles sentenced under section 53(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, who have not hitherto been covered in the legislation. The Government are not persuaded that justice or principle demand any wider statutory right to legal representation than is provided for in this clause. Many less serious young offenders, who do not fall within the clause, will continue to be granted legal aid, but there should be some discretion for the courts to decide what is necessary in the circumstances of each case.
I appreciate the way in which new clause 4 has been drafted, to make allowance for the difficulty that the Government find with amendments on the same subject

tabled in Committee. The Government are prepared to accept new clause 4 in principle. It is clear that Labour Members have given careful consideration to the need to allow the courts in some circumstances to dispense with a mandatory requirement to consider a social inquiry report. In broad terms, the difference between new clause 4 and the amendment then put forward in Committee is that new clause 4 recognises that there may be special circumstances where that will not be necessary and requires that there shall be a statement of those circumstances if that is the case.
I made it clear at an earlier stage that the Secretary of State has power under section 45 of the 1973 Act to make rules requiring a court to consider a social inquiry report. I also said that the Government would be prepared to use that power, if necessary. However, it is clear that there is a strong body of feeling in favour of including this provision in the Bill. The terms upon which the new clause is now urged on the Government make it acceptable, and we undertake to give effect to it.
I cannot advise the House to accept the new clause in its present form, although we have no objection to its substance. A provision requiring the consideration of social inquiry reports would need, somehow, to be reconciled with or incorporated in the provision that is now made in clause 1(6), and we shall seek the advice of counsel as to how that may appropriately be done. We thank the sponsors of the new clause for having taken careful account of what was said in debate at an earlier stage. I hope that in the light of my undertaking, we may proceed accordingly. I believe that that is the best way in which I can help the House.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: I am grateful to the Minister for tabling new clause 30, which meets most of the points that we raised in Committee about young offenders being sentenced to any period of custody without the benefit of legal representation. The need for legal representation is so obvious that, in view of the Minister's concessions, I need not burden the House with the reasons.
I am also grateful to the Minister for agreeing to implement the spirit, if not the entire wording, of new clause 4. It is obvious that no young offender should be given a custodial sentence unless the court has had the benefit of the fullest and most comprehensive report available on his domestic and social circumstances. That is why we suggested in Committee that social inquiry reports should be mandatory in sentencing any young offender to a period of custody.
In Committee the Minister said that there were circumstances when clearly it would be unnecessary and wasteful of resources for the court to contemplate a social inquiry report—for instance, in cases where the punishment is mandatory or where, no matter what the social inquiry report said, clearly on any rational assessment the young offender would have to undergo custodial treatment. That is why we sought in the new clause to enable the court to have some discretion and that, where it considers it appropriate to dispense with a social inquiry report, it should give the reasons.
There is nothing more that I need say, other than that I am grateful to the Minister for acceding to the wishes of the Committee.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: Like my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. Davidson), I am


grateful to the Minister for going as far as he has gone. I hope that he will not think me churlish if I follow that remark by complaining that, in my view, he has not gone far enough.
In Committee I said that, particularly when dealing with a young accused person under the age of 21, it is extremely important that, if that young person is likely to be convicted and given a custodial sentence, he should have the opportunity of legal representation, not simply after he has been convicted or pleaded guilty, but from the very beginning of the case. That would enable him to decide whether it was a proper charge to which he should plead guilty or one that he should contest. It would also enable him to prepare his defence.
I understand that procedural difficulties would be involved in such a rule. I am sure that the Minister will agree with me about the desirability of a person who is at risk of receiving a custodial penalty having legal aid all the way through, if he wishes. I understand the procedural difficulties, in that it may be said "You may not know until all the facts have been brought to the attention of the court whether a custodial sentence is likely, yet you would have to make a decision about legal aid at a much earlier stage".
I do not believe that would cause any procedural complication that would be impossible to overcome. At a certain stage of the case, when a defendant is not legally represented, the court may realise, having heard the outline of the facts or the evidence of a particular witness, that a custodial sentence may be imposed. At that stage it would be open to the court to say to the defendant "We think that you should have the opportunity of legal representation here and now." In a small number of cases it might be necessary to start again.
However, that inconvenience is as nothing compared with the injustice that can be done. I am sure that the Minister knows of many cases, particularly in relation to pleas, when people are easily influenced to plead guilty when they might have a perfectly good defence in law. The Minister, like me, will have come across cases in which people, particularly young people, have been advised by well-meaning persons to plead guilty and get it over quickly, when they should not have done so. He will also know of many cases in which the proper preparation of a defendant's case from the beginning—the search for witnesses, and so on—will secure an acquittal, while an unrepresented defendant simply would not know how to get the necessary evidence.
I take the Minister's point that a court can grant legal aid in such a case in any event. In my view, we should go further and make it equally mandatory to cover the whole proceedings before a custodial penalty can be imposed, just as the new clause provides in relation to a person who is convicted and in respect of whom the custodial penalty is at issue once that conviction has taken place. I hope that the Minister will think again about this issue before it goes to another place.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence: I welcome my hon. and learned Friend's acceptance of new clause 4 because it gives formality to what is good judicial practice. No judge will sentence a young offender without first seeking a social inquiry report. Obviously if the procedure is formalised the reports will be produced at the earliest possible moment instead of later when there are

adjournments. There is a great deal of good sense in that. It is no more than I would have expected of my hon. and learned Friend for him to have accepted that.
I also welcome his approach in the form of new clause 30. I am not sure that I understand why there is the qualification that if somebody is considered able to pay for himself he should not get legal aid. That is unrealistic in this context and I do not think that the proposal could have come from my hon. and learned Friend.
We are not talking about people who may be wealthy business men. It is highly unlikely that we are talking about people who have made a fortune out of crime and who can afford to pay for their defence. We are talking about young people. To say of young people that they have not satisfied the court that they are in need of legal aid is a little unrealistic; I put it no higher than that.
Any risks of wasting public money are surely taken into account by the principle that a person who is granted criminal legal aid must make a contribution according to his means. I always say this sort of thing with a certain hesitancy, but if my hon. and learned Friend accepted the proposals in new clause 23 or new clause 3, that would be much simpler and more sensible because the practice of any court with any sense would be to say, "This is a young person. We are considering sending him into some form of custody and he must be properly represented. We will not quibble about whether he should be given legal aid because, if he has the resources, we will be able to claim a substantial part of it back."
Why should we clutter the legislation with qualifications that clearly do not apply to persons under 21'? My hon. and learned Friend should reconsider that first qualification which does not seem to make a lot of practical common sense. Then perhaps we can move on more quickly to some of the more substantial matters that have to be discussed under the Bill.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Like my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) and—if I read him correctly—the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), I welcome the Government's new clause 30. Like them, I would also have preferred the Government to go further, at least, for example, to the extent of accepting new clause 3, tabled by my right hon. and hon. Friends.
When we were debating the issue on another occasion the Minister accepted that a custodial sentence is extremely important in the life of a young person It disrupts whatever employment, training opportunities or educational courses young people may be involved in. It can also have a profound impact upon family relationships and their whole social context. In those circumstances any additional safeguards that we can bring in to ensure that a custodial sentence is imposed only as a last resort are to be welcomed.
Young people who are legally represented are less likely to be given a custodial sentence, or, if given a custodial sentence, are likely to have a shorter one than those who are not represented. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich pointed out, we are talking about the young person being represented throughout the proceedings and, most importantly, in the preparation of the case.
As the hon. and learned Member for Burton implied, many of the young people we are talking about in this context are not particularly articulate. The Government's


figures show that about 30 per cent. of those committed to borstal training have a reading age of 10 years or less. Even if they are articulate, they are not skilled or adept at presenting their case in the difficult circumstances of a court hearing.
In those circumstances legal representation is important for ensuring that proper inquiries have been made about the facts of the case, that there is a clear presentation of the defendant's case, that he has considered the kind of judgment plea that he should make, that his view—if he has one—should be heard, that mitigating circumstances should be brought to the attention of the court, and, in many ways more important, that reports, if they exist, of probation officers or social workers are properly scrutinised and, if appropriate, challenged for accuracy. Of course, if he is convicted, he needs proper advice on applying for bail.
It is mandatory already under section 21 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 for an offender of any age to be offered legal representation when a first custodial sentence is involved. That recognises that a first custodial sentence is a landmark for any individual. The same considerations apply equally to a further custodial sentence, particularly for a young person. The Government should recognise this and should feel able, particularly in the light of the cross-party support, to accept the new clause tabled by my right hon. and hon. Friends.
I should also like briefly to welcome the Government's acceptance, at least in principle, of the sentiments expressed in new clause 4. Again the point was made forcefully in Committee. The Minister did not accept it then, but he has accepted since that social inquiry reports are important in giving the court a full account of the background, family, employment, education, home and housing circumstances of an offender. Indeed, the Home Office in "Research Study Number 48 Social Inquiry Reports: A Survey", published in 1979, described the benefit that the courts derive in passing sentences from having a full knowledge of the background circumstances of an offender. I am pleased that the Minister has acknowledged this and will in another place ensure that it is properly put back into the Bill.

Mr. Alfred Dubs: I too welcome the new clause which the Minister has tabled. He will not be surprised if I join the other right hon. and hon. Members who feel that it is too narrow and that it does not give the necessary safeguards to the broad numbers of young people who are liable to come before the courts with the likelihood of receiving a custodial sentence.
In introducing the new clause the Minister referred to the few offenders who do not have legal representation. I wonder what the source of his information is. The various bits of information about legal representation provide few statistics about exactly how many people have legal representation. We have information about those who are granted legal aid, but, except in the case of the juvenile courts, that cannot be related to young people. There is a paucity of information, but one can draw some conclusions from the figures available.
I doubt whether any hon. Member would advise any young person who is before the courts on an offence, other than possibly a minor motoring offence, that he should not

have legal representation. What we are saying is that because legal aid is difficult to come by, large numbers of young people without resources come before the courts without legal representation. I am bound to say that there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor. The vast majority of the poor are much more vulnerable in these circumstances.
Young people do not always come before the courts because their offence is liable to lead to a custodial sentence, but the very fact that they may not have legal representation and are found guilty makes it that much more likely that they will subsequently, when coming before the courts, be given a custodial sentence. So it is the start of a path for young people. Without the safeguards that we would advise them to have if they can afford them, they are much more likely to end up in custody eventually even if the first time they come before the courts they are unlikely on the balance of probability to receive a custodial sentence.
We all know that when the police pick up young people they use methods of coercion—I do not hesitate to use that word—to get them to plead guilty. If the young people agree to plead guilty there is less need to provide the sort of evidence that would result in acquittal if the young people themselves had the benefit of legal advice.
In this area of law justice is not always seen to be done. We must bear in mind the fact that for young people this is often their first serious confrontation with the forces of law and order. They may become cynical and believe that the court's decisions are stacked against them and that they are not being given real justice in the sense that we would like it to be given to all people.
A few figures are available. Statistics have been published on legal aid refusal rates. Some figures produced not long ago in the LAG Bulletin suggest that there are large discrepancies between the refusal rates given by one magistrates' court and another in the London area. In inner London in 1980 the rates varied from 4 per cent. at Hampstead to 26 per cent. at Highbury Corner. For outer London magistrates' courts there was a variation from 6 per cent. at Watford to 36 per cent. at Uxbridge.
Those wide variations cannot reflect an objective assessment of the entitlement to legal aid for the people who are applying. There must be an element of lottery or gamble over the court in which the person appears. In one court he may have a better chance of getting legal aid than in another. One cannot relate the refusal rates to the age of the offender. We must speculate about that.
Other figures in the criminal statistics suggest that whereas in Crown court proceedings the majority of people applying for legal aid receive it, that is not so for magistrates' courts proceedings. On the 1980 figures, 62 per cent. of all defendants received legal aid; 70 per cent. of those who applied for legal aid received it. We do not know much about those who did not bother to apply for legal aid. Those figures are for indictable offences in the magistrates' courts. For non-indictable or summary offences we find that of all the people who appeared in 1980, only 2 per cent. were granted legal aid, 3 per cent. having applied for it.
Entitlement to legal representation does not carry through for the majority of people who appear before magistrates' courts. I fear that we are not doing justice to many of the young offenders who are a subject of the Bill.


I urge the Minister to think again about some of the other amendments, which would provide further safeguards for the many young people who come before our courts.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful for the words of appreciation that have been expressed, from whatever quarter. We are familiar with the adage:
Unto every one that hath shall be given".
When it comes to Governments at Report stage, there is a variant which says "From those who give ever more shall be demanded". I would not have thought that the speeches that have been made came from those who supported the Government in the past and who did none of the things that are now being demanded, let alone what the clause does.
The right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) said that there should be legal aid for every case that carries a possible sentence of imprisonment or custody in some other form. That was repeated in other speeches, including the speech of the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk). A small proportion of young offenders face custodial sentence without legal representation. The expense would be prohibitive to make legal aid available throughout. The resources are not there.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: rose——

Mr. Mayhew: I shall not give way at the moment.
The resources are not available to meet an open-ended requirement. I agree that the smaller the proportion, the less the expense. The House will recall that the responsibility for funding legal aid lies with my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor. I cannot enter into an obligation for the use of resources in that way.
The question is not academic, but is whether the public purse ought to pay highly qualified lawyers to carry out functions for which their qualifications would not be needed. Every court has legal advice available to it from its clerk and power to grant legal aid where it is in the interests of justice to do so.
The court has a duty to see that the interests of justice are served. If it is dealing with a juvenile, it has a statutory duty to have regard to his welfare under section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. The court should also ensure that the juvenile's parents are in the court. If one looks at the matter realistically, one sees that all those factors direct the court to consider whether the defendant's interests are properly represented. If not, the court should make sure that the defendant has legal representation.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: Everything that the Minister has just said tends to reduce the expenditure of resources that would be required if legal aid were to be made mandatory. He is saying that in many cases the court is likely to ensure that the defendant has legal representation now; certainly in any case where it feels that there is a possibility of a custodial sentence being imposed eventually, assuming that the young person is convicted.
But the Minister will be as familiar as I am with the sort of case in which legal representation is granted after either a plea of guilty or conviction. When it comes to that point the legal representative says: "This is the sort of case in which the defendant should never have pleaded guilty or in which, on what he or she tells me by way of mitigation, had the case been properly proposed and presented, he would probably never have been convicted." It is no consolation to be told when the damage has been done that

one can have legal representation. Surely the Minister will agree that the additional cost would be confined to a few cases during which it has become apparent that the case was graver than was thought in the first instance. The court should then decide that because of the possibility or even likelihood of a custodial sentence, it is right to grant legal aid.

Mr. Mayhew: I regret that I cannot go further thin I have in the new clause. It is a substantial concession, as has been acknowledged.
I had acknowledged the point that was raised by the hon. Member for Ormskirk before the right hon. and learned Gentleman intervened. The sum that we are talking about may not be large. We do not know. However, I cannot commit resources in an open-ended way. The right hon. and learned Gentleman must accept that. He knows that he and his colleagues were not able to do so when they were in Government.
On the example that the right hon. and learned Gentleman gave, if someone has pleaded guilty, representation is granted, and it becomes clear that there is an equivocal plea or that instructions to his representative by way of mitigation are inconsistent with a plea of guilty, it is the duty of the court to direct that the plea of not guilty is entered. Therefore, nothing is lost there. Usually, when the court finds that a case in the course of a hearing or a contested case seems to be acquiring greater gravity, under the ordinary legal aid procedures it is open to it to grant legal aid.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) asked why we had to clutter up legislation with the question of means. The legal aid formula in the new clause is the same as that used in the existing provision, section 21 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, which relates to legal aid before custodial sentence.
Virtually all young people will qualify for legal aid on means grounds, but these days there is no reason why the age of 21 should be regarded as the threshold in life at which one should have enough money to finance one's own representation. There is no reason why those few who can afford to pay for their representation should not do so. The general test in the Legal Aid Act is that the court should grant legal aid only when the defendant's means are such that he requires assistance. We would not want to depart in this instance from that general principle.
The hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs) was asking for legal aid right across the board, whether for imprisonable offences or not, on the grounds that in some cases failure to provide it can be the first step on a path that leads to more serious criminal convictions. The Government accept that some non-custodial sentences can be serious. That is why clause 21 provides for a juvenile to be legally represented before a residential care order is made. But we cannot accept that legal representation should always be guaranteed before a young offender is given a non-custodial sentence. I think that one or two illustrations will explain the force of that. There is no reason why a court should not, for example, give an absolute discharge to a 15-year-old who does not have a lawyer standing by him or impose a fine on a 20-year-old motoring offender. We would also probably have to put an end to the convenient arrangement which allows young adults such as those over 21 to plead guilty by post in some


circumstances. We hold to the view that it is much better in some cases to leave the question of legal representation to the discretion of the court.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: As I was so generous in my appreciation of the Minister of State's concessions, will the Minister at least come to the House at some stage with an assessment provided by the Lord Chancellor of what the cost would be if legal aid were granted to all young people whether they had pleaded guilty or not, in accordance with the wishes of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin)?

Mr. Mayhew: I cannot do that because too many uncertain factors go into that calculation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31

VAGRANCY OFFENCES

'(1) Where a person is convicted—
(a) under section 3 or 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, of wandering abroad, or placing himself in any public place, street, highway, court, or passage, to beg or gather alms; or
(b) under section 4 of that Act,—
(i) of wandering abroad and lodging in any barn or outhouse, or in any deserted or unoccupied building, or in the open air, or under a tent, or in any cart or waggon, and not giving a good account of himself; or
(ii) of wandering abroad, and endeavouring by the exposure of wounds and deformities to obtain or gather alms, the court shall not have power to sentence him to imprisonment but shall have the same power to fine him as if this section had not been enacted.

(2) If a person deemed a rogue and vagabond by virtue of section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 is thereafter guilty of an offence mentioned in subsection (1) above, he shall be convicted of that offence under section 4 of that Act and accordingly—
(a) shall not be deemed an incorrigible rogue: and
(b) shall not be committed to the Crown Court, by reason only of that conviction.

(3) This section applies to offences committed before as well as after it comes into effect.'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 39.

Mr. Mayhew: The tabling of new clause 31 fulfils an undertaking which I gave in Committee in response to an amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk). It was the general view on both sides of the Committee that, with one minor exception, the principle of the hon. Gentleman's amendment should be accepted. Accordingly, I undertook to bring forward a suitably drafted new clause on Report.
The effect of the new clause is to make nonimprisonable—a word for which I apologise—the offence in section 3 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 of wandering abroad to beg and the offences in section 4 of that Act of sleeping rough and beging by exposing wounds. I should perhaps add that if the drafting of the new clause appears somewhat tortuous, as it must, it is because of the peculiar structure

of the 1824 Act, under which persons may be convicted of the same offence, but under different sections, according to whether it is a first or subsequent offence.
The only point at which the new clause differs in substance from the amendment discussed in Committee is that it does not apply to a separate offence in section 4 of the 1824 Act of fraudulently collecting alms. I think that the Committee was disposed to accept that this offence, involving as it does fraudulent pretence, is not on a par with the other offences.
Amendment No. 39 is simply a technical provision to ensure that the 1824 Act will be read in conjuction with the new clause, assuming that the latter is enacted.
I now turn to the policy considerations underlying the new clause. It is clearly right that Parliament should weigh very carefully, especially in the light of the overcrowding in our prisons, the need to retain a power to imprison in respect of minor offences of this kind. This is particularly appropriate where, as in this instance, the offences were enacted in very different times to deal with problems of a wholly different order.
Although relatively few persons are sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment for these offences—in 1980 a total of 119 for the main begging and sleeping rough offences—any reduction in the prison population which can be effected without any appreciable risks to the public would be very welcome. Some right hon. and hon. Members—perhaps a good many—will take the view that it is wrong in principle that persons should continue to be liable to imprisonment for minor offences which are rooted in wider social problems. Others may place greater emphasis on the fact that there is little reason to think that a power to imprison serves as a deterrent in the case of persons liable to commit these offences or that prison is likely to help them to mend their ways.
The Select Committee on Home Affairs, in its third report last Session, recommended that these offences should cease to be imprisonable. Paragraph 26 of the report reads:
While we have concluded that these provisions should, at least for the time being, remain on the statute book, we are convinced that imprisonment is neither a necessary nor an appropriate penalty for minor offences of this type. Though we accept that the criminal law must continue to play a limited role in controlling the activities of beggars and vagrants, we consider that it is quite wrong that they should be faced even with the theoretical possibility of imprisonment on these grounds alone, and we therefore recommend that both sleeping rough and begging should cease to be imprisonable offences.
The Government considered this recommendation very carefully. We did not consider that the case for removing the power to imprison was quite as decisive as the Select Committee had suggested. In particular, we were conscious that the practical effect of such a change would be limited since a good proportion of those currently sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment would end up in prison as fine defaulters instead. We also took into account the views expressed to us by the Magistrates Association and the chief metropolitan magistrate about the need for an effective sanction. The conclusion which we reached—it was fairly finely balanced—was that we did not feel justified at that time in bringing forward legislation to give effect to the Select Committee's recommendation.
I should be misleading the House if I were to say that these reservations have all been dispelled. It remains the case that the removal of a power to imprison will be of very


limited effect. I am sure, too, that the reservations about the need for an effective, "last resort" sanction are still felt in some quarters.
We must also pay attention to a manifestation which has been noted in some reports of an increase in what may be described as aggressive begging. That is an important matter but it must be borne in mind that it would be open to the police, in the light of the circumstances of the case, to consider preferring a more grave charge than mere begging. It may be appropriate in a serious case where threats are made to prefer a charge under section 21 of the Theft Act 1968 for blackmail which consists in the making of an "unwarranted demand with menaces." In a less serious case it may be appropriate to prefer a charge under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936 which provides for penalising any person using
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour
in any public place
with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned.
Both those offences carry a sentence of imprisonment which would make it possible for the court to consider a community service order or a detention order in an appropriate case.
It is a question of weighing in the balance the reservations about the practical difficulties which the removal of a power to imprison might cause in a small number of cases against the general argument, to which I referred earlier, in support of the change. Those are powerful arguments. No one in the Standing Committee said that this change should not be made. In the light of that, the Government see no decisive case for pressing a different view.
I commend the new clause to the House.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: As the Minister said, the new clause makes non-imprisonable the offences of begging and sleeping rough. It has been tabled in response to the assurances that he gave to me in Committee on amendments tabled by the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group. Therefore, I welcome the Minister's fulfilment of his commitment. I am glad that he has at last recognised that these offences, these minor nuisances, are not serious enough to warrant the severe, indeed draconian, penalty of imprisonment.
The change will affect a relatively small number of people and will not significantly reduce the prison population. Only about 100 vagrants a year are subject to a sentence of immediate imprisonment. But, given that the prison population last Friday was 44,169—almost a record figure—any reduction in the prison population is to be welcomed and should be particularly welcomed when the individuals we are discussing should never have been punished for what is largely their social inadequacy and homelessness. They certainly should not have been punished with the severity of a prison sentence.
It was made clear in Committee, as the Minister has pointed out, that there was considerable support on both sides for these proposals. There was also considerable support for the suggestion that these offences should be removed from the statute book and that we should recognise that we must deal more compassionately and humanely with the few people who must resort to sleeping rough or begging. However, I welcome the Government's commitment and the new clause, and I again thank the Minister for honouring the commitments that he gave in Committee.

5 pm

Mr. Matthew Parris: It was said often enough in Committee, and it deserves repeating, that the overcrowding of our prisons is not a reason for making non-imprisonable offences that were previously imprison-able. The overcrowding of our prisons is a reason for building new prisons, and that the Government are doing.
This change must be justified on its own merits. Is there any point or purpose in sending these people to prison? The Committee was convinced that there is no point in doing so. I am therefore glad that my hon. and learned Friend has moved the new clause, and I wish it a speedy passage.

Dr. Shirley Summerskill: It is welcome that the Government have decided to treat this as a non-custodial offence. There is much evidence to show that it is not justified to imprison vagrants or beggars, either on rehabilitative grounds or on deterrent grounds. In fact, the National Association of Probation Officers has stated that in its experience not only does prison have no deterrent effect upon these people, but they often emerge facing equal and sometimes greater problems than when they went in.
The Minister was cautious about creating non-custodial offences. We welcome the fact that he supported, albeit reluctantly, in Committee—when he took a neutral stance—the view that soliciting should now be a non-imprisonable offence. Vagrancy is now to be a non-imprisonable offence, and both those measures are welcome.
I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will not now close his mind to making other offences non-custodial, particularly as the Bill is about to go to another place. He mentioned the fact that not many people will be involved as a result of this measure—only 119 in 1980—but, as I pointed out in Committee, if very few people are involved it could be argued that the measure will not have much effect on the huge prison population. That is true. Equally, if a larger number of people are involved, it could be argued—the Minister probably would—that clearly the courts are using the provision of imprisonment. Therefore, whether the number involved is small or large, it could be argued that an offence should remain custodial.
The main criterion that should be used is that used by the Home Secretary, who has said that people should not be put in prison for any criminal offence unless they can be seen to be a danger to the public. I hope that, in considering other offences and whether they should be custodial or non-custodial, the Minister will use the Home Secretary's yardstick and try to widen even further the categories of non-custodial offence.

Mr. Lawrence: By this measure, the Conservative Party can once again be seen as having a human face. Also, it can be seen to have a more human face than the Labour Party, because the Labour Party did not introduce this measure when it was in office. A blot has now been removed. It may not be a large blot, but it was certainly a blot on our penal system. It was always wrong—never more so than in recent times—to imprison people who had done no wrong. It was always a disgrace that some of the cases that came before this House should ever have arrived here because people who could not look after themselves were sent to prison.
We must now decide how to remedy the problem of those who have hitherto been sentenced to imprisonment for repeatedly and persistently sleeping rough and behaving as vagrants. I hope that the new clause will oblige the present and future Governments to take more account of the need to make proper provision for the misfits in our society who cannot look after themselves. It was never right to throw them upon the police service and to require the police to act as the warders for the inadequates in our society. Most of all, it was wrong to impose that burden on the police. More social provision will have to be made for the inadequates in our society, and I hope that in a small way the new clause will encourage the Government to look at the problem and to try to solve it in a more humane way than it has ever been dealt with in the past.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful for what has been said. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) is quite right. The Labour Government did not remove this offence, notwithstanding the publication of the report of the working party, known as the Brennan report, in 1976. However, I must not make too much of that or be too fierce with the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill), or she may be reduced to begging by exposing her wounds, an offence that we have left on the statute book.
I agree that this is not an absolutely open and shut case, because it remains right to give careful consideration to those who have expressed reservations.
My hon. and learned Friend asked what we would do about people who endlessly made nuisances of themselves. They are liable to control under the machinery of an injunction. If it becomes necessary, an injunction can be obtained to restrain them, and that, in the last resort, is enforceable by imprisonment. However, I am grateful for the reception that the new clause has received.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 33

POWER TO ALTER THE MINIMUM PERIOD FOR ELIGIBILITY FOR RELEASE ON LICENCE

`In the Criminal Justice Act 1967—
(a) in section 60 (release of persons serving determinate sentences)—
(i) in subsection (1), for the words "twelve months thereof' there shall be substituted the words "the specified period"; and
(ii) the following subsections shall be inserted after that subsection—
"(1A) In subsection (1) of this section "the specified period" means twelve months or such period, not more than twelve months, as the Secretary of State may by order provide.
(1B) An order under subsection (1A) of this section may make such incidental or supplementary provision amending enactments) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate."; and
(b) the following subsection shall be inserted after section 100(2)—
"(2A) An order shall not be made under section 60(1A) of this Act unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.".'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
In moving the new clause, I am giving effect to an undertaking that I gave in Committee as a result of which the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) was persuaded to withdraw a new clause of his own. That clause was aimed at reducing the minimum qualifying period for parole from one year, as at present, to six months.
The Government could not accept that proposal as it stood, but we are in sympathy with its objectives. The Government are not opposed to the idea of extending the benefits of parole to shorter-sentence prisoners by reducing the minimum period they have to serve before qualifying, but we must recognise that there are considerable practical difficulties in the way of doing so. Parole is a selection process—it is important to emphasise that—based on a careful assessment of the balance of benefit and risk—benefit to the prisoner and risk to the community. Therefore, selection takes time.
Successive Administrations, in considering this problem, have found themselves inhibited by the exigencies of the reporting and selection process from recommending to Parliament a reduction in the period that must be available for a proper assessment to be made of a prisoner's suitability for parole. We recognised in the "Review of Parole" published last year that the fact that parole was not available for prisoners serving shorter sentences created anomalies. There is an impressive body of opinion in favour of some reduction in the minimum qualifying period for parole.
We accept that it would be wrong to regard the 12-month minimum fixed in the 1967 Act as absolute. Any minimum is bound to be arbitrary. The lower it can be made the wider the benefits of parole can be made available. Therefore, we think it right that the legislation regulating the parole scheme should incorporate flexibility. The new clause will achieve that. It will enable the qualifying period to be reduced below—but not raised above—the present 12 month minimum. It would enable the benefits of parole to be extended to prisoners serving sentences of less than 18 months, because the 12-month minimum is the 12 months spent in custody.
I have to emphasise that we are proposing this power in advance of carrying out the study that will be necessary before any reduction in the minimum qualifying period can be introduced. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has decided to undertake a further detailed investigation to see whether this is feasible. It is important that the success of the parole scheme should not be put at risk by significantly reducing the characteristic of selectivity that is so central to the system. We shall have to consider carefully, therefore, the implications of reducing the minimum qualifying period for the principle of selectivity. The process of parole review naturally requires resources. In considering the minimum qualifying period we shall accordingly also have to consider carefully the resource implications.
I obviously cannot predict what conclusion our investigation will reach, but another opportunity to amend the 1967 Act to enable the minimum qualifying period to be reduced may not present itself for some time. As we believe that flexibility is desirable, we have accordingly decided to seek a power to reduce the minimum qualifying period for parole by statutory instrument, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament. As I said in


Committee we cannot enter into any commitment to exercise the proposed power. The power will make it possible, in advance of any opportunity that main legislation is likely to afford to reduce the minimum qualifying period if our investigation points to the conclusion that this is practicable. The proposed power will enable this to be done, with the approval of Parliament, without having to wait for another opportunity for primary legislation.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The new clause will enable the Government to reduce, by order, the minimum period that has to be served before an offender can qualify or be considered for parole. As the Minister pointed out, it is a fulfilment of an assurance that he gave me in Committee, when he was responding to clauses tabled on behalf of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group. The clauses that were then tabled by the group would have reduced the minimum period of parole eligibility from the present 12 months to six months and would, on our estimates, have reduced the prison population by about 2,000, not a negligible amount, given the chronic and persistent overcrowding in the prison system. It would be a significant reduction without threat to the safety and security of the public.
The Minister has fulfilled part of his assurance by tabling this clause. He also undertook to carry out a review to see whether some practicable way could be found of reducing the minimum threshold of eligibility for parole. I acknowledge that he gave no commitment in Committee to exercise the power to be conferred by the new clause, and he has reiterated that point today. The Minister has emphasised that although the power has now been taken by the Government he will not give any commitment as to when or how it will be implemented.
I hope that the review, which the hon. and learned Gentleman again referred to, will be carried out speedily. I am confident, particularly in view of the support for the proposal from the Parole Board and from the outgoing chairman, Lord Harris, that the result will be that a reduction in the threshold is found to be a reasonably practicable and sensible proposition.
For the moment, although I want the Minister to exercise the power, I wish the review to be conducted speedily and effectively and for it to come to the conclusion that we all hope and believe that it will. I welcome the new clause. It is a step in the right direction.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk), I welcome the new clause. In Committee the Minister said that the Government would take powers to enable parole to be available for short-term prisoners. He has been as good as his word in that respect. However, he will not be surprised when I say that I hope that it will not be long before he can activate the powers that he has given the Government and the Home Secretary.
The case for making parole available for those serving sentences of only 18 months is strong and overwhelming. I hope that the House will forgive me if I quote the over-quoted remarks of Lord Justice Waller at the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders annual general meeting in 1980:
The injustice is best illustrated by this example. Two men are convicted of a serious crime. They are of previous good character. One is the ringleader who gets three years, the other

taking a relatively minor part gets 18 months. The ringleader gets parole and they are both released on the same day. It must appear unjust to the minor party. There is no parole available for him though, of course, if there were he would be extremely eligible.
The case for making parole available to those serving prison sentences shorter than 18 months is overwhelming on the ground of natural justice and the grounds put forward by my hon. Friend—that it would result in a considerable reduction in the prison population and therefore a considerable lessening of the overcrowding of the prison system. I am grateful to the Minister for going as far as he has. I hope that he will not reply by saying "Well, you didn't even go that far."

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 34

PERSONS RECOMMENDED BY COURTS FOR DEPORTATION

Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 shall be amended in accordance with Schedule [Amendment of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971] to this Act.".—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this new clause it will be convenient to take amendment 77:

AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULE 3 TO IMMIGRATION ACT 1971

`the following shall be added after paragraph 3—

Powers of courts pending deportation

4. Where the release of a person recommended for deportation is directed by a court, he shall be subject to such restrictions as to residence and as to reporting to the police as the court may direct.

5.—(1) On an application made—
(a) by or on behalf of a person recommended for deportation whose release was so directed; or
(b) by a constable; or
(c) by an immigration officer, the appropriate court shall have the powers specified in subparagraph (2) below.

(2) The powers mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) above are—
(a) if the person to whom the application relates is not subject to any such restrictions imposed by a court as are mentioned in paragraph 4 above, to order that he shall be subject to any such restriction as the court may direct; and
(b) if he is subject to such restrictions imposed by a court by virtue of that paragraph of this paragraph—
(i) to direct that any of them shall be varied or shall cease to have effect; or
(ii) to give further directions as to his residence and reporting.

6.—(1) In this Schedule "the appropriate court" means, except in a case to which sub-paragraph (2) below applies, the court which directed release.

(2) This sub-paragraph applies where the court which directed release was—
(a) the Crown Court;
(b) the Court of Appeal;
(c) the High Court of Justiciary; or
(d) the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland.

(3) Where the Crown Court or the Crown Court in Northern Ireland directed release, the appropriate court is—
(a) the court that directed release; or
(b) a magistrates' court acting for the commission area or county court division where the person to whom the application relates resides.

(4) Where the Court of Appeal or the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland gave the direction, the appropriate court is the Crown Court or the Crown Court in Northern Ireland, as the case may be.

(5) Where the High Court of Justiciary directed release, the appropriate court is—


(a) that court; or
(b) in a case where release was directed by that court on appeal, the court from which the appeal was made.

7.—(1) A constable or immigration officer may arrest without warrant any person who is subject to restrictions imposed by a court under this Schedule and who at the time of the arrest is in the relevant part of the United Kingdom—
(a) if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that that person is contravening or has contravened any of those restrictions; or
(b) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to contravene any of them.

(2) In sub-paragraph (1) above "the relevant part of the United Kingdom" means—
(a) England and Wales, in a case where a court with jurisdiction in England or Wales imposed the restrictions;
(b) Scotland, in a case where a court with jurisdiction in Scotland imposed them; and
(c) Northern Ireland, in a case where a court in Northern Ireland imposed them.

8.—(1) A person arrested in England or Wales or Northern Ireland in pursuance of paragraph 7 above shall be brought as soon as practicable and in any event within 24 hours after his arrest before a justice of the peace for the petty sessions area or district in which he was arrested.

(2) In reckoning for the purposes of this paragraph any period of 24 hours, no account shall be taken of Christmas Day, Good Friday or any Sunday.

9.—(1) A person arrested in Scotland in pursuance of paragraph 7 above shall wherever practicable be brought before the appropriate court not later than in the course of the first day after his arrest, such day not being a Saturday, a Sunday or a court holiday prescribed for that court under section 10 of the Bail etc. (Scotland) Act 1980.

(2) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a person arrested in Scotland being brought before a court on a Saturday, a Sunday or such a court holiday as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) above where the court is, in pursuance of section 10 of the said Act of 1980, sitting on such day for the disposal of criminal business.

10. Any justice of the peace or court before whom a person is brought by virtue of paragraph 8 or 9 above—
(a) if of the opinion that that person is contravening has contravened or is likely to contravene any restriction imposed on him by a court under this Schedule, may direct—
(i) that he be detained; or
(ii) that he be released subject to such restrictions as to his residence and reporting to the police as the court may direct; and
(b) if not of that opinion, shall release him without altering the restrictions as to his residence and his reporting to the police.".'.

Mr. Mayhew: This new clause and its associated schedule deal with a matter which was the subject of an amendment moved by the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) in the Standing Committee. The Government accepted his amendment in principle and undertook to bring forward their own amendment on Report.
The new clause and schedule would enable a court, when it convicts someone and recommends him for deportation, to direct that he be released on restrictions while that recommendation is being considered. At present courts have a choice between granting unconditional release or directing that the person be detained. These amendments would give them a further option of releasing the person, subject to restrictions. It would thus, we hope, enable them to direct the release of some people whom they would otherwise consider had to be detained. The restrictions that courts would be able to impose under the amendments are restrictions as to residence and as to reporting to the police.
During 1981, 134 people were detained pending the making of a deportation order who were given a noncustodial sentence for their offence. This is the group of people the amendment is mainly aimed at. It will make a small but nevertheless important contribution towards reducing the number of people in custody, and will do so in a way that will not impose any risk on the public, which must always be the overriding consideration.
I need not set out the machinery by way of which this change is made, but in the provisions, power is given to a constable or to an immigration officer to arrest without warrant a person who is in breach of the restrictions or is thought likely to be, and to bring him before a justice. This will mean that minor breaches can be dealt with quickly by the police without their having to bring proceedings under the Immigration Act for an offence of being in breach of restrictions. The procedure set out in these paragraphs is similar to procedures elsewhere in the Immigration Act.
I should perhaps explain a technical point. Because the Immigration Act extends throughout the United Kingdom, so does the new clause. Various adaptations are required for the different court procedures in Scotland and Northern Ireland. These are covered by paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of the schedule.
I should mention two connected matters on which we have it in mind to introduce amendments in another place. One relates to the powers of the Court of Appeal to direct release when it upholds a recommendation for deportation. There is some doubt whether the court has this power and we think it desirable to clarify that. The other point concerns the Home Secretary's power, which is similar to that of the courts, to release a person convicted of an offence who is recommended for deportation. It would be consistent with the objective of reducing the numbers in custody to give the Home Secretary the same power as we are now seeking to give the courts to grant release subject to restrictions.

Mr. John Tilley: The Opposition welcome the new clause. We also welcome the two commitments that the Minister gave at the end of his remarks. As the hon. and learned Gentleman remarked in Committee, we also hope that the result of the new clause will not be that those who are already being released will now be released with conditions but that in future people who would otherwise be held in custody will be released under conditions. We welcome this minor but important contribution to reducing the prison population. I speak as the hon. Member representing the constituency that includes Brixton prison. I am aware of the problem and therefore of the contribution that the new clause will make towards alleviating it.
The Opposition also welcome the fact that the Government seem to be mitigating ways in which the immigration law appears to be harsher and more arbitrary in its operation than the rest of the law. We would especially welcome this move if we thought that it was the first of many ways in which the Government intended to reform the immigration law. I fear that it is the last.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The new clause empowers the courts to impose conditions upon those offenders recommenced for deportation in terms of their residence and reporting to the police. It follows assurances given to me in response


to proposals put forward on behalf of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group. The group would have liked the Minister to go further. Although we welcome the commitment that the hon. and learned Gentleman gave in Committee and his fulfilment of it today, we would have preferred the operation of the Bail Act to be applied fully to Immigration Act detainees. In fact, the presumption of bail and even the power to demand sureties apply in these cases.
However, the Minister has made a small but significant step in the right direction. It is important in bringing about a sense of justice for the limited number of people detained under the Immigration Act. It is important and not to be derided for its small but important effect on reducing the prison population. At least there should now be fewer people detained in prison under the Immigration Act. That is an important and welcome step.

Mr. William Pitt: I welcome the new clause with one reservation. It will give comfort to many people arrested for minor offences who are discovered to be over-stayers. It will improve their opportunity to assemble a case for appeal. In truth, however, the whole Immigration Act should be repealed. Like the hon. Member for Lambeth, Central (Mr. Tilley), I hope that this is a small chink in the armour and that we are on the way towards seeing its repeal. My reservation relates to paragraph 7 of the proposed schedule and the powers of a constable. The Immigration Act 1971 is already very unpopular, and justly so, among the minority communities.
I hope that police officers carrying out their functions under paragraph 7 will act with great caution. "Reasonable grounds" can always be contested. I am not saying that a police officer or immigration officer would use this power deliberately to attack a minority community but I would hate further immigration regulations to be brought into disrepute by a paragraph under a schedule that already imposes a greater penalty on minority communities.
That is my one reservation. Otherwise, the Government have taken a positive and constructive step towards providing a little relief from the Immigration Act 1971.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 35

BYELAWS RELATING TO THE BURNING OF STRAW OR STUBBLE

'In section 31 of the Criminal Law Act 1977—
(a) in subsection (4) (which among other things provides for maximum fines of £200 on summary conviction of offences under certain byelaws and, in paragraph (c), specifies among the byelaws to which it relates byelaws relating to the burning of straw or stubble made by a local authority under section 235 of the Local Government Act 1972)—
(i) after the word "exceeding", in the first place where it occurs there shall be inserted the words ", except in the case of byelaws to which subsection (4A) of this section applies,"; and
(ii) for the words "such byelaw", in the first place where they occur, there shall be substituted the words "byelaws such as is mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above which is"; and
(b) the following subsections shall be inserted after that subsection—

"(4A) Byelaws to which this subsection applies may provide that persons contravening the byelaws shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £500.
(4B) The byelaws to which subsection (4A) of this section applies are byelaws such as are mentioned in subsection (4)(c) of this section which are made after the coming into force of section [Byelaws relating to the burning of straw or stubble] of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.".'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause increases from £200 to £500 the maximum fine available for offences in byelaws relating to straw and stubble burning. Control over stubble burning is primarily enforced by local authorities under byelaws made under the Local Government Act 1972. The maximum penalty for offences under these byelaws was increased to £200 by the Criminal Law Act 1977. Straw and stubble burning is not only a perfectly proper agricultural practice but a 'valuable one. It must, however, be carried out properly and safely, or danger and annoyance extending over a wide area may result.
A code of practice, drawn up by the National Fanners Union in 1965, is already in existence. It forms the substance of many of the relevant byelaws. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Rhodes James) for bringing to our notice the representations of the National Farmers Union—or, I should perhaps more strictly say, giving them added emphasis—and of the Association of County Councils, and for pressing, as he has done insistently, /Or stiffer penalties for infringements.
My hon. Friend has argued the case persuasively and with great persistence. He has brought representatives of the National Farmers Union and of the Association of County Councils to see me and my noble Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The reason is that widespread damage and nuisance was caused after last year's harvest that followed a particularly dry season, not least in Cambridgeshire. Only a small minority of the fanning community is responsible either locally or in other areas. But the National Farmers Union which is conducting a forceful campaign of education within its membership and which is launching a new film this month on the subject is convinced that a much larger financial penalty is needed than the present maximum fine of £200. The Association of County Councils agrees.
Accordingly, the Government have thought it right to provide for an increase from £200 to a maximum of £500. I recognise that some may have wished the amount to, be higher immediately, but the new maximum fine will be eligible for uprating, together with all fines deriving from the 1977 Act, as soon as the present Bill is passed The Bill, as the House will recall, contains provisions for uprating by statutory instrument to take account of changes in the value of money.
There is, therefore, the prospect, within a relatively short time, of a further increase if so advised. I am grateful to the NFU, to the Association of County Councils and to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge for making their representations in such a timely and clear way. I am satisfied that this is an important new clause and that the amount should be increased. The new clause will go a long way to meet the anxieties that have been expressed.

Mr. Robert Rhodes James: I should like to thank my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State for tabling the new clause.
My interest in this matter began at the end of last August and the beginning of September. Circumstances around Cambridge and in Cambridgeshire caused a volume of correspondence and anxiety among my constituents which was fully shared not only by myself but by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) who, like me, was very much involved with the National Farmers Union in bringing this matter to the attention of the House, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Home Secretary. My hon. and learned Friend will be aware that I had proposed, with the support of the National Farmers Union, a Private Member's Bill which would have gone rather further than the proposals in the new clause. It would have included fines of up to £1,000 for each offence, the imposition of national regulations and the possibility of banning stubble burning after repeated offences.
Following the meetings with my hon. and learned Friend and the Home Secretary, I became convinced, as I believe did the NFU, that the Government's proposals met our primary concern to impose a deterrent fine that will affect the small minority of farmers who have been grossly in breach of the code of practice and—it is important to emphasise this—in breach of the Clean Air Act and the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, under which they can be fined £1,000 for each offence. My hon. and learned Friend also emphasised that the fine of £500 can be uprated. I should have thought that it almost certainly will be.
The deterrent effect that the NFU and I wish to impose will be met by the new clause. A clear warning has now been given to that small minority of farmers who have caused immense harm to the relationship between inhabitants of the towns and villages and the farming community that under the byelaws the situation will not be tolerated in future.
I briefly quote from one of the hundreds of letters that I received from my constituents last September:
Vast clouds obliterate what little sun we get; the smell is all-pervasive; it is bad for health to breathe; but most of all, the daily descent of carbon is disastrous—windows must be kept closed on hot days, it covers the furniture.… and ruins the washing".
One of the advantages of living in one's constituency is that I was also a recipient of all those effects. I felt so strongly about the matter that I brought forward a Private Member's Bill, with the full support of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire. Some of his constituents were involved in the difficulties that we had in the city.
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I am truly grateful to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, to the Minister of State and to everyone involved in this matter. It has been another example of how, whatever party is in office, the concerns of ordinary people can be met. That happened when the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) was Minister in a Labour Government and I introduced a Private Member's Bill that was eventually successful. It is enormously encouraging for Back Benchers when their anxieties are met in this way. I thank the Government most warmly.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: I was intitially mystified by the new clause. Most of us do not suffer from the effects of

stubble burning, or even know what stubble is. Having listened to the debate I agree with the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Rhodes James). One of the enjoyable features of Parliament is that a constituency problem can eventually result in a Bill being changed. We all approve of that. I am the last person to say whether the Minister is right or wrong, but this time he seems to be completely right. I know that a Labour Government did not bring forward such a measure but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be the last to make a party point about that. The Opposition welcome the new clause.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: I should not like the occasion to pass without saying that although the new clause is of great advantage to Cambridge, the Thanet farmers find no difficulty in burning their stubble without causing offence. Possibly the superb Thanet air enables the smoke to disperse rather more rapidly than in the low-lying Fens of Cambridgeshire or the operation is more ably carried out by the Thanet farmers. I should not want it to be thought that every county suffers from the problem. I have not had complaints from Thanet or East Kent.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 37

CRITERIA FOR ACCOMMODATION OF CHILDREN IN CARE

`In section 39 of the Child Care Act 1980 (regulations as to conduct of community homes etc.)—
(a) in subsection (2), the following paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph (e)—
"(ea) prescribe criteria according to which different descriptions of children are to be placed and kept in different decriptions of accommodation;"; and
(b) the following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—
"(2A) Without prejudice to the generality of this section, regulations under this section may contain provisions to ensure that a child may not be placed, and, if placed, may not be kept, in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty unless he appears likely otherwise—
(a) to abscond; or
(b) to injure himself or other persons; or
(c) to damage or take other persons' property'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause paves the way for ensuring that children in care are held in secure accommodation only in the most serious circumstances. During the debate in Committee it was clear that there was considerable concern about the use that can be made of accommodation in community homes, which is designed to restrict the liberty of children. The Government are in no doubt that it is, sadly, necessary to have such accommdation available to deal with difficult and disturbed children. We agreed, however, to see what could be done to meet the concern expressed in Committee, and the new clause fulfils that undertaking.
It seems right that the law should provide that if children are to be locked up, albeit in a community home, it should be only when that is strictly necessary. It also seems right that it should set standards for when it can be regarded as strictly necessary. That is what the new clause does. In general terms, a child should not be placed in secure accommodation or be kept there unless he is likely


to run away, to injure himself, or to harm other persons or their property. Regulations made under this measure will make more specific provision of these general criteria. Those regulations, which are the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Secretary, of State for Social Services, will themselves be placed before Parliament in due course.
I trust that there will be general agreement that this is a desirable measure. It operates, as is apparent, by specifying a power to make regulations which will
prescribe criteria according to which different descriptions of children are to be placed and kept in different descriptions of accommodation
It goes on to specify that
a child may not be placed, and, if placed, may not be kept, in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty unless he appears likely otherwise
(a) to abscond; or
(b) to injure himself or other persons;
(c) to damage or take other persons' property."
In Committee we were agreed that the criteria expressed in imprecise terms were the criteria for a serious offence. It has proved difficult to incorporate that into statutory language and therefore the draftsmen have sought to identify the consequences to the child, or to some other member of the public, of the child being likely to commit a serious offence and to express the criteria in terms of those consequences. I thought it necessary to take a little time to explain why the clause is drafted in those terms.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman accept that it is not a good principle to say that the proposal is too difficult to put into legislation and that it must be done by regulation? Is it not far better to include the measure in the Bill? However, if we are to have regulations, what consultations will take place and what opportunities will there be for people to make representations? Hon. Members have no opportunity to amend regulations.

Mr. Mayhew: The hon. Gentleman will know that regulations already exist for governing community homes and the new clause sets out a power for further regulations to be made to achieve that purpose. Therefore, while I cannot speak for other Departments, the hon. Gentleman may feel confident that no fewer opportunities for consultation will exist in this respect than have existed in previous regulations.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Am I not correct in believing that the community homes regulations are statutory and that if they are amended the House will have to debate, or at least confirm, the amendments?

Mr. Mayhew: Certainly; amendments cannot take effect without the approval of the House. If a matter inherent in regulations does not receive the approval of the House hon. Members can reject the regulations and have done so recently, though fortunately not in the case of Home Office regulations.
The new clause sets out the criteria by which any regulations will have to be drafted. Therefore, it gives some control over the regulations. We need not worry too much about the form of the regulations.
The new clause is intended to meet an undertaking that I gave the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) in Committee and I believe that it does so in a bone fide way.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The new clause empowers the Home Secretary to make regulations laying down the statutory

criteria for the detention of juveniles in secure accommodation in the local authority community homes system. The Secretary of State for Social Services has announced that he is reviewing the operation of the community homes regulations that were passed in 1972.
The new clause follows an assurance that the Minister of State gave me in Committee in response to a new clause tabled by the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group. The Minister has, in effect, laid down some guidelines, perhaps not yet entirely satisfactory, about the sort of principles that we may expect to see enshrined in revised regulations.
The new clause that we debated in Committee was one of two tabled on behalf of the all-party group, which were designed to increase the safeguards for young people in secure accommodation. The new clauses were, in turn, in response to two disturbing reports from the DHSS which were the backbone of our discussions about juveniles dealt with in local authority community homes.
The two major research studies sponsored by the DHSS found that secure units in the local authority system are being used for younger and less delinquent children than was the case several years ago. We all know that the reconviction rates from community homes, and particularly from secure units within those homes, are inordinately high.
I welcome the Government's acceptance of the need for statutory criteria and I welcome the new clause. We have established an important principle, but my colleagues and I in the all-party group will need to examine the new clause carefully. We have already received representations from the Children's Legal Centre, which considers that the terms of the new clause are far too wide.
The centre believes that young people should be detained in secure accommodation only if their behaviour constitutes an imminent danger to the public or to themselves or if there are no appropriate alternatives. It also believes that the interpretation of those criteria by local authorities should be the subject of judicial review. The centre published on Monday this week an important report entitled "Locked up in Care" and subtitled:
A report on the use of secure accommodation for young people in care".
That report is pertinent to our debate.
Although I welcome the new clause, my colleagues in the all-party group will want another place to return to the issue and we will certainly want to pursue the points made by the Children's Legal Centre.
5.45 pm
I welcome the fact that the Government have taken a step in the right direction and I hope that they will enter into discussions in another place about whether the wording of the new clause is appropriate, whether it will achieve the Minister of State's objectives and whether it will bring about the enforcement of the principles that many of us on both sides of the Committee sought to see established.
I hope that the Government will bear in mind the fact that the new clause was tabled rather late and will be willing to discuss it at a later stage with a view to improving its operation. We have all accepted, not least the DHSS, that we put far too many young people into local authority residential institutions and into the secure units without adequate preparation, supervision or proper legal control. It does them little, if any, good to be held in those units.
In the light of the overwhelming research evidence, not least that provided by the DHSS, we should certainly ensure that the safeguards that we erect to prevent young people from being put into secure units are extremely stringent. The Government have gone part of the way and I hope that they will go much further in another place.

Dr. Summerskill: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) I welcome the new clause, which goes some way towards meeting the points that we made in Committee.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley), my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. Davidson) and I tabled an amendment to delete clause 21 from the Bill. Unfortunately, that amendment was not selected and we hope that the new clause will at least improve clause 21.
I am glad that the new clause makes it clear that different sorts of children should be placed in different types of residential accommodation, suitable to their needs and appropriate to individual offenders. However, the Minister of State has not taken up my suggestion in Committee that courts should be obliged to consult local authorities about the available accommodation.
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman feel that courts will seek information from local authorities about the types of accommodation that are available, so that they may be assured that suitable accommodation will be provided? In the vital years of a child's development—three years is the average time for which care orders are made in criminal proceedings—he should be in the right place according to his offence, character and needs. We welcome the safeguards introduced in the regulations laying down criteria. They would lessen the possibility of totally unsuitable children being deprived of their liberty where the offence and their personal circumstances or character do not justify it.
There is a 70 per cent. reconviction rate for children who have been in local authority homes. That makes one pessimistic about the effect of putting them there in the first place. Labour Members want to reduce the number of offenders receiving both custodial and residential care. We were told in Committee that the cost of new clause 21 to the ratepayer and the taxpayer could be £6 million a year. However, the new clause certainly goes a small way towards ensuring that greater thought and consideration are given before care orders are implemented.
In Committee the Minister said that the danger of restricting too much the terms of the care order was that there might be a greater use of custodial sentences. I hope that his prediction is not correct. It is only a prediction; he cannot possibly be sure that that would be the effect. On the other side of the argument, residential care orders are expensive and ineffective as a deterrent. There is no evidence that they help the offender or protect society. We prefer that such people should be cared for in the community, particularly as we are talking about young children.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful for the words of welcome that have been uttered. I should correct an impression that the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) may inadvertently have given. New clause 37 establishes criteria, which may be implemented by way of regulation in due course, to govern the circumstances in which a child

may be held in secure accommodation. The decision as to whether the child shall be held in secure accommodation is not a matter for the court that makes the care order; it is a professional decision made by the local authority in whose care the child is ordered to be placed. We must be clear about that important distinction.
Anxiety has been expressed that criteria, established with the approval of Parliament, do not exist to govern circumstances in which that professional decision shall be made. That is an important point and it bears upon the point that the hon. Lady was making a few moments ago when she referred to something I said in Committee to the effect that if we restrict too tightly the circumstances in which a court can make a care order, we may find the opposite of what we want, an increase in the number of custodial disposals or sentences made.
I am grateful for the opportunity to clear that matter up. I believe that the undertaking I gave has been fulfilled and I commend the new clause to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 2

SECRETARY OF STATE TO GIVE REASONS FOR REFUSAL OF PAROLE

`In section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, after subsection (1) there shall be inserted the following subsection—
"(1A) If in any particular case the Secretary of State decides that a person to whom subsection (1) above applies shall not be released on licence, he shall communicate in writing the reasons for this decision to the person to whom the case relates". '.—[Dr. Summerskill.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The reason for introducing this clause, tabled by myself and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley), was that we felt that it was time for the House to discuss the giving of reasons for refusal of parole to prisoners. It is a current topic of discussion outside the House, but it is not often discussed in the Chamber. It was not discussed in Committee. We are led to believe that one of the main grievances among prisoners is that they have first to wait for the result of whether they have been granted parole, and, having been told the result, if it is negative they never know why. That is rightly felt by prisoners to be unjust.
The primary reason for secrecy surrounding the administrative decision about parole, as far as I can see, is that it would be difficult to formulate the reasons clearly and succinctly to the benefit of the prisoner. After all, it is his or her individual liberty and life that is at stake. Disquiet and resentment is caused among prisoners when they are not told. They even invent their own reasons, which can be even worse than being told the real reasons. The present system is open to accusations of favouritism, victimisation and corruption, all of which are created by the fact that prisoners are never told why decisions are made concerning their liberty or lack of it.
A positive reason for giving a prisoner reasons is that he and his family would then, we hope, try to put right what was wrong. It would also enable probation and prison officers, who are in contact with offenders, working both


inside and outside prisons, to assist in this process. If none of them knows the reasons for refusal of parole, they cannot even start to put right what was wrong.
There are precedents for giving reasons in various parts of the criminal justice system. For instance, if bail is refused the court must give reasons. That may be difficult, but they must do it. Under clause 1(7) reasons must be given if a custodial sentence is imposed. However, the most persuasive precedent before us is the mental health review tribunals where a panel of about five people discuss the release of people from a different kind of custody. They normally give reasons and that must be extremely difficult—harder, I would have thought, than giving reasons for someone's release from prison.
I know that the Home Office and the Parole Board have been looking at this matter for some time. In an experiment, the Parole Board was asked to give reasons—I think, to prisoners. No doubt, the Minister will tell us of that in his reply. We are led to believe that the Parole Board found difficulties in putting succinctly the reasons for not giving parole. It implied that if the prisoner were told the reasons it could lead to court cases or allegations and to prisoners refuting what has been said in the report. However, I am not asking here for an appeal system for prisoners. I am not asking that prisoners should give evidence to the Parole Board.

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Mr. Rees-Davies: The hon. Lady must recognise that parole is discretionary. Once reasons are given, the prisoner is bound to try to challenge, with the assistance of his friends and relatives, those reasons. To challenge them, he will try to give evidence. If he can bring a court case, he will. If he goes to his Member of Parliament and says that what has been said is untrue, it could lead to immensely long inquiries. Surely the hon. Lady recognises that part of the reason for the discretion is that in very serious cases the length of sentence intended alone may count. Therefore, there are many reasons for the present position.

Dr. Summerskill: I cannot see much difference between the reasons given by a mental health tribunal and the facts revealed in the psychiatric and probation reports that are laid before the courts. Personal matters are revealed. There is not much difference between the type of information given by mental health review tribunals, which the person is allowed to know about, and the type of information produced by the Parole Board when considering a case.
I sat in on a Parole Board session. Some of the members consider an individual case. The members give their conclusions briefly to all the other members round the table. In the session that I attended, they summed up their reasons for refusal very comprehensively, without talking for hours and hours. They managed to do it in a few sentences. They had probably spent hours going through the reports on that case, but their final conclusions were summarised fairly briefly. Therefore, the practical difficulties that we are told exist could be overcome. Some form of short summary could be given to the prisoner. The new clause does not ask that the prisoner should be able to give evidence to the Parole Board or that he should be able to take up all the points in the refusal and so on. It simply asks that the prisoner, his family and the probation and prison officers should be able to know the reasons so that they can try to put things right.

Mr. Lawrence: If a man was looking forward to his release on the understanding that he would return to live with his wife and family, how would the hon. Lady tell him that she knew more about the situation than he did, because he had been in custody? How could that man be told that his wife no longer wanted him back, whatever she may have pretended to him when she visited him? How could he be told that she was living with another man and that even if the prisoner returned, the household would be quite unsatisfactory and he would be so frustrated that he might well be driven into resuming his anti-social behaviour? How can that be explained to a man in such a situation?

Dr. Summerskill: That man will eventually have to face that disastrous set of circumstances when he is released. According to the hon. and learned Gentleman, we should keep him permanently imprisoned because his wife has gone to live with another man. According to him, we should not allow him to face that predicament. However, he will have to face it some time. A domestic situation alone is an insufficient reason for keeping someone in custody. Therefore, that is not a very good example and does not justify failing to give the reasons for refusal of parole.

Miss Jo Richardson: Does not my hon. Friend agree that the wife will also have been living out a lie and that she must also face that? The sooner the husband and wife get together out of the confines of prison visiting, the sooner the situation can be resolved.

Dr. Summerskill: The hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) has certainly not given us a good reason for not telling someone why he was refused parole. I hope that the Minister wall produce a better example. I also hope that he will explain the problems apparently faced by the Parole Board when it tried, in the experiment, to explain to prisoners the reasons for refusal. Why did the Minister decide to retain the present system? I hope that he will not say—as he often does—that the Labour Government did not do anything. That is one of his usual arguments.
This difficult problem causes increasing concern and dissatisfaction not only to prisoners, but to prison officers. With the present overcrowding, our prisons have enough problems and it would help to consider how we might alleviate that additinal burden. After all, it involves everyone in the prison system. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will explain the position.

Mr. Percy Grieve: I rise briefly to express my appreciation of the way in which the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) moved the clause. Regretfully, I am unable to support it. I say that, because I recognise the truth of what she said. The failure to give reasons may cause resentment to some prisoners. Of course we wish to avoid that. However, I am not sure that giving reasons would not occasion even more resentment.
The Parole Board must seek its information from all sorts of sources. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) said, information will be sought from the family, from the home and from those who have custody of the prisoner. However succinctly those reasons were put and even if the sources of information were concealed as far as possible, resentment would arise. As a result, we should institutionalise


something that, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Thanet, West (Mr. Rees-Davies) said, is discretionary. Parole is discretionary and is not given as of right. There is a great distinction between giving parole and the cases with which the hon. Member for Halifax sought to draw an analogy. She drew an analogy with bail, but unless there is good reason for not giving bail, the House has rightly said that a man is entitled to the freedom that he enjoys as a citizen. She also drew an analogy with mental health review tribunals. Before entering the House, I had the honour to serve for a number of years on a mental health review tribunal in the Sheffield region. It was one of the duties that was incompatible with the list in the House of Commons Disqualification Act and so, on entering the House, I relinquished it. However, in that case, unless a person is mentally sick, he is entitled to his freedom. That is a different matter from parole. Those who are sent to prison are not entitled to their freedom. They have no entitlement until they have served their sentences.
If we were to institutionalise a privilege or a discretionary matter because the Parole Board thought that it was safe and reasonable to put someone at liberty long before the expiry of his sentence and his normal release date—having earned his one-third remission—the next demand would be for some sort of appellate process. The prisoner will say "I am not satisfied with this. I want to appeal." There will then be a demand for an appeal from the Parole Board. That would cut at the roots of the whole concept of parole, which is discretionary. It is to give men the chance of enjoying liberty and showing that they can be honest citizens, notwithstanding that the court which tried them determined the length of sentences commensurate with their records, backgrounds and the gravity of the offence.

Dr. Summerskill: I carefully stated that I am not asking for an appellate procedure. Would not the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that there could be a case for giving reasons for refusing parole and leaving it at that? By being given reasons the prisoner can try to right what is wrong.

Mr. Grieve: Perhaps I did not make myself clear as to the objections that I saw to the hon. Lady's new clause. The first clear objection is that I believe that the giving of reasons would in the end cause more resentment and ill-feeling than the failure to give reasons, and with the Parole Board saying, as it does now "We are very sorry, the time is not yet right."
The second point is that if we were to say that the Parole Board should give its reasons, having regard to the resentment to which I believe such reasons would give rise, I believe that in the majority of cases where parole was refused—because people would be very loth to accept and face up to the reasons—we would be faced with a demand for some sort of appellate procedure. If there was not that, there would be letters to Members of Parliament. The long-term effect would be a tendency to institutionalise something that ought not to be institutionalised. It is for those reasons that I could not support the hon. Lady's new clause, much though I respect the way in which she moved it.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I have never understood the real difficulty about giving reasons for the

refusal of parole. I recollect that when Lord Harris, who is now chairman of the Parole Board, was a junior Minister at the Home Office, he was in favour of giving reasons. He changed his mind only when he became chairman. I recollect also that I once had to exercise the power of the Home Secretary in his discretion in relation to immigration cases. I handed that over for a week to Lord Harris and when I returned he said that it was like playing God. Indeed it is, because there is absolute discretion. The discretion is exercised by the Minister. At least the Minister has to write and explain why he has exercised the discretion. Being chairman of the Parole Board one plays God and does not explain to anybody.
One of the difficulties of the present system is that nobody outside the Parole Board knows why parole has been refused. I do not believe that it would be necessary to have an appeal system but it is a necessary check upon the exercise of the Parole Board's discretion that it should give reasons for its decision.
I do not accept the main argument that Lord Harris has put forward previously as to why the Parole Board cannot give reasons. The hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) suggested that there might be something in the prisoner's domestic circumstances which he would not like to be told. That should never be taken into account in deciding whether or not to give parole. The existence of domestic circumstances that the man would not like should not be a reason for keeping him in prison. He may well commit another offence if he returns home and finds that his wife is living with another man. He should be warned of the position before he returns and he should have the opportunity of talking to his wife about it before he is released. It should be explained to him that if he commits another offence he will be inside again. That is not a reason for refusing parole, and the fact that Lord Harris uses that argument so frequently suggests that it is used in refusing parole. It is a very significant factor in his approach to the problem.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Is it not most disturbing that many prisoners begin to wonder whether something like that is happening to them when they are refused parole?

Mr. Lyon: I think that my hon. Friend is right. I have known prisoners who began to suspect that when they were refused parole. It is a wrong premise from which to argue the case, because it should never be taken into account as a reason for refusing parole. That goes to the root of why we need reasons. It is not only that the prisoner should have reasons. Society should know that the job is being done properly. There is no way we can know that because we do not know how the job is being done. The most we can do is say that we have appointed somebody great and good to the job and therefore we must trust them. It would be a great help to know what reasons there are for refusing parole.
Lord Harris also argued against giving reasons because, he said, it would involve a considerable amount of paperwork which would increase the cost of the system and require more staff. For the reasons my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) gave I cannot see why. I have never been in a Parole Board meeting, but I am certain from the nature of the proceedings that by the time the decision is made the reasons are clear and can be stated in a few sentences. Lord Harris said that on


occasions different members of the board have different reasons. One could give two or three reasons which would only take three or four sentences. That is the most anyone asks. One does not ask for a six-page statement of the arguments, but simply brief reasons as to why it is not possible to release the prisoner on that occasion.
Another argument that is sometimes used is that the reason he has not been released has nothing to do with his conduct in prison. It concerns the gravity of the offence and the extent to which it excited public emotion when he was convicted, leading the Parole Board to the view that it might discredit the whole system if he were released. He will therefore be kept in custody. That is also an unacceptable reason for refusing parole. There might be a greater division of opinion among hon. Members on that point, but my feeling is strongly that public perception of the offence is not a ground for refusing parole to a man who on every other consideration has proved that he is capable of returning and not being a danger to society. If that is not the case, he should not be given parole. If it is the case, the fact that his offence excited a good deal of public emotion, which has not been forgotten, should not be a reason for refusing parole. He should have lived down his conviction and he should be released.
For those reasons, therefore, I believe that the new clause is justified. I set in support of it the considerable anxiety that this issue has caused among prisoners throughout the country in many different circumstances. There is no doubt that when a prisoner who has worked hard in prison, has a clean sheet and believes that he is entitled to parole, is refused parole it is a very testing time both for him and for the prison authorities. A great strain is placed on the prison authorities in that he must then be nursed through the feeling of rejection when he and his family had built up hopes of parole.
It is not right that a prisoner should have to go through that without the reasons being explained to him. If the reasons are explained, he can decide that if he did not do things properly on the last occasion he can work towards eliminating the problems on the next occasion. Alternatively, if the reason given seems to him unjustified by the facts, he can put the matter to the Parole Board. If the Parole Board has got it wrong, which I doubt very much on a question of fact, he is entitled to put his case to it for consideration in due course.
That seems a perfectly sensible system. I strongly suspect that if the amendment were passed tonight because the Government supporters did not arrive in time for the Division, within two or three years we should wonder why we never gave reasons from the beginning. Indeed, I greatly regret that when I was on the Committee when parole was introduced in 1967 we did not apply our minds to this aspect then, as it would have been highly desirable and would have considerably improved the working of the system.

Mr. Lawrence: I oppose the new clause, although I understand that it has been tabled for the best possible reasons. If hon. Members had bothered to read my speeches, they would know that I do not like the parole system at all. I should much prefer a points system whereby people could work their way out of prison and none of these problems would arise.
Given the existing system, however, I shall explain my reasons for opposing the new clause. I shall not repeat the intervention that the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr.

Summerskill) was courteous enough to allow me—I did not thank her sufficiently at the time, but I think that her response to it was thoroughly unrealistic. As I recall it, she said, in effect, that the domestic problems must be faced sooner or later in any event.
That is surely a misunderstanding of what parole is. It is not a device whereby a person is entitled actually to suffer only one-third of the sentence that the judge considered appropriate, so that we must look for any means of allowing him out early and it would be a terrible shame if he were refused parole without reasons being given. That is not the purpose of parole. As I understand it, the purpose of parole is this. If it is possible, as a matter of humanity, and if the domestic and other circumstances of the person's life allow it to happen as a matter of humanity, it would be justifiable to let him out early. If the effect of giving reasons would be inhumane and thus conter-productive to the cause of humanity that I understand to be the basis of parole, clearly it would be wrong to do so. That is why I believe that in many situations to give reasons would be inhumane.
Worse than that, what would inevitably happen is that the authorities would be unable to put into words the precise distressing circumstances that caused them to reach their conclusion, and it would not be long before the prison service was accused of suppressing the truth, misleading by half-truth and perhaps even by falsehood in the sense that it was not conveying the true situation. That would undermine and not strengthen the respect that it is so necessary for the penal system to retain in order to be effective.
Parole is not like bail. With bail, there is a presumption of freedom. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) has said, one presumes that a person should not be in custody and one therefore bends every possible resource to give him his freedom. When a sentence of imprisonment is being served, however, one presumes that the person should be serving it. One may then bend as much humanity as one can to make that service as short as possible.
I agree with the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) that if cost were a factor it should not be taken seriously into account because this is far more a matter of humanity, but I do not agree with him that it is wrong to repose in the good and the true whom we select to serve on the Parole Board an element of trust and discretion. In the end, that element can be supervised by a Minister who has some responsibility to the House and can answer to an individual Member of Parliament. As Members of Parliament, we all know that when we raise constituency problems with local authorities and with the Home Office, we sometimes receive both the reply that the authorities would like the constituent to receive and a private, confidential reply to the effect that a certain factor has affected the authorities' thinking but that they think that it would be harmful if it were passed on. The Minister or the executive of the district council therefore trusts the Member of Parliament not to pass on that hurtful detail, but the information is given to him so that he may test the Home Office or the authority on it.
I do not know whether reasons for Parole Board refusals can be passed on in detail to Members of Parliament, but it might not be a bad idea if the Member of Parliament were accorded the same trust in similar circumstances so that he may satisfy himself that the Minister has used his


judgment correctly and that the Minister is satisfied that the discretion exercised by the Parole Board has been correctly and properly used.
If Lord Harris changed his mind since ceasing to be a Minister and becoming chairman of the Parole Board, it can only have been because he became aware of the reality of decision-making and the discretionary process. It is that reality that we must continue to repose as a matter of trust in the people involved, knowing that in the end the Minister can test that trust and perhaps, if this does not already happen, Members of Parliament may also test the Minister on that trust.
Those are my reasons for opposing the new clause. Principally, I believe that the stand taken by the Opposition is utterly unrealistic, bearing in mind the fact that the purpose of parole is not as a matter of policy to reduce the sentence to one-third of that which the judge thought appropriate in all the circumstances.

Mr. Ronald W. Brown: It is that very trust that is now prejudiced. Over the years I have had many problems with the Home Office. Indeed, when the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) made her speech, I thought that she was reading the submissions that I made to her on at least two cases when she was a Minister, when I argued that my constituents should not have been refused parole. At that time, before Lord Harris came into the picture, the hon. Lady's view was quite clear. She argued that it would be quite wrong to allow any parole examination to be made public.
The hon. Lady will recall the classic case of Thomas Unstead who, together with six other people, was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. When I examined the papers relative to the trial on his behalf, I was satisfied that there was something terribly wrong in the whole case. The case did not appear to be right. It appeared to be fraudulent and my constituent had been put upon. I did much work on that case, as the hon. Lady will remember because we talked about it on many occasions. Each time she had a different argument as to why she could not be helpful.

Dr. Summerskill: May I reply to my erstwhile hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Brown) and to the Minister, who made the same accusations about my change of attitude on the imprisonment of maintenance defaulters? If one is a thinking person one might change one's mind occasionally. It is to the credit of politicians that occasionally they might change their minds. I learnt a great deal at the Home Office about how the Parole Board works. If one has had that experience, one's mind should be open and not shut to possible changes. I agree that I have changed my mind, although I was never completely satisfied with the arrangement when I was at the Home Office. Today's debate is to find out the result of the experiment that has taken place since I left the Home Office, but I shall not justify myself any longer.

Mr. Brown: I am grateful to the hon. Lady. My heart is also bleeding. I am delighted that her mind is now open. I regret only that it was not so open in those days, because

I put to her then the arguments that she put today, using my words. If her mind was closed then, it was closed only to the words that she now tries to use in the House.
I have used the hon. Lady's words simply to try to understand the problem. The Minister talked about trust. I went through Mr. Unstead's story with her and she, among others, repeated that there was no evidence or proof and that my case was all hypothesis. I saw the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor. Finally, through an informant in the underworld, I was given a piece of information which led me to examine the Hampshire constabulary. There was clear evidence of collusion between the Hampshire constabulary and an informer who had never been brought to court. I gave evidence to the hon. Lady, which ended with two informers to the Hampshire constabulary being charged. It is true that my constituent received a sentence of 14 years whereas the informers received only seven years some time later. There was very clear evidence of collusion and if I had not taken up the case and pursued it in the way that I did the collusion would have escaped detection.
As a result of that, the Home Office was very angry with me, as was the Hampshire constabulary, because I had blown their informers' cover. When Mr. Unstead came up for parole, it was refused out of hand. We began to examine the reasons for that because everyone in the prison—the governor, the assistant governor and "screws" on the landings—argued that he was a model prisoner. His home affairs were also considered and a good report was given of them. One could not see why he had been refused. The governor told me that he did not understand why parole had been refused. I visited the hon. Lady again, who told me that she could do nothing about it because the Parole Board was a separate entity. Sir Louis Petch was then the chairman of the Parole Board.
Eventually Mr. Unstead came before the Parole Board again and was refused for the second time. I visited the hon. Lady but she said that she could not add much more. When I visited her on the third occasion that parole was refused I asked her why I could not discuss the matter with Sir Louis Petch in her office. She agreed to that but she would not let me see Sir Louis. She saw him, interpreted my question and then gave me his answer to the question that I would have put to him had I not needed to go through the hon. Lady. I then asked the hon. Lady why I could not go before the Parole Board. She said that she would attend a Parole Board meeting to see how it worked. I asked her whether she could ask Sir Louis again to allow me to attend the Parole Board meeting when Mr. Unstead's case came up.
The House will be interested to know that, under that system, Thomas Unstead had to serve the whole of his time and the Parole Board did not grant him parole. Yet that man's prison work was of the highest order and he had behaved himself in every conceivable way. I have never had a satisfactory answer why Thomas Unstead was not allowed out. I believe that it was because I took up his case in the House and debated it with the hon. Lady, as a result of which sanctions were taken against him.

Mr. Lawrence: Did Mr. Unstead receive a remission of one-third of his sentence for good conduct?

Mr. Brown: Yes, of course, but he had to go the whole course for his remission. The object of parole is to encourage prisoners to behave themselves, to be peaceful


and law-abiding in prison and to help the prison authorities. As a commendation for their good behaviour, they are allowed out.
My second case is about Mr. Danny Allpress. I now address myself to the Minister instead of the hon. Lady. Danny Allpress has served his time in prison peacefully and has done his work well. He has the approval of the governor, the assistant governor and the "screws" on the landing and his home affairs are in good order. There is no reason why he should not be allowed parole. I ask the Minister why I cannot go to the Parole Board, see Lord Harris and ask him the same thing? I cannot get through to anyone because no one is listening. As the hon. Lady's mind is now open, Lord Harris' mind is closed and we cannot get the two things working together.
I am seeing Lord Elton tomorrow about another constituent, Mr. Peter Colson, who has been refused parole twice, for no reason. No one understands it. The prison governor, the assistant governor and the "screws" on the landing say that he is a good prisoner. His home report is good. The question must be asked—what is the Parole Board doing? Who is providing the secret information?
In the case of Danny Allpress I have found one reason that has not been mentioned tonight. A new procedure was introduced when he was sentenced and, because money was involved in the crime, a bankruptcy order was brought against him. Now he is coming up for parole and there is another joker in the pack. The Official Receiver is now involved. When a bankruptcy court official visited my constituent in prison, Mr. Allpress was unwise enough to believe that he had the right to speak to whom he wished and he did not wish to speak to the official. The official said "That finishes it. You will never get out of here."
When that was reported to me, I did not believe it to be the sort of jargon used by bureaucrats, but he was right. Apparently, the bankruptcy official's report is now preventing Danny Allpress from receiving parole because it has been taken into consideration by the Parole Board. I have just discovered that my other constituent, Mr. Colson, had a bankruptcy order made against him. So now, although we know that everyone in the prison has given a good report of Mr. Colson, the one man who apparently has not done so is the Official Receiver, the bankruptcy official.

Mr. Grieve: Was he made bankrupt as a result of an order made by the court which tried him?

Mr. Brown: Yes, and as I say, that started in about 1978. I did not know—the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) may have known—that this was a joker in the pack for parole. If the bankruptcy official, whom one does not even know, gives an adverse report—he can do so for all kinds of petulant reasons—that will affect the man's application for parole. In the case of Peter Colson, there was no reason whatsoever for him not to receive parole, yet it was refused.
It is interesting that every time that Peter Colson comes up for parole, he is moved about three days before his parole is considered. The person on the Parole Board looking at his papers sees that he has been moved from one prison to another prison within two or three days, and the implication is that it is because of Colson's bad behaviour. After his parole has been considered and refused, he is moved back to the former prison. I keep asking the Home

Office why he was moved two years running at exactly the same time, 4 May, when his parole was due to be considered on 12 May. I want to know why he was moved back immediately after his parole was considered and refused. It seems extraordinary that just before a man is considered for parole he is shifted from place to place the implication being that he is an unsatisfactory prisoner.
New clause 2 goes a long way towards achieving what I want—an explanation. It is no good trying to get people to behave themselves in prison, serve their time, and contribute to the peace and harmony of the prison service, if their parole application is refused for no just reason. Of course we must trust, but we must see that that trust is well founded. I selected three cases where that did not happen. There are many other cases that I could have chosen, as the hon. Lady well knows. I could quote quite a few from her time at the Home Office, and some in the time of her successors. As the Minister knows, I am always in touch with him about cases. Indeed, I could mention the case of Mr. Sharp. So there are many cases where it is distressing not to be able to understand why parole is refused. If new clause 2 goes some way to opening this Pandora's box, this cosy position of the Parole Board, tonight's work will have been well worth while.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I am sorry to disagree with almost every word that the hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Brown) has said. I do so for a few short and simple reasons.
First, parole is entirely discretionary. Once a person is convicted and goes to prison, whether he ever comes up and has parole is a matter entirely of discretion. In the ordinary way, if his sentence is for seven or eight years, subject to remission for good conduct to which he is absolutely entitled if his conduct is good, he must serve that period.
The second point on which the hon. Member is wrong is this. The Parole Board is not just concerned with whether a prisoner behaves well in prison. He gets his remission for good conduct for that purpose. It is concerned with whether he has shown that he will be a good and honest character after he leaves prison. Unfortunately, a number of cases that are turned down, without any reason being assigned, are turned down because it is well known that the people are members of a permanent gang of robbers or housebreakers, or are associated with such a community. It is therefore extremely unlikely that, if they are ever released short of the period for which they have been sentenced, they w ill be of good behaviour. There are some who can change, but there are many who cannot convince a Parole Board of that. That is the background to parole.
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Those of us who have looked at many of these cases from the other side of the fence accept that usually people who have been convicted, after a couple of years, when they come up for consideration for parole, try to reopen the facts of their case. If reasons were given that related to the seriousness of the case, and therefore to the facts of the case—the facts not only of that case, but of their association with other criminal enterprises at that time—they might wish to have a further trial after the trial. So the post-trial syndrome, if I may call it that—the possibility of regurgitating all the facts and going over them again—would arise.
That would be highly undesirable for Members of Parliament. Their postbags would be full of letters from criminals who had been convicted and who wanted to try to reopen their cases on the ground that, even if they were not wrongly convicted, there were many matters of mitigation that were never put properly at the proper time to the court. Furthermore, all those facts could be brought forward with a view to seeing whether they could get the case before the Home Secretary. If all the facts were elucidated, the Home Secretary could advise on the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, which he is always entitled to do.
If what the hon. Member argued is true, it is one way in which one could open up the class of case in which there has been either corruption or perjury. That is certainly true. In such circumstances it may be possible to go back to the facts of the case, elucidate them, and find that there has been some perjury or corruption. To that extent the hon. Gentleman is right, but in my view that is not the right way to do it. I believe, for the reasons that I have given, that it is entirely discretionary, and that it would open up the whole question of a post-trial trial within a trial, and that it is wrong.
A directly analogous example involved the grant of a gaming licence and the Gaming Board for Great Britain. It will be remembered that, with some reluctance, the House of Commons took the view that the decision whether to grant a gaining licence should be entirely autocratic, and that no reasons of any kind would be given by the gaming board for the grant or the refusal. Many people have objected to that autocratic power. Nevertheless, in my view, it was right. There is no way to prove that there was a possible mafioso element behind the application. If one did, one would be liable to a libel action. Therefore, it was decided to place implicit trust in the gaming board. I do not believe that the gaming board has let us down in that trust, much as I disliked the board. However, we should not forget that not only the present Lord Chancellor, but none other than Lord Gardiner agreed with that autocracy. The same is true here, although here it involves not autocracy, but absolute discretion. In my view, it is far better to leave this board to continue with its good work in its own way, and trust it to carry out its work properly.

Miss Richardson: I support new clause 2.
Parole, particularly as it affects families, is a source of great mystery. Members get letters not only from prisoners, but from prisoners' families. I often get letters from young wives whose husbands are in prison, perhaps for a short time, and who cannot understand why their husbands are being kept in when in their view, they should have been paroled. The matter has caused tremendous distress and, the break-up of many marriages. In some cases a wife feels that if her husband's parole has been turned down he is perhaps a worse character than she thought he was. The whole system has to be properly overhauled. This new clause would at least open one chink and throw a little light on something which is shrouded in mystery.
Three or four years ago I went on a deputation to meet Lord Harris and to discuss with him, as chairman of the Parole Board, how it worked. I came away none the wiser.

I could not get from him any reason why some indication should not be given to a prisoner why his parole was refused.
Following what the hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Brown) has been saying, I have been in correspondence not with a constituent but with one of the Richardson brothers, Charles, whose case is fairly well known to most people. A younger brother is now out of prison. Charles Richardson has been in prison for 16 years. He has applied for parole seven or eight times, on each occasion going through the routine, which the hon. Gentleman so graphically described, of getting reports from various people—from people on his landing, the governor, the prison doctor, the priest and so on. He was always assured that he would be paroled and then he was not paroled. Indeed, he tells me that he believes that the main Parole Board, as distinct from the local parole board, has on three occasions recommended his parole. He can only come to the conclusion—this brings me back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon)—that there is ministerial interference in the decision whether to parole.
As hon. Members probably recall, Charles Richardson escaped from prison some time ago to make two or three points which were detailed in an article in The Sunday Times while he was free. He went back to prison after the points had been made. One of the points was that 16 years in prison is enough, however violent the crime one has committed. He recounts it to me as two life sentences, not one, because often people on a life sentence get out after about eight years.
His parole application is coming up for the eighth or ninth time. He feels that if he is turned down on this occasion, again possibly by ministerial decision, he will simply collapse and become a cabbage. He says that his observation of people in prison over many years has led him to believe that after 10 years prisoners become cabbages. They give up and deteriorate mentally. He has managed to keep himself in a fairly alert mental state, and I am sure that there are many like him. He wants to be able to come out and start a new life, to make acquaintance with his grown-up children who were youngsters when he went into prison and to try in some way to make recompense to his mother who has looked after his children during the time he has been in gaol.
This seems to be the sort of case in which, as my hon. Friend the Member for York said, the Home Secretary may feel that, because a well-known name is involved, it is better to keep the person in prison rather than to risk the difficulties which might attend on him as Home Secretary if publicity were given to the prisoner's release. As has been said before, that is no reason to keep a man in prison longer than is warranted.
Those are the sort of considerations that we must face. In principle, we must try to work out a system for the future so that prisoners know what part of themselves is still lacking which prevents parole being granted. I am not now talking about spectacular cases like the Richardson case but the more common or garden, run-of-the-mill cases where people do not know, never have known and never will know what they lack which has caused the parole board, locally or centrally, to turn them down.
I hope that we pass this clause. I do not think that it will perfect the system, but it will go a long way towards it.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I support new clause 2 for two main reasons. The policy of not giving reasons for the refusal of parole has seriously eroded the confidence of prisoners in the parole system and it adds considerably to their sense of grievance on being turned down. To deny parole to a prisoner who has often been waiting anxiously for three months or more, and then to give no explanation why he has been denied parole, increases cynicism and bitterness within the prison service. The procedure of the parole system is brought into disrepute.
Any hon. Member who has visited a prison and spoken to prisoners who have been refused parole will know full well the great resentment, bitterness and distrust that they have towards the parole system and towards authority and the prison service. The Minister will acknowledge that many prisoners, certainly long-term prisoners, no longer make parole applications because they have no confidence in the system and think that it will not treat them fairly.

Mr. Rees-Davies: There is an important point which the hon. Gentleman might like to think about later, if not now. Does he think it would be better if we abolished the idea of application being made by any prisoner for parole and merely let the parole board move of its own accord without any such application so that it could consider the matter, so to speak, de novo itself without being approached?

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I would, but would the hon. and learned Gentleman have voted for such a proposal? I would have preferred that. We had the option before us of automatic supervised release on parole. The Home Secretary himself canvassed it as recently as last July. The operation of such a system would have released 7,000 nonviolent prisoners on one-third sentence, one-third remission, and one-third parole.
A new clause was tabled on behalf of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group and was debated in Committee. It has been tabled again but has not been selected for debate.
If prisoners are not given the reasons why they have been refused parole, naturally they invent their own reasons. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) said, often the reasons they invent are much worse than the actual reasons. Like my hon. Friends who have spoken on this point, I believe that it is far more important to the prisoner that he be given the truth, however unpalatable that truth may be, and that we have no right, simply because they are prisoners, to patronise them and assume that they cannot be given the full information about themselves which prejudiced their case and prevented their early release.
If a prisoner is not given the reasons, to which he has a right, for his failure to obtain parole, it is difficult if not impossible for him to work constructively to attempt to obtain his release on parole in the future. The report of the Parole Board for 1975 acknowledged that when it said:
there will certainly be cases where a man can improve his future prospects of parole if he knows why he has failed in the past.
Yet it is the Parole Board, backed by the Government, which refuses to give the man those reasons and therefore the ability to improve his future prospects of early realease on parole. Surely it is reasonable that a prisoner should be told clearly where he has been going wrong so as to give him an opportunity to put things right before his next parole review.
The combined effects of the two considerations that I have pointed to was vividly summarised by Peter Waugh, then chairman of the Prison Officers Association, when he gave evidence to the Expenditure Committee on 27 February 1978. He said:
One of the problems of parole is not just the disappointment of not getting it; it is not knowing the reasons why they do not get parole. This is a question that people like me face every day.
He is speaking as a prison officer. He states further:
A man comes to me and says 'I did not get parole', and I say 'I know, I'm sorry lad'. Then he says "What did I do wrong?' and I say 'I do not know. We have submitted reports and everybody has submitted reports'. Then he says 'Can you tell me how to put myself right so that I will be more favourably considered?' and I say 'No, because I do not know either'. These are the factors which create the problems, not the fact that a man is disappointed.
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That is the evidence from a man who should know. He is chairman of the Prison Officers Association. He i3 in constant and intimate contact with long-term prisoners who have been disappointed not so much by not getting parole but more importantly by not being given the reasons why they have been refused parole. It may be that the reasons were not good or not true. If the reasons are not given, there is no way that they can be challenged. 'The prisoners cannot amend their behaviour so that they get a more favourable review in future.
The Home Office's document, entitled "Review of Parole in England and Wales", which was published in 1981, rejected the argument that reasons should be given for the refusal of parole. The document argued that giving reasons would lead to litigation in the courts which challenged the reasons that had been given for refusal. That point was made by the hon. and learned Members for Thanet, West (Mr. Rees-Davies) and Solihull (Mr. Grieve). Both believed that if reasons were given, that would lead to an appellate system or litigation.
The document argues that giving reasons would lead to a movement towards a system in which parole was a right to be claimed rather than a privilege to be earned, reinforcing the point that was made by the hon. and learned Member for Solihull. However, if that is true, why do none of those consequences appear to flow from the similar circumstances of the provisions that have been made for the mental health review tribunals? Their reasons are given for turning down an application for release. The tribunals deal with cases that are just as sensitive—in many instances they are far more sensitive—as those dealt with by the Parole Board. That does not lead either to litigation in the courts, which has been suggested as a potential consequence, or to a notion that release is a right rather than a privilege.
The dangers of giving frank comments about a prisoner's circumstances are more grave for someone in a mental hospital. However, those reasons are given and are available to the patient. I suppose that hon. Members who practise in the courts will know that similar frank comments are made in social inquiry reports, psychiatric reports and probation officers' reports, all of which are laid before the courts and which defendants have a right to see. There is no reason why the same consideration that is applied in those circumstances cannot be applied to giving reasons for the refusal of parole.
Those considerations are not the powerful arguments against fulfilling this basic requirement of natural justice. The main obstacles to introducing the change that is


proposed today are not objections in principle. That is the way in which the debate has been conducted. The obstacles are rather two important, purely practical, considerations. The first is resources. The Government do not wish to move to a system of giving reasons for parole because of the resource consequences. "Review of Parole in England and Wales" said in paragraph 74:
To amalgamate each member's reasons into a single self-consistent explanation of their collective decision, requiring the agreement of every member who favoured release, would be a substantial addition to the labours of the Board and their staff, which, without the provision of significant extra resources, it would simply not be practicable to impose.
The review was referring to giving reasonably full statements of reasons and not to the alternative proposal of ticking off items on a standard list of reasons. As the latter procedure would be unsatisfactory from the prisoners' point of view it is right that we should conduct the argument for giving reasons on the basis of fairly full reasons. I accept that that would have resource implications. However, if the suggestion made by the hon. and learned Member for Thanet, West of automatic release on licence were introduced for a large number of short-term prisoners, that would relieve the parole system of the need to review the cases which would have automatic release. The resource implications of giving reasons in the remaining cases would be limited. The remaining cases that would need to be considered by the parole board would be more manageable than the present large number of cases.
The second practical problem is one that everyone involved in the system—the Minister, his officials and those in the parole board—knows well, but no one wishes to state in public. It is the fact that although the Home Secretary can have reasonable confidence in the reasons that are given by the Parole Board, he could not have the same confidence in the reasons given by the local review committees. Those committees do not meet so often. According to the Home Office's research evidence they vary considerably in the extent to which they recommend parole in almost identical and similar cases. The Home Secretary and the chairman of the Parole Board are saying that they are not prepared to stand up and publicly defend the publicly given reasons of the local review bodies in which they have no confidence.
In that case it would seem much easier to introduce this change, which many Opposition Members seem to favour. If, as the conference of chief probation officers and NACRO have proposed, we abolished the local review committees in favour of a smaller number of regional parole boards or a peripatetic parole board, that would make it easier to achieve more consistency between one prisoner and another than the present large number of local review committees have achieved in practice.
For that reason I am pleased to see that the Opposition are committed to introducing a system of giving reasons for the refusal of parole. I hope that when the next Labour Government are in office and they introduce this reform, they will be prepared to go further and make fundamental changes in the parole system, which will make it easier for a larger number of prisoners to get parole on automatic licence and for those not given parole to be given, in terms of natural justice, the reasons why they have been refused

and therefore the opportunity to amend their character and behaviour in the hope that they will be successful in future. I support the new clause.

Mr. Parris: I had not intended to speak on the new clause, but I wish to make one observation. The hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) made the strongest case that can be made for the new clause. Central to her argument was the point that all that the new clause asks for is disclosure, and that to ask for disclosure is by no means to ask for a system of appeal. However, a few minutes after the hon. Lady had finished speaking several hon. Members were asking, effectively, for a system of appeal. They asked for disclosure because they knew of cases where they thought that disclosure might have shown up wrongful decisions against which, naturally they would have wanted to appeal.
There is no point in disclosure unless there is a system of challenging disclosures which turn out to be wrong. If we had a system of disclosure, it would be only a matter of months before we were being asked for a system of appeal. It is a cruelty to the prisoner to disclose without giving him the right to challenge. As soon as we give the prisoner the right to challenge, there must be a procedure by which the challenge can be adjudicated. Before we know where we are we shall have a system of appeal. Therefore, the argument must be conducted in terms of an argument for an appeal system and not for disclosure. For that reason, I cannot support the new clause.

Mr. Pitt: Like the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Parris) I did not intend to speak but I rise briefly to support new clause 2 and take up the hon. Gentleman's point about disclosure. It is true that the new clause asks only for disclosure. The prisoner has the right to have the answers disclosed to him. My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Brown) and others have shown that there are faults in the system and that the faults should be discovered and disclosed.
We should not shun the fact that over a period there might be action to give grounds for appeal. I do not see why prisoners should not have the right of appeal. A person may have been led to believe that there are reports favourable to him from all sectors of the prison—I will not even begin to use the graphic terminology of my hon. Friend. He may have the impression that everything that he has done during his prison sentence has led people to believe that he can make a proper go of it outside in the real world. His family circumstances may be highly favourable. If he applies for parole and it is refused not once or twice but in some cases three times, I believe that that person is entitled not only to disclosure—that is a fundamental right—but to a right of appeal. I would support not only disclosure to a prisoner of the reasons why he cannot get parole but any recommendation to give a prisoner the right of appeal so that he can find out the grounds on which he was refused and make claim and counter-claim.

Mr. Mayhew: This has been an interesting debate on an important matter. It is an issue that gives rise to a great deal of feeling among prisoners who have been denied parole on application or who fear that in future they will again be denied. Therefore, it is right that we should have taken time to consider this matter. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) for introducing the new clause.
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Central to this issue is the nature of the parole system. Parole was intended by Parliament to be a privilege and not a right. That is the basis on which it is operated. Proposals on the lines set out in new clause 2 have been considered and rejected by successive Administrations ever since the parole scheme was introduced. The problems are not new. As hon. Members have said, they were considered most recently in "Review of Parole in England and Wales", published in May last year.
It never has been the practice to give reasons to prisoners who are not selected for parole. During the passage of the original legislation, parole was clearly seen as a privilege rather than a right. It is significant to remind the House that a prisoner serving a life sentence is not entitled to parole, but there is a system whereby he may be licensed by the Home Secretary.
The statute that set up the parole system requires reasons to be given to those who have been paroled, whose licences have been revoked and who have been recalled to prison. Those people will have been given their liberty on conditions. If they are deprived of it by a revocation of their licence, it must be right that they should be told the reason. They must have an opportunity of answering the allegations made against them that led to their recall to prison because the presumption is that they are entitled to retain the liberty that has been conferred on them.
Similarly, in the case of the mental health review tribunal, which has been much cited, although I believe misleadingly in this context, there is a difference in kind between the role of the tribunals and that of the Secretary of State in deciding whether to release on parole.
In the case of the mental health review tribunals, there is an obligation, in essence, to justify continuing detention because the tribunal is dealing with a patient and not with someone who has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to custody, or, at any rate, not having been sentenced to custody without there having been an element of mental disorder. In the second case, of an applicant for parole, the decision formally resting with the Secretary of State, which is a matter of privilege and not of right, is whether the prisoner should complete a sentence that has already been imposed by a court in the community. The presumption is quite different.
To listen to the debate and to many of the contributions from Opposition Members has been almost to listen to a condemnation of something that is unjust and which in no circumstances can confer benefit on those who have been sentenced to prison. Essentially we are dealing with cases of those who have committed criminal offences and have been found guilty by the legal system. They have been cast on the criminal justice system, which has prescribed that they shall serve a sentence of imprisonment. That sentence is not indeterminate. The only indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for an adult is life imprisonment, to which parole does not apply.
A determinate sentence of imprisonment has been passed by the judge. Therefore, the presumption is, and should be, that the sentence will be served, subject to remission for good conduct, which is conferred under the prison rules, which themselves have been approved by Parliament. The presumption is that prisoners remain in custody until their sentence is served, subject to remission for good conduct.
Anything that is to intervene in that process can only be of the nature of a privilege. It cannot be a right. That

is crucial. The two cases that I have described—the case of the ordinary applicant for parole who is not entitled to reasons for refusal, and the case of someone who has been licensed as a parolee and then is called back to prison because his licence has been revoked—are different.
Parliament intended that they should be treated differently for that reason. A prison inmate, when applying for parole, is without liberty. It has been taken away by order of the court. But, in the case of someone who has been licensed and has had his liberty restored, albeit on conditions, and Parliament having shown its intention in the statute, reasons for his recall should be given. That is crucial to this matter.
I turn to the practical consequences of what is urged in new clause 2. There are great practical problems in the way of giving reasons for the refusal of parole. The financial cost, although I do not neglect it, is not what I put first. The Parole Board and the local review committees meet in panels of four or five members. The system was fully described in "Review of Parole in England and Wales" to which reference has been made. The Parole Board and the local review committees consider all the circumstances of the case.
The hon. Member for Halifax will recall—she asked what the outcome of it was—that in 1978 an experiment was tried in producing a standardised list of 16 factors that might commonly cause the Parole Board or the local review committee to refuse parole. The idea was that the board or the local review committee could indicate from the list the points that had particularly troubled it f t an individual case.
The results of this experiment were a disappointment and the idea had to be abandoned. Even after a year had passed, the local review committees that took part in the experiment were finding it difficult to agree upon appropriate reasons from the lists, and where the review committee and the Parole Board had both considered a case, and both were agreed that it was appropriate to refuse parole, they identified differing grounds for refusal in about 25 per cent. of the cases.
I noted with interest that the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) said that a system of ticking off lists from a kind of pro-forma was not satisfactory, and he did not recommend it. That was the view of the parole board as a result of its experiment. It must follow that one must recognise that the reasons are not only far more various than can be contained in a list of 16 to be ticked, but that individual members of a review committee or the Parole Board may conscientiously and perfectly properly differ as to what reason justifies refusal. That does not mean to say that the corporate decision to refuse is any the less valid or reliable because individual members have selected different reasons.
If there had to be a statutory right to be told what the reasons were, I have only to mention that circumstance to demonstrate how impractical it would be.
Another reason of extreme importance is that to adopt such a proposal would induce a situation in which the giving of reasons for refusal to the applicant would involve procedures that simply could not be contained within the framework of the present parole system. To adopt it would be likely to change its whole character and to diminish its value. As I have said, the present system makes parole a privilege to be acquired, and the procedures are flexible and sensitive. If reasons had to be given I can readily


foresee that refusal would become subject to judicial review, and parole would take on the character of a right to be claimed.
Those who compile the reports upon which the decision is in part made, and perhaps also those who serve on the board and give the reasons, would feel an inhibition in their respective functions that would certainly not work to the benefit of the prisoners or their families. In fact, I think that it would work in the contrary direction, because I believe that the reports would be much more cautious and less forthcoming, as a result of which fewer people would be paroled.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: How can the judges have judicial review unless we allow them to have it? If we pass legislation that says they do not have judicial review, they do not get it.

Mr. Mayhew: The hon. Gentleman knows very well that the courts are diligent in finding ways of reviewing the exercise of any discretion. If Parliament passed a statute that conferred a discretion and said that reasons shall be given, it would be easy for the courts to find a means of reviewing the process by which those reasons were acted upon. In my opinion, that is the whole character of the development of the jurisdiction of the civil courts against decisions of the Executive over the past 20 or 25 years.
That is not a development that I would resent or regret——

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: We should put a stop to it.

Mr. Mayhew: No doubt that was a feeling widely shared in the last Government, but it is not a development that I regret, still less resent. If we obliged the board to give reasons, with the consequence that I foresee, and which I have endeavoured to describe, of those reasons being subject to review by the courts and the exercise of discretion being subject to judicial review, we must ask whether that is appropriate to what Parliament has always intended to be a scheme conferring a privilege.

Mr. Lawrence: Perhaps my hon. and learned Friend will allow me to add another more likely counterproductive result. If instead of being a privilege it became a right that a prisoner could serve only one-third of his sentence, is it not at any rate likely that judges might take that into consideration when imposing the original sentence?

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. The judges would do their best to apply loyally what Parliament appeared to have intended. However, I foresee circumstances in which the court, having regard to its duty to protect the public from the criminal activities of someone before it, might well feel that if parole developed along these lines it would have to impose a longer nominal sentence.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: Perhaps the Minister will clarify something that I have not quite followed. He seemed to be saying that he welcomes the system of judicial review but that he would not welcome reasons being given because they would be subject to judicial review. I do not follow that argument.

Mr. Mayhew: Where reasons must be expressed, that lets in the judicial testing of the process by which those

reasons and explanations have been given. Where that happens, it is but a short step to the process of discovery of the reports and dossiers upon which the conclusions have arisen. All that is opened up, with the inhibiting effects that I have endeavoured to describe on those who make the reports.
Parliament faced all this in much the same way in the case of the gaming board, which has been described by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Thanet, West (Mr. Rees-Davies). It faced the need in this particular and special jurisdiction to repose absolute confidence in the Parole Board, just as it did in the gaming board for the very reasons that we have been exploring.
As, in my view, the new clause would act against the interests of those whom the Parole Board system is designed to serve, and would lead to fewer rather than more people being paroled, I must advise the House to reject it.

Question put and negatived.

New clause 6

INCREASE OF PENALTY FOR UNLAWFUL EVICTION AND HARASSMENT

'In section 1 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 (Unlawful eviction and harassment of occupier) in subsection (4) for the words "£1,000" there shall be substituted "£5,000".'.—[Mr. Wheeler.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. John Wheeler: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The present maximum fine on summary conviction of £1,000 for this offence was fixed comparatively recently by the Criminal Law Act 1977, but it does not reflect the enormous value accruing to landlords who obtain possession through the use of unlawful means. Although it is recognised that the statute enables the matter to be tried on indictment where an unlimited fine or imprisonment for up to two years is available, in practice it has been found that, because of the long delays experienced in bringing cases before the Crown court and the unwillingness to tenants who are more reluctant to give evidence in the more intimidating surroundings of the Crown court, very few matters of this kind can be taken to the Crown court.
The general rule appears to have been that the magistrates' court could be enabled to impose only a maximum fine of £1,000. There are one or two exceptions to that rule in relation to pollution, fisheries and revenue offences, where it is necessary to deal with the matters speedily because the defendant may leave the jurisdiction.
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The Government have recently been persuaded, in the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, to breach that rule in relation to offences committed under the new provisions dealing with the licensing of sex shops. In the case of offences of harassment of unlawful eviction, the nature of the offence requires that the prosecution be dealt with speedily. In practical terms, that means through the magistrates' court. However, it is essential that the magistrates have sufficient power to punish offenders so that the maximum punishments available to them reflect the increased value of the property as a result of vacant possession having been obtained or sought by unlawful means.
I should be grateful if my hon. and learned Friend would look carefully at this new clause, because it is strongly supported by the London Boroughs Association and particularly by the inner London borough councils such as the council of the City of Westminster and the Royal borough of Kensington and Chelsea. I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Stevens) here, because his authority also has difficulty in this matter.
In London, as well as in other cities, we have a particularly difficult problem with bad landlords and vastly increased property values. There is a strong feeling, particularly in London, that some action should be taken to ensure that the law is respected and that the penalties available to the courts, especially to the magistrates' courts, are sufficient to deal with one of the most unpleasant evils that we are confronted with in inner London and some of our biggest cities.
I recognise that this matter strays, to an extent, into the preserve of the Department of the Environment but, nevertheless, I hope that the opportunity will be found to use the Bill to increase these penalties to deal with a great problem.

Mr. Martin Stevens: I strongly support the new clause proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington (Mr. Wheeler). My purpose in intervening is to confirm that in my borough, as in his, the facts are as he states.
So often, the House passes measures designed to protect the weak against the strong but which, when applied in practice to the day-to-day relationships of ordinary life, simply do not work. We have protected tenants against landlords who arrive at the front doorstep with savage dogs, or who throw bricks through the windows. However, in real life the sort of pressure to which a landlord submits a tenant is not, generally, so ferocious. Harassment tends to take the form of abuse such as letters demanding that the premises be vacated. Many tenants become nervous and upset as a result of this form of intimidation and become anxious to leave under almost any circumstances, even though they know that the landlord has no legal right to enforce his demand for possession.
When a fine, as in this case, is so low—other than in the circumstances that my hon. Friend has defined—it is, in contrast to the gain in value that the landlord will get for vacant possession of the premises, a flea bite. It is a minuscule tax, not a punishment. The increase in house values since 1977 makes the earlier figure out of date.
As my hon. Friend said, there is a desire for speed. Without speed, the law is ineffective and that means that in practice, higher financial penalties must be allowed to the magistrates' courts. The old limit has now been breached several times in the general top level of fines that can be imposed by the justices, and is no longer applicable for many offences where the financial stakes are so much higher than they were a decade ago.
I know that my hon. and learned Friend the Minister may feel bound to point out that the proposals that we are making would fall more naturally under legislation promoted by his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment. However, I join my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington in urging that if we can possibly cut the red tape in this case and introduce these proposals into the Bill, which will more quickly enable the tenant to

be aided, as he badly needs, we shall have served the cause of justice between landlord and tenant particularly in the inner cities.

Mr. Pitt: I support the new clause. I had hoped that we would have chosen a clause with slightly sharper teeth because it is my belief, and I think that of the hon. Members who have tabled the new clause, that whatever sum is substituted for a fine will have to be increased in the end, unless it can be so penal as to rob the landlord of any profit he may make.
Not only in the London boroughs that have been mentioned, but in the southern part of inner London where I have worked for six and a half years and in my own borough of Croydon, far too many landlords are using the excuses of the law to harass their tenants. I have a large wad of paper with me with details of the case of a Mr. Hallahan, of St. James' Road, Croydon. For the last six to nine months, he has been unmercifully harassed by his landlord, largely within the law. We cannot stop those who are within the law but we can, by the increase in the fines, if we accept the new clause, at least touch the Landlords who go so far that they go outwith the law, and fall within the purview of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.
I wish that we could have had a new clause that gives the Protection from Eviction Act stronger teeth. because we need some strong sanctions to prevent the bad landlordism that is on the increase in inner and outer London. I am content to support the new clause because it will at least give some greater power to stop these people preying on their tenants. The tenants are mostly unsophisticated people on low income, often with no job or a job that carries little responsibility. These are the people who are preyed on and the increase in the fine would assist them in some small way. I look forward in the near future to some legislation that will give—stronger teeth to the Protection from Eviction Act.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington (Mr. Wheeler) for taking the opportunity presented by the Bill to raise a matter about which he feels strongly. I have particularly noted the support that he has told us exists in the London Boroughs Association and among the inner London boroughs for his proposals.
New clause 6 would extend the maximum fine for the offences of unlawful eviction and harassment of an occupier from £1,000 to £5,000. My hon. Friend rightly notes, as does my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Stevens), that these are matters of policy which fall within the jurisdiction of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment. I have an interest, however, in the structure of fines.
It is important that we retain a consistency, so far as this is possible, in the pattern of maximum fines for one offence and another. That has been established to some extent by the Criminal Law Act 1977 and carried further in the Bill. It is therefore important to avoid the temptation of providing one-off exceptions unless there are overwhelming reasons for doing so. The sum of £1,000 is the maximum financial penalty normally available to magistrates' courts. It represents the normal dividing line between the jurisdiction of magistrates' courts and Crown courts and the general limit beyond which defendants should be entitled to jury trial.
As my hon. Friend has mentioned, these are offences that are triable in two ways. They can be tried summarily


by the magistrates, in which case £1,000 is the maximum fine; or they can be tried on indictment in a Crown court, in which event there is no limit to the fine that may be imposed upon conviction. The only offences triable either way like this for which maximum fines of more than £1,000 are available on summary conviction by magistrates are those in pollution and merchant shipping legislation where environmental damage can be immense and where it is necessary to undertake proceedings speedily against the foreign vessels concerned before they leave our jurisdiction.
I have noted what my hon. Friend says about the need for speedy action in the case of harassment. If it was decided to proceed against the accused person seeking trial on indictment at the Crown court, it would be possible, I suppose, once proceedings had begun, for an injunction to be obtained to restrain the continuing action that is complained of and that the injunction could be enforced by way of imprisonment if it was defied. I should have thought that the need for speedy action in those circumstances could be met.
There has been reference to the provision in the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill—what might be called the sex shop provision—for a £5,000 penalty on summary conviction. We have said that steps will be taken in another place to increase that amount. I do not believe, however, that this is on all fours with the present offences. Summary trial only has been provided for dealing with the sex shop offences and unlimited fines would not therefore be available.
I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington has been in correspondence with my right hon. Friend the Minister for Local Government and Environmental Services. In that correspondence, my hon. Friend has drawn my right hon. Friend's attention to examples of incidents that give rise to concern. My noble Friend the then Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office asked for advice upon these incidents from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. The Metropolitan Police have been able to give my officials some preliminary observations on their policy in this area and have undertaken to provide reports on the detailed incidents to which my hon. Friend has drawn attention.
Enforcement in this area of the law is not an easy matter. Nor, if there are problems of enforcement, does it necessarily follow that a legislative solution such as this is the answer. What is clear, however, is that my noble Friend the present Under-Secretary of State must be given the opportunity to examine police advice on incidents drawn to his attention before this aspect of the matter can be taken further.
I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that the Government take seriously the matters that he has raised and understand his desire and the desire of other hon. Members who have spoken to achieve remedies. Responsibility for general oversight of the Protection from Eviction Act rests with my hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment. I am sure that he will pay full attention to what has been said in this debate.

Mr. Wheeler: Speed in dealing with this problem is essential and time is passing. There is an increasing number of problems in inner London associated with bad

landlords, some of whom are foreign nationals with no commitment to the interests of British people who live in London. Many of the people upon whom great ills are perpetrated have a deprived and inadequate background and do not find it easy to go to court and to give evidence or make statements.
The Secretary of State for the Environment has not been particularly forthcoming in dealing with these matters. There is great concern that the Government generally do not look upon the problems of London with the necessary—care and concern. That is why this opportunity is taken to press the matter. I am afraid that it rests with my hon. and learned Friend to decide whether this new clause should go into the Bill.

Mr. Mayhew: I hear what my hon. Friend says. I do not challenge his contention that these people are not adept in court procedures and find it difficult to provide statements. That is just as relevant to a trial in a magistrates' court as it is to a trial in a Crown court. There cannot be any fine imposed upon someone accused of these serious offences unless it is the result of conviction in one court or the other. However, the present fine of £1,000 will be eligible under the Bill for uprating to take account of the decline in the value of money in recent years.
Once the Bill is on the statute book, it will be open to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to place an order before Parliament to increase these maxima and other maxima. It is his intention as soon as possible next year, if this provision is enacted, to use that power. In that event, it is our expectation that the maximum of £1,000 will be increased to about £2,500. If that course of events comes about, it is foreseeable that by the middle of next year the maximum would be increased to half of the sum that my hon. Friend would like to achieve.
I should like to be able to say more to my hon. Friend, but I am afraid that I cannot do so. I understand the way in which he puts the case. I have done my best to explain the difficulties that lie in our way. I have given the undertaking that my noble Friend will be considering the detailed representations made to him by the police about the incidents that have been brought to his attention. I hope that what I have said will be of some, although I recognise not of entire, comfort to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Wheeler: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 8

INAPPROPRIATE SENTENCES

'(1) Where any person has been sentenced in any criminal cause or matter the Attorney-General may if he thinks fit at any time within … days of the passing of the sentence at the trial refer the sentence to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal on the ground that it was whether wholly or in one or more particular respects inappropriate having regard to all the circumstances of the case and on any such reference the Court if they think the sentence was inappropriate shall quash it and shall pass such other sentence warranted in law by the verdict (whether more or less severe) in substitution therefore as they think ought to have been passed provided that they shall only have power to pass such sentence as could have been passed by the Court by which the person was originally sentenced and that they shall take into account any part of the original sentence already served.

(2) On any such reference the Attorney-General shall pay the sentenced person's taxed costs of the reference in any event.'.—[Mr. Alan Clark.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Alan Clark: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The House will recognise that there is great and growing public anxiety about the whole area of what is loosely and colloquially defined as law and order. We accept in the quieter atmosphere of Report stage that it would be inappropriate to cast any stain or to blame individuals or parties. However, public indignation is constantly expressed in one sector. I refer to the inconsistency of sentences for the same offences and the inadequacy of sentences for offences that the public find particularly offensive and upsetting.
The purpose of the new clause is to give the Attorney-General the power, if a sentence is, in his judgment, inappropriate, to refer it to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. He will set out the grounds on which it is in one or more respects inappropriate. This will give the Criminal Division the chance to correct the defect.
I do not think that the power would be widely used. There is no question of the prosecution having the right to call for a particular sentence and, if that call is not met, referring to the Attorney-General and pursuing a defendant. The new clause has been drafted to avoid that. It merely gives the Attorney-General the power to respond to a public sense of indignation. He would be the judge of the level of that indignation and the manner in which and extent to which it had been expressed.
The fact that the power is available will, even if only used sparingly, give great reassurance to the public who have been expressing widespread disquiet.
I shall not burden the House, as it would be so easy to do, with examples of sentences that, in the view of the layman, have been inadequate and, indeed, offensive. In some cases this year human life has been taken, including the lives of children, but the defendants for one reason or another have walked free from the court, and the sense of public outrage has been extremely marked.
Every hon. Member, in the course of his service as an elected representative, must have received a number of letters from constituents complaining about sentences awarded either locally or nationally. Hon. Members will know the indignation that is aroused. It is important to go some way towards quietening that anxiety because the frustration arising from inadequate sentences is finding expression in a number of disagreeable and highly dangerous symptons. It is almost impossible to obtain a conviction against a person in a position of authority—a prison officer or a police officer—who has used violence, even to the extent of causing loss of life, against prisoners who are either on remand or have received sentence. Practically no jury will convict in such cases because of an unspoken acceptance by juries and the public that there are many inexplicable cases of really odious crimes. There is a tacit acceptance of rough justice, and of those applying it, when it is applied in unclear circumstances.
The House knows of many cases where injuries of varying degrees of severity have been inflicted on persons who have been convicted, or are on remand for crimes of various scales. Where that has happened those charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm, or even causing death, have always been acquitted.

Mr. Lawrence: How will my hon. Friend's new clause affect the situation if the man is acquitted?

Mr. Clark: Acquittal is the most difficult consideration in these cases. I am surprised that my hon. and learned Friend, with his legal knowledge, should ask that question. As he knows, an acquittal is not a sentence and, although the public may feel that an acquittal is inappropriate, arising from a bad verdict, the new clause does not apply. The new clause refers to sentences, not verdicts. If a person has been acquitted, that is that. No one would dream of suggesting that that principle should be interfered with. We are trying to find some way of allaying the widespread and increasing public indignation about inadequate sentences. I remind my hon. and learned Friend that sentence is pronounced only after a person has been convicted.
The new clause will get rid of a great deal of frustration. People will realise that a measure is available to correct the situation. The sinister and intrusive element—not quite the desire for lynch law—that proper justice under the constitution cannot be, or is not being, applied and that rough justice is, therefore, legitimised by the defect, would be eliminated.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson: Perhaps my hon. Friend has in mind the fine of £2,000 that was imposed upon a rapist early in the year. There was much public disquiet and many people felt that a prison sentence should also have been imposed. In such a case, who would apprise the Attorney-General of the public's concern so that he could use the new clause to have the sentence reconsidered?

Mr. Clark: I am flattered that my hon. Friend should be expressing such interest in the new clause. He should only be questioning me about the minutiae of its technicality. I prefer to con lime myself to the text of the clause. However, I remind my hon. Friend that the Attorney-General is a senior Law Officer. He is a political animal and a political appointee. He would be well aware of the scale of public indignation at any given moment. He talks to Government and Back-Bench colleagues and receives a voluminous mail. He has many other sources and contacts from which he should be able to appraise cases in which it would be appropriate for him to make such a referral. Precedents would gradually accumulate.
Laymen have to tread carefully when they draft new clauses and never more so than when they are seeking to amend a lawyer's Bill. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) will support me and will put the issue in the language of lawyers much more elegantly and persuasively than I could do. However, I am sure that the House would not feel it appropriate that arguments relating to new clauses in legal Bills should be confined to lawyers, much though they would prefer that to be the case. It is natural that hearing laymen stumble their way through legal arguments would offend lawyer's sensibilities.
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I conclude, still in the language of laymen. There is a cosmetic aspect to the new clause. I suggest that it would do great good immediately, because the public would realise that there was a machinery by which inadequate and offensive sentences could be corrected if the senior


Law Officer of the Crown decided that that was necessary. That would rid us of certain undesirable new symptoms that are starting to pervade law and order issues.
I shall be satisfied if my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State will simply give an undertaking to refer my suggestion to the Criminal Law Revision Committee. Indeed, it would be ungracious of him to refuse to do even that, because the suggestion should be seriously considered. The level of public disquiet is strong and we have available a relatively easy curative measure.
The House has heard enough from me in lay language and I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde will support the new clause in language that lawyers will find easier to understand and more persuasive.

Mr. Edward Gardner: I support the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) and I cannot help but agree with his description of the growing concern in the public mind about over-lenient sentences and the absence of any power for the courts to deal with such mistaken judgments.
The purpose of the new clause is to identify, and to give the Government the opportunity to consider, what many rightly regard as a serious defect in our appellate system. Harsh sentences can be corrected on appeal, but if by a mischance—fortunately such cases are rare—a judge decides on a sentence that is obviously inappropriate to a particularly serious crime nothing can be done about it.
In 1965 the Morris committee, which looked at possible ways of improving the appellate system, recommended that the Court of Criminal Appeal should become the Court of Appeal criminal division, with additional and reformed powers. The committee examined the prospect of allowing the new court to retain its power to increase a sentence when someone had come before it on an appeal to decrease his sentence.
It was decided, for good reasons, that that would be a wholly inappropriate power, which was unfair to the appellant. It was becoming traditional that if the Court of Criminal Appeal decided that an appeal had no merit it could bring the matter to a swift conclusion by threatening the appellant with an increased sentence if he persisted with his appeal.
The Morris committee decided that the power should be removed from the Court of Appeal, but the removal of that power must not be confused with the proposal in the new clause to introduce a new power for the Court of Appeal to increase sentences where an inordinately lenient sentence has been imposed for a serious crime and it is thought that it should be corrected.
The proposal in the new clause is not a novel suggestion. Many countries, including Canada and a number in Europe, allow their courts to use the power that we suggest ought to be considered by the Government as a new power for the Court of Appeal.
My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton dealt with an important matter in reply to an intervention by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) about what would happen in the case of an acquittal. I should make it clear to the House that acquittals would not be affected by the new clause which refers only to sentences.
One should always have in the background when such a reform is suggested the fear that an appellant may be put in double jeopardy, but that fear is removed immediately by the fact that the new clause would apply only to sentences and there would be no question of anyone being put in double jeopardy or of the verdict of a jury being exposed to alteration.

Mr. Keith Best: My hon. and learned Friend speaks with his usual forceful persuasion. The new clause gives what appears to be an unfettered discretion to the Attorney-General. I do not expect my hon. and learned Friend to try to define how that discretion may be used, but will he tell us what matters he believes would be material in the Attorney-General's mind before he made a reference to the Court of Appeal?

Mr. Gardner: I would expect the Attorney-General to be moved by considerations of the sort that I suspect move the Court of Appeal when it sees that a sentence has caused a sense of public outrage. It always seems that by some happy coincidence a case soon comes before the Court of Appeal which allows it to make it clear, with guidelines if necessary, how such offences should be dealt with in the future. I hope that the same considerations would influence the Attorney-General in deciding whether a case should be referred to the Court of Appeal.

Mr. Best: If that is the case, we would almost certainly have a trial of sentence by the media. It would be the editors of newspapers in editorials who would largely determine whether there were such a public outrage that the Attorney-General should feel that his discretion should be exercised in making a reference within the new clause.

Mr. Gardner: I should be almost as outraged by the Attorney-General acting in that way as I should be by an inordinately lenient sentence. I should like to put my trust in the judgment, experience and wisdom of the Attorney-General. I would have faith in an Attorney-General appointed by either side of the House to exercise that discretion justly. I would fear nothing of the kind that my hon. Friend has anticipated.

Mr. Alan Clark: My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) appears to think that the Attorney-General might succumb to pressure from editorial pages, but there is also the fact that the case will go to the Court of Appeal. My hon. Friend cannot say that it, too, would be influenced by the editorial.

Mr. Gardner: This power, given to the Attorney-General on a discretionary basis, would in my view be used sparingly and rarely. It would, as it were, be a reserve power which could, in certain circumstances, be valuable and could be used to the improvement of our system of justice. I endorse the plea by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton to my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State, and through him to the Government, that the problem that is summarised in and solved by this new clause—it is a problem—should be submitted to the Criminal Law Revision Committee. It is all too clear that there are all kinds of peripheral and indeed central, difficulties which attach to any reform of this kind. It would require the careful consideration of a committee such as the Criminal Law Revision Committee. I strongly urge my hon. and learned Friend to help us by telling us this evening that the matter will be submitted to the Criminal Law Revision Committee.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: When I read this new clause I must confess that I was not strongly disposed in its favour. When I listened to the arguments advanced by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), I became strongly disposed against it. I regret to say that that disposition has not been much lessened by the persuasive words of the hon. and learned Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner).
The clause would allow an application to be made where, in the view of the Attorney-General, the sentence was either too severe or too lenient. It is apparent from what has been said by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and the hon. and learned Member for South Fylde that what they have in mind is that it would be exercised only where it was thought that the sentence was too lenient. There are perfectly adequate powers of appeal that cover circumstances where a sentence is over severe. It would be unnecessary to give such a power to the Attorney-General in that case.
The hon. and learned Gentleman was right in saying that there are jurisdictions in which the prosecution has a right of appeal against a sentence on the ground that it is inadequate. If one follows the logic of his argument, it is difficult to see why he is not suggesting that precisely that power should be applied in our courts. Why suggest that the power should be one that could be exercised only by the Attorney-General?
As I understood it, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton put his case on two grounds. First, that there is from time to time—he said, very rarely—a feeling of public outrage about an inadequate sentence. No doubt there is from time to time such a feeling of outrage, whether justified or not. In my experience, in many cases such a feeling is not justified because the public does not know all the facts that the judge knows. However, there may be the odd case where the judge has been unduly lenient. Secondly, he put what seems to me to be the extraordinary argument that when police or prison officers beat up someone in their charge, juries acquit because they think that judges are too generally soft.

Mr. Alan Clark: I am surprised at the hon. and learned Gentleman employing the device of fore-shortening an argument, expressing in it in a compressed and disreputable form and then shooting it down. I said that the new clause must be seen in the context of a general level of public frustration with law enforcement and sentencing. That level of frustration is so pervasive that it is already beginning to have many undesirable side-effects, of which I gave the example that no jury will convict in cases such as he cited. I did not say that there is a direct link between the two. It is a little unfair to attribute that to me.

Mr. Silkin: I would be the last person to wish to do injustice to the hon. Gentleman, whom I have heard speaking in Committee on the Bill from time to time. I hope that, when I re-read what he said in Hansard, I will find that I did him an injustice. However, I am bound to say that it seemed to me to be a most extraordinary way to put his case. The hon. Gentleman says that he was simply giving an example of the general feeling of frustration. That feeling of frustration to which he referred arises, it is said, because judges are too lenient, whether in particular cases or generally. If that were the situation,

and that frustration were justified and general, one comes back to the point that there might be a case for giving the prosecution a general power.

Mr. Edward Gardner: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has raised an important question. Why not give this power to the prosecution? I do not want to see the prosecution involved in the sentencing process. It would be incompatible with the tastes of our people. There i:, no need for it. The alternative solution, which is part of the new clause, provides a satisfactory way of overcoming the objections that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has in mind.

Mr. Silkin: I am delighted to hear the hon. and learned Gentleman say that he does not want the prosecution to be involved. It is fundamental to our system of justice and of sentencing that the prosecution is impartial in the conduct of the trial and should not be placed in the position of demanding a particular sentence. We have rejected the idea of the prosecution demanding a sentence—as app lies in some jurisdictions—and of giving the prosecution a right of appeal against sentence for that very reason. Although the case is slightly different, Parliament also decided that it was wrong to continue with a system under which the court used to have a power to increase a sentence when an appellant appealed on the ground of its severity. The whole trend of our thinking on sentences has gone in the opposite direction to that proposed in the new clause.
The proposed power is to be given to the Attorney-General to get over that difficulty. I do not know how he is to operate that power unless the prosecution tells him the facts of the case. Is it suggested that he should read newspaper accounts, or that matters should be brought to his attention by Members of Parliament saying -Look at this terrible case in which someone has been given only six months when he should have been given five years"? Is that the way in which the matter will be brought to his attention? That does not appeal to me and would not appeal to any Attorney-General.
In recent years, the Attorney-General has been given a power to refer certain matters to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. That power was to apply when he thought that an acquittal by a lower court should be referred because an important question of law was involved. The power was expressly limited so that the name and identity of the defendant were not known and so that nothing that the Court of Appeal did in reaching its decision on the law would have any effect on the acquittal of the defendant.
Therefore, the power is very much restricted and is quite different from that envisaged in the new clause. Under the new clause, a defendant who had been convicted and sentenced would never know whether the matter was to be raised again. To some extent, the matter would depend on popular clamour and so on. The defendant would be at risk because it would be a matter of chance whether a local reporter heard his trial and sentence and passed on the information to the national press, thus creating a fuss. Justice should not be dispensed in that way.
When I held the office of Attorney-General I had to operate many difficult powers. The Attorney-General often knows that whatever decision he takes, he will be criticised and attacked. He takes that in his stride, as he


must. If such a power were given to the Attorney-General, I would regard it as the most distasteful power and would never want to exercise it.

Mr. Lawrence: There is certainly no agreement on this side of the House that the new clause should be accepted. I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) that the provision is thoroughly unacceptable, and I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Minister will completely and utterly reject it.
Of course I endorse what my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) said in his opening remarks. The public are anxious about law and order. There are many things that should be done about that. My hon. Friend and I are in complete agreement about most of those matters and we have often ventilated together our suggestions about what more can be done to improve the criminal legal process to ensure that more of the guilty are caught, convicted and properly sentenced.
However, the new clause is not the sort of proposal that we should consider. In his frustration at the inadequacy of law and order, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton has proposed a measure that not many of those involved in the legal process will support. The new clause was no doubt tabled with great fervour but as my hon. Friend came closer to moving the new clause, and then while actually moving it, the strength of his adherence to the principle began to wane. Ultimately my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) said, in effect, "Let's throw it at the Criminal Law Revision Committee and let it bite at this bone." That may be a partial solution, but there are more important matters for that Committee to consider.
I shall deal with some of the most glaring objections to the new clause. First, the Attorney-General's power to refer the matter to the Court of Appeal is the power of the highest prosecuting authority in the land. It cannot seriously be argued that the prosecution would not be taking part in the sentencing process. It would certainly be seen as such. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde, a sponsor of the new clause, shied away from that. It is clear that that change would be contrary to the cherished principles of our English legal criminal system. It is contrary to the historic principle of English law that a person should not be hounded into conviction or into a longer sentence after conviction.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton waxed eloquent in his cause, he began to drift—as was inevitable—into saying that there were acquittals that should not have been made. That was why I asked him how acquittals would be affected by the new clause, which does not deal with them.

Mr. Alan Clark: I did not say anything about acquittals. The first time acquittals were mentioned was during the extraordinary intervention of my hon. and learned Friend. He asked how the clause would cope with acquittals. The clause is confined entirely to sentence.

Mr. Lawrence: I intervened precisely because my hon. Friend was dealing with acquittals. He was talking about juries who refused to convict prison and police officers who had done wrong.
My second objection is that once we break into that principle and start to reconsider whether a person has been rightly let off by the inadequacy of the sentence, how long will it be before we are driven to consider whether a person has been rightly let off by the insanity or stupidity of the jury? How long would it be before we were invited to consider—as even now there are rumours—whether the jury system itself is wholly adequate to suit the needs of a modern society where terrorism and lawlessness abide?

Mr. Arthur Davidson: The next course might be not just whether the sentence is inappropriate but whether it is lenient.

Mr. Lawrence: I am going down another path at the moment. How long will it be before we abolish the jury system and substitute the decision of either single or dual judges? How long before it is considered that some of the rules of evidence which we have consistently embraced as being a fair test of a man's innocence or guilt begin to be eroded? How long will it be before judges suggest that defence speeches are too long and repetitious and that cross-examination is too lengthy? Do I strike some chord of recollection in the ears of hon. Gentlemen opposite who even now recall reading in the newspapers of observations by judges who are frustrated at the inadequacy of the existing system to deal with lawlessness?
How long will it be before counsel are frightened to take a case? How long will it be before in a particularly obnoxious case a client will not find it easy to get a counsel to defend him? It happens. It happened in the case of Shcharansky in the Soviet Union. It is difficult for counsel who want to enter a plea of not guilty to expect that they will long remain in their chosen profession under a regime which has slipped away into totalitarianism. It is because that is anathema to our system that we should not begin the process.
My third objection is that the process would savour of vindictiveness and hounding. We are appalled at the prospect of double jeopardy. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde was driven to deny that there was any element of double jeopardy in reconsidering a man's sentence. There are many forms of double jeopardy. It is one form of double jeopardy to retry a man who has been acquitted and it is another to reconsider the adequacy of the sentence. The purpose of reconsidering the sentence would be to impose a harsher one. That would be repulsive to the historic principles of English law. It astonishes me that any hon. and learned Friend of mine could seriously put his name to the matter.
I could continue but there are other hon. Ladies and Gentlemen who want to speak, and my view is not the only one. It does appear that this new clause is ill-considered in the light of the effect it would have on the historic attitude and processes of our criminal legal system. It appears that it is impracticable to operate, by virtue of the exchanges we have heard. As the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich said, there would be difficulties for an Attorney-General having to call in papers, examine transcripts and deal with the matter by reference to newspapers. We know how unbiased they are in their reporting. We know how much trust we can repose in the media because we have had recent evidence of that, particularly with the BBC. I hope that nobody will blame me for taking the opportunity of getting that matter in.
Therefore, I hope that the new clause will be dealt with by the House on its merits—that is, no merit at all—and


I hope that we shall not allow ourselves to be a party to the reversal of any of the traditional, historic, well-established and well-regarded principles that are fundamental to our British legal system.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: The hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) has painted a gruesome picture of the effects that the new clause could have upon the traditions of the English legal system. I am not sure that I would read quite so much into it, but, from what he has said and from what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) has said with all the authority of an ex-Attorney-General, I believe that it is an illogical and inappropriate way to deal with inappropriate sentences.
The hon. and learned Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner), who is experienced in legal matters, knows that he cannot hide behind the fact that the new clause does not seek to involve the prosecution in the sentencing process, because it is inescapable that that will be the ultimate effect. Neither he nor anyone who has pride in the impartial way in which prosecutors present the case would wish that to happen, but it is not logical to suggest that the Attorney-General should have power to remit a case on the ground that the sentence is inappropriate without discussions with the prosecution and without the prosecution having expressed a view upon it. If the prosecution expresses a view upon it, the logical conclusion is that during the trial the prosecution should express a view about the ultimate sentence. If that were to happen, the whole role and tradition of presentation by the prosecution would be changed, as the hon. and learned Gentleman well knows.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: My hon. and learned Friend is making a very important point. Might not one effect be the prosecution indicating to the judge how the Court of Appeal dealt with a previous similar case in which the sentence was increased?

Mr. Davidson: That is a possible conclusion. For fear that the judge might pass an inappropriate sentence, the prosecution would seek to introduce as much evidence as possible relevant not to obtaining the correct verdict but to obtaining a heavy sentence. That is the inevitable logic of the new clause.
The same would apply to the police. The pressure upon them to gather information that would strengthen the court's inclination to lengthen the sentence would be irresistible. There would be a strong tendency, for which they could not be blamed, to bring forward as much information as possible to obtain the longest possible sentence. They would do that because the hon. and learned Member for South Fylde would have achieved the creation in the police and in the prosecution of a personal interest in the sentence, rather than an institutional one as at present. The hon. and learned Gentleman, in my view, cannot really answer that argument.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich spoke of the difficulty that an Attorney-General would feel if he were burdened with this responsibility. We in this House know that successive Attorneys-General, on both sides of the House—I include the present Attorney-General—have the ability to walk that tightrope of being political appointees while exercising fairness and impartiality in their decisions as guardians of the public interest.
The danger of the new clause lies in involving the Attorney-General, even if he did not wish it, in overall Government policy on law and order. That would be the irresistible conclusion that the public would reach.
The other conclusion would be this. The hon. and learned Member for South Fylde suggests that if this power were given to the Attorney-General the public would be reassured that inappropriate sentences would be rectified. There is a public concern about that. I accept that, as does everybody else, but I do not believe that that would be the conclusion. In any given case where there was a public clamour in the newspapers for an Attorney-General's reference to be made and the Attorney-General did not make that reference, the public would be even more concerned. They would say that the Attorney-General had not carried out his public duty or even his political duty—the duty which he was elected to carry out. That would dangerously erode the high reputation that Attorneys-General rightly have in the constitution of this country.
There are other more obvious reasons. It would be oppressive and unfair for any convicted person who has had all the torment and horrors of a criminal trial and who has been convicted and sentenced to have hanging over him the fear that his sentence might ultimately be overturned and a heavier sentence imposed. That may not be double jeopardy, but it is certainly jeopardy and is oppressive and in many ways offensive to all our traditions. It is, as it were, single jeopardy or additional jeopardy, as the hon. and learned Member for Burton rightly points out.
If the hon. and learned Member for South Fylde feels that this new clause is necessary, I should have thought that he would at least limit it to cases where the judge has got the law wrong, as he certainly appeared to have done in the notorious rape case by his introduction of the strange doctrine of contributory negligence, but that is not provided for in the new clause either. If this new clause were to be adopted, it would be more logical for the Minister to change the nature of the prosecution system by introducing as a prerequisite a national prosecution agency where the prosecution is seen to be an independent force.
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The added difficulty, which I am sure that the Minister does not intend, is that there could be a tendency for judges to give a longer sentence than perhaps a case merits, which goes against the whole flavour and intent of the measure.
In all the circumstances, the House should feel that, although this has been a useful debate, the new clause should be rejected. If it is not, the traditions of our legal system will be changed for the worse.

Mr. Best: It is clear that the House is against the new clause, but my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) are right to say that there is a sense of public outrage at some of the sentences passed in our courts. However, I am sure that they would be the first to acknowledge that it is wrong to say that there is a general sense of disillusionment with the majority of sentences. The majority are not open to challenge. The new clause is designed to remedy those that cause a sense of outrage.
We must ask ourselves what causes that sense of outrage. Surely it must be, in the majority of cases, the way in which sentences are reported in the press. Sadly,


the general public do not have access to all the mitigating circumstances and the details of the trial, or of the offence to which a defendant has pleaded guilty. Therefore—I say it with respect to the general public—they are not competent in most cases to make a definitive judgment as to the validity of a sentence. Those who are competent are the people who sit, in decreasing numbers, in the public galleries of our courts and who hear all the facts and the mitigating circumstances.
Although I acknowledge that both my hon. Friend and my hon. and learned Friend are correct in their estimation that there is a sense of public outrage, they are incorrect about the remedy for it. The remedy must be a better way of reporting court cases so that the general public can have access to the facts that they would have if they sat in the public gallery. I suspect that many hon. Members would say that that is clearly impractical and that it is impossible to publish verbatim in the newspapers all the circumstances, facts and mitigation in a case. They are absolutely right. If that is the case, it means, even more persuasively, that the new clause is not the way to deal with abuse. If I am correct, it is an ill-founded concept in any event.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best). It is not only impractical, but in many cases it would be completely undesirable, that all the matters taken into account by the judge, including social inquiry reports, should be ventilated in public.

Mr. Best: The right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) speaks with great force on such matters, as a former Attorney-General, and he is right. The point that I wish to establish is that because the general public feel a sense of outrage at some sentences, it does not necessarily mean that the sense of outrage is well-founded. If only the facts were available to a wider public, many members of the public would realise that the sentence was absolutely right. I accept, however, that that does not entirely dispose of the argument of my hon. and learned Friend and my hon. Friend. Inevitably, there will still be cases where a judge gets it wrong. Just as a judge can get it wrong in law, so the judge can get the sentence wrong in the opinion of those who sit around the court and feel that the sentence should be other than the one that was passed.
Who is the custodian of the public conscience in terms of sentencing? Is it the judge in the courtroom where the sentence is passed, calling into account all his experience at the Bar and as a member of the Law Society, and all the surrounding circumstances which he understands as a member of the general public as well as a member of the judiciary? Or should the public conscience be, not the judge at the trial, but the Attorney-General in this place? My hon. and learned Friend and my hon. Friend are saying that the Attorney-General should be the final arbiter of the public sense in matters of sentencing, and that it should be removed from the judge—accepting, of course, that the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal would make the final decision, and not the Attorney-General, on the sentencing.
How will the Attorney-General gauge whether a matter is one of sufficient public outrage that a reference should be made? Surely it can only be by reading the newspapers

which express a sense of outrage, either in letters from readers or in editorial comment, and I hope that I have already demonstrated to the House that that is a highly inaccurate way of gauging the true sense of public opinion on a particular case.
If that is so, it must surely be right that the custodianship of the public sense in terms of sentencing should still rest with the judiciary, and not with a political officer in this House, the Attorney-General.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I am completely against the new clause. The hon. and learned Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) was right when he said that the practice that used to obtain, of allowing the Court of Appeal to increase a sentence if the court thought that the appeal was inappropriate, was abolished some time ago. He was in favour of that abolition, and said that it had nothing to do with a proposal of this nature. I accept that.
This is a wholly novel proposal for English law, though it is not the first time that it has been made. It was made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ashley) a few years ago, after another rape case. The House voted on it in a Ten-Minute Bill, and rejected it. If there is any possibilty that this proposal will get off the ground, I hope that it will be voted down tonight.
In introducing the new clause, the hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) suggested that they would be happy if the Minister sent it to the Criminal Law Revision Cornmitee. I should not be happy about that. In practice, the fact that it has been referred by Parliament to that Committee gives it a start. Because the proposal has been urged by hon. Members, the Committee thinks that a proportion of opinion in the House is behind it. If that were to happen, simply as a means of getting rid of this new clause, it would be disastrous.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee and everybody else ought to know that the strength of feeling in the House is almost completely opposed to the proposal. The reasons have been given by several hon. Members. The best reason has been given by the hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best). There is no such thing as a right or wrong sentence. There is a perception, which is frequently subjective, about whether a sentence was too lenient or too heavy. Where it is thought, by the accused in particular, to have been too heavy he can appeal. The Court of Appeal then takes a view about whether the sentence was too heavy.
To give the Court of Appeal the right to decide whether a sentence was too lenient is to provide that the Court of Appeal might be able to drag up a sentence rather than drag it down. That flies in the face of the mood not only of the House but of people outside in recent years that sentencing on the whole for offences that were not violent has been too heavy and that there should be some degree of shorter sentencing.
If we were to pass this clause it would be an indication to the judiciary that we were reconsidering that mood. I do not want to reconsider it. It is highly desirable that we should get towards shorter sentences as quickly as possible. Therefore, I would not be in favour of the new clause.
Who would be able to estimate whether there was a sufficient head of steam to allow the Attorney-General to intervene? The hon. Member for Anglesey is right. The Attorney-General would decide by reason of the screaming headlines. It would be The Sun or the Daily Express that


would decide whether public comment was such that the case ought to go to the Court of Appeal. Those who believe, as apparently the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton believes, that judges are not affected by this cannot know what judges are like. Of course they are as affected by criticism in the press as anybody else. The only difference is that those of us in public life who have been subjected to such criticism know better how to bear it. The judiciary feel it strongly. There is no doubt that it makes a difference to their decisions. It has been suggested that after one of these outbursts of public indignation in the newspapers the Court of Appeal can take a certain view; of course it can. It can respond to public pressure through the newspapers. That is not a sensible way to proceed.
If we take rape as an example, it is not right to say that there should never be a non-custodial sentence for the offence of rape. Rape varies in its enormity from one case to another. It can be the most odious kind of violent offence, but it can also be an offence which is only marginally over the border from a woman saying "Yes" to a woman leading a man to the position where he thinks she is going to say "Yes" and at that stage she says "No". It is still rape and the man is convicted of a serious offence. But anybody who believes that that kind of rape requires a custodial sentence is flying in the face of common sense.
If in such a case a judge decides that it is wrong to send a man to prison, he may couch his language in the wrong way. It may be that we would take a different view but he is surely entitled to take a view on all the facts that a lenient sentence is desirable. Then all the pressure groups in society who are concerned about rape scream about that decision and ask that the sentence should be revised. If this clause were enacted, the Attorney-General would feel that he was under considerable pressure to send that case to the Court of Appeal. It is in that sort of situation that injustice could be done.
The hon. and learned Member for South Fylde said that that would not be double jeopardy. I do not know what it would be if it is not double jeopardy. The man has been put before a court and considered for sentence and then he is being sent to another court so that the same facts may be used to justify not a lower sentence, which certainly would not put him in double jeopardy, but a higher sentence, which would. In those circumstances it flies in the face of our whole tradition of sentencing that we should take this kind of step.
I hope that the Minister will make it clear that the Government will not go any distance along that road. If he were to say to those who proposed the new clause that it might be considered in future, we should vote to ensure that it is known that we are totally opposed to that.

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Mr. Edward Lyons: We have a phenomenon in political life where every time the Court of Appeal does something which those on the Left do not like, they attack the judiciary as being biased. Now we see a similar emanation in the new clause. Those on the Right, where there is mistrust of judges who do not make sentences severe enough for their taste, seek to call in aid a member of the Executive branch of the Government to act as a sort of interim court of appeal and to act as a quasi-judge who will consider whether the sentence is too low. If it is, he will use all his authority to pass it upwards to the Court of Appeal.
I deplore what amounts to a vote of no confidence in the judiciary, which is embodied in the new clause. It is a retrograde development to ask a member of the Executive, the Attorney-General, to take a hand in the sentencing process. There is no doubt that when an Attorney-General refers, the Court of Appeal will take the view that he is referring because he thinks that there is something in the charge that the sentence is too low. The Court of Appeal will start from that basis.
I believe that the judiciary alone should be responsible for sentencing and that the Attorney-General should have nothing to do with it. If one starts allowing members of the Executive to interfere in that way in sentencing, one could open a Pandora's Box of other nasty developments. As far as possible we must try to keep the Executive and the judiciary separate. Where we allow the Attorney-General to intervene, it should be on the side of action that deals with points of law or something in the general public interest.
The Court of Appeal criminal division has much work on its hands from people appealing against sentences which, in their view, are too severe. To add to the workload of the Court of Appeal criminal division by producing a flow of work from the other direction—appeals against sentences that are too low—would be expensive. More judges would be required if the Attorney-General were active in pursuit of his references. It would also be expensive because of the cost of transcripts.
An Attorney-General dare not refer unless he has seen a transcript of the case. When a Member of Parliament gets in touch with the Attorney-General and asks him what he thinks of a sentence or when the Attorney-General reads a newspaper proclaiming from the depths of ignorance that a sentence is wrong, the first thing that he must dc to protect himself from criticism is to call for a transcript.
The shorthand writers will have a lovely time preparing all the transcripts at public expense. The poor old Attorney-General, who is already one of the most overworked members of the Administration, whichever Attorney-General is holding the post at the time, will h aye to read large numbers of transcripts, with the aid of a small staff, to see which of the cases justify reference.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: Does it not inevitably follow, despite what was said in support of the new clause, that the Attorney-General would have to ask those who prosecuted at the trial whether they thought the sentence was inadequate? Indeed, who will the Attorney-General use to present the case to the Court of Appeal, if not the prosecution?

Mr. Lyons: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right. I remember how hard he worked with his small staff when he was Attorney-General. The idea of saddling him with large numbers of transcripts every time the relatives of a victim felt that the sentence was inadequate, or the newspapers or a Member of Parliament decided that a sentence was not appropriate, is horrifying.
Furthermore, there is an old legal maxim—ut sit finis litium—which means that there should be an end to litigation. That maxim is eroded to the extent that we allow persons whose sentences in their view are too severe to appeal. But we should resile from eroding it still further by saying that the matter should be kept open when the sentence is not regarded by the convicted person as being too high.
If the new clause were to be enacted, clever people would wait for the judge to pronounce sentence and then say "If we do not get the press here, how can we put pressure on the Attorney-General?" First, those anxious for a higher sentence would get reporters into court, otherwise, they would not be able to get the publicity that is needed to put pressure on the Attorney-General. Therefore, those involved would be running around notifying journalists who are not often in court when sentences are passed, particularly when there are several courts in the same building. They would say to the press "Come on, you had better get here; if you are not here to hear the sentence we have no means of bringing this before the Court of Appeal." The judge, who may be only a simple humble recorder or a new judge, would suddenly see the press coming into court. He would know why they were there. He would think that they were waiting to discover whether the sentence was too low—a pressure on him to give a higher sentence than he would otherwise think right. Therefore, the new clause has nasty aspects.
Another problem is that the new clause, remarkably and surprisingly, gives an appeal direct to the Court of Appeal criminal division on sentence from magistrates' court. At the moment it is not possible to appeal to the Court of Appeal criminal division on sentence from a magistrates' court. Appeals are made to the Crown court. In cases from the magistrates' court, what should the Attorney-General do? Should he do nothing or should he say that the prosecution has right of appeal to the Crown court and, therefore, in this type of case, he will send it direct to the Court of Appeal? Accordingly, if a sentence is regarded as too high it goes from magistrates' court to Crown court but if it is too low it goes from a magistrates' court to the Court of Appeal. What sort of common sense is that? If this type of new system is introduced, there must be some parity. It is an absurd proposal and I hope that the House will not entertain it for an instant longer.

Mr. Mayhew: This has been a lengthy debate, although hardly a two-sided one. It was important that so radical a change in our procedures should be thoroughly examined. I note at the outset that it seems to be a radical procedure to make in order to deal with what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) described as something that fortunately rarely happens—the sentence that appears to be excessively lenient. I do not underrate the importance of reassuring the public in their anxiety about sentences that appear to be excessively lenient, although I agree with my hon. and learned Friend that such cases rarely arise.
The publicity that such cases attract, when the ordinary run consistent with the normal pattern and tariff of the sentences naturally enough attracts no publicity at all, gives a misleading impression to the public of the general pattern of sentencing in our courts. The general pattern and tariff of sentencing in our courts is not vulnerable to such criticism.
If and when mistakes—if they are mistakes—occur, it is right that we should persist with the present practice whereby the Lord Chief Justice usually manages to find an early opportunity to restate the correct sentencing principles. That is what happens. That is our practice.
When addressing ourselves to the new clause, we must recognise that in practice this will be a right of appeal, admittedly an indirect one, conferred on the prosecution.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde said that it should be for the Attorney-General to be the judge of that public indignation. It is common ground that from time to time public indignation is occasioned by cases of this nature, and we agree that it is a bad thing that the public should be indignant about any feature of our criminal justice system. My hon. and learned Friend said that the Attorney-General should be the judge of that public indignation, but he was anxious to abjure the suggestion that the Attorney-General should be influenced by the newspapers.
My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) suggested that this would be trial by media and that these matters would be dealt with by the publicity that they attracted. Naturally, my hon. and learned Friend was repelled by that idea and said that that would not happen, nor was it the intention.
If the Attorney-General is not to be influenced by what he has seen in the newspapers or on television or heard on the radio, what will enable him to judge public indignation? The answer must surely be the consultations that he has with the prosecution. That point was made by the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) and my hon. Friend the member for Anglesey. I do not for the life of me see who else he will consult. It will not be the defence, and if he cannot pay attention to what is in the media, it will be the prosecution.
In those circumstances, I would not blame the Attorney-General for consulting the prosecution, or at least paying attention to what the prosecution says, were he to be given this jurisdiction. However, all of us must have noted what the former Attorney-General, the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich, said about what he regarded as the most distasteful power that could ever be given to him. He said that he would never wish to exercise it.
One must not conceal from oneself the fact that in practice the new clause would confer, albeit indirectly and through the filter of the Attorney-General, a right of appeal upon the prosecution. There is the additional point, again made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) that the Attorney-General, who would be the recipient of this jurisdiction, is, as he described it, the highest prosecuting authority in the land, in the sense that he directs the DPP.
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We all agree that the prosecution should not have a right of appeal, direct or indirect. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde was at pains to say that he did not want that because it was wrong. However, there are others who may not see so clearly that this would be, not only a great departure from our practices and traditions but dangerous. I shall explain briefly why I think that.
The start point must be that it is the judge's responsibility, under our system, to ensure that a balance is kept between the interests of our society and the interests of the offender. Once the facts have been adduced by the prosecution, or have been established by the evidence, the gravity of the offence has been adequately exposed. It is then for the judge to take into account any mitigating circumstances, and any evidence about the prevalence of the offence and then to decide on the appropriate sentence


in the light of the material before him. We do not give the prosecution, as happens in some other systems, any function other than suggesting, or demanding, a particular sentence.
As a party in the criminal proceedings, the Crown is only properly interested in the issue of guilt or innocence. It has no interest in the selection of available sentences. As long as the prosecution has no role in the sentencing at first instance, it has no place, and it would be out of place to give it one, in the suggested indirect right of appeal. The judge whose decision was being appealed against would have no opportunity to adduce arguments about why he should have taken a different course.
To give the prosecutor a right to be heard on the question of sentence would be damagingly to blur the prosecution's position as established in this country. These matters must be left to the courts. No doubt from time to time, they will, if one takes an objective view, get it wrong. I agree that it is very rare that they get it wrong. When that happens, it must be left to the courts to reestablish, through the Court of Appeal, the proper sentencing practice.
A right of appeal for the prosecution against a lenient sentence would—this has not been touched upon—introduce an unjustifiable element of uncertainty—whether by the prosecution or through the medium of the Attorney-General makes no difference for the purpose of this argument. Let us suppose that somebody has been sentenced to community service, and indignation has risen, although the order and sentence have been served. Months later, following the operation of the system, when transcripts have been sent for and the attorney has considered all the points, no matter how it was brought to his attention, it would be unjustifiable for the Court of Appeal, following a referral by the Attorney-General, to impose a custodial sentence. That would not be justifiable in our criminal justice system.
Another practical illustration of what would happen is that the police would be regarded by the public as the prosecuting authority. There would be a great deal of pressure to appeal against too lenient a sentence. This would not assist the police in their relations with the public. A filter whereby appeals could be mounted only by the authority of the Attorney-General would not be likely to stem that pressure.
I am not surprised that no hon. Member who has taken part in the debate—there have been numerous speakers on both sides of the House—apart from the two hon. Members who have put their names to the clause, felt it possible to support it. I accept that in a few cases what appear to have been exceptionally lenient sentences have been passed. That is regrettable. We must all do our best to see how that can be mitigated.
This has been a valuable debate, for which I am grateful. I am authorised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General to say that I have his support in my view that we ought to keep this small number of cases in proportion and to rely on the judiciary for a corrective outside any formal appeal or referral system, whether direct or indirect. I must therefore decline the invitation to commit my right hon. Friend to submit this suggestion to the Criminal Law Revision Committee. I certainly give no such commitment. I am afraid that I cannot do other than advise the House to withold support from the new clause.

Mr. Ronald W. Brown: The Minister's reply worries me a little. As he knows, am dealing with a tragic case in my constituency where someone was taken to court for misbehaviour and two of my constituents—Mrs. Dodds and her husband—were asked to be witnesses to the occasion. They appeared at court before the magistrates, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Oulton and Mr. Nabarro. The person who was being prosecuted was found guilty. She was fined £50 for having broken her recognisance of an earlier sentence for breach of the peace. The magistrates—these educated, dedicated, idiots—decided to say that they would hind everyone over.

Mr. Lawrence: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order to carry on debating a new clause that has been withdrawn?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): It has not been withdrawn.

Mr. Brown: I was endeavouring to draw your attention, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to the fact that the magistrates, having decided to find the person guilty, attempted to bind over my two constituents. My two constituents decided not to be bound over as they were only witnesses. As a result, they have been sentenced to 28 days' imprisonment each. They were taken down to the cells, stripped, had all their valuables taken away from them and were then brought back upstairs to the court in the afternoon. They have now been bound over on £50 bail to appear at the Crown court on appeal.
I wish only to put to the Minister of State the argument that the new clause would have helped in that case. The hon. and learned Gentleman says that he cannot help me. The Lord Chancellor says that he cannot help me and that it is the Home Secretary's job to help me. The Home Secretary now tells me again that he cannot help me. I have two constituents who were not involved in a case but who were giving evidence as witnesses and who are both under sentence of 28 days' imprisonment. They have to go to the expense of going to lawyers to fight a case in the Court of Appeal. I want to know what sort of society it is when that sort of thing can happen to ordinary, innocent people. The warning must go out to any witnesses that if they go to this court in Old Street, they are likely to find themselves in prison for giving evidence.

Mr. Alan Clark: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 9

CONDITIONAL RELEASE

'(1) A person who is serving, or who after the commencement of this Act is sentenced to, a term of imprisonment other than imprisonment for life shall be released on a conditional release licence when he has served one half of his sentence or seven days, whichever is the longer; or such later date as may be necessary to take account of any forfeiture of remission.

(2) Any person subject to a conditional release licence shall comply with such requirements, if any, as the Secretary of State may specify in this licence.

(3) For the purposes of this section consecutive and concurrent terms of imprisonment shall be treated as a single term.

(4) A person whose sentence is reduced by the operation of section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (reduction of sentence of imprisonment by reference to periods spent in custody on remand) shall for the purposes of this section be treated as if any period taken into account under this section were included in his sentence.

(5) A person shall remain subject to a conditional release licence until he has served two-thirds of his sentence, with the additions of any period for which he may have forfeited remission unless the licence is revoked under subsection (6) below.

(6) Where a person subject to a conditional release licence commits an offence punishable with imprisonment, a court may order his return to custody for a period not exceeding
(a) the outstanding period for which the conditional release licence would otherwise be in force, or
(b) 30 days, whichever is the longer.'.—[Mr. Kilroy-Silk.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The prison population today is again approaching the 45,500 level. There has been an unprecedented increase of 3,500 in the last three months. Those prisoners are occupying space that the chief inspector of the prison service says should be occupied by no more than 37,000 and that the prison and borstal governors say should be occupied by no more than 32,000 in order to meet the objective of ending cell-sharing and slopping-out. About 17,000 of the 44,000 men, women and young people in our prisons today occupy cells built for one in Victorian times. There are two or three prisoners to a cell often for 23 hours out of every 24. They are denied any reasonable access to recreation, leisure activities, association or to training or educational pursuits. For many of them, the conditions are appalling and degrading. The conditions have been described by the chief inspector of the prison service and, indeed, by the director general of the prison service, as dehumanising and brutalising. We have reached the point where the Home Secretary is often forced to use police cells, not just in the Metropolitan Police area but in the provinces, to contain prisoners who would otherwise be held in prison service establishments.
The Home Secretary and the Minister of State have recognised the appallingly overcrowded conditions in our prisons. The Home Secretary has travelled the country making the case for fewer people to be sent to prison and for shorter times. He has been joined in that campaign not just by the Lord Chancellor, but by the Lord Chief Justice. Everyone accepts that there is a crisis of overcrowding in the prison system and that the solution is to reduce the numbers sent to prison and the time that they are held there. It is also common ground that that can be achieved reasonably and effectively without endangering the public.
So far, the Home Secretary has relied on exhortations to the judiciary. He has asked that they pass shorter

sentences and the judiciary has responded, not least in the noteworthy cases of Upton and Bibi. Mr. Faulkner, the deputy director of the prison service, writing in the October 1981 edition of the board of visitors journal conceded that the decrease in the length of sentences, consequent on the Upton and Bibi judgments, has not reduced the prison population, though it may have lessened the rate of increase. As Mr. Faulkner pointed out, welcome though the judgments and the marginal decrease in the length of sentences have been, they are not sufficient.
Last year the Home Secretary was relying for a significant reduction in the prison population on the widely canvassed and much-supported scheme of automatic supervised release on parole.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I wish to make sure that there has not been a drafting error in the new clause. It provides that the Secretary of State "shall" release a person. In other words, the obligation is mandatory and it is not merely a permissive power. Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that that is his intention?

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Yes, that is the intention of the new clause.
The deputy director of the prison service argued in 1981 that what was required was automatic release on parole which, the Home Office suggested, would reduce the prison population by about 7,000—a not negligible decrease.
For a variety of reasons, the Government have not found it possible to proceed with that scheme. If we are not to get a significant reduction in the length of sentences and if the Home Secretary is not prepared, for one reason or another, to go along the road of automatic release on parole, a bolder step is required and a bold, radical, but common-sense step is proposed in the new clause—a conditional release scheme of 50 per cent., instead of the one-third that is available at present. The scheme was a recommendation of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group, of which I have the honour to be chairman, in its 1980 report "Too Many Prisoners" and the new clause has been tabled on behalf of the all-party group.
Though I have referred to the scheme as bold and radical, it is not new, innovatory or untried. The proposed scheme for England and Wales is no more than an extension of the scheme already in operation and apparently working successfully in Northern Ireland. It will certainly be within the memory of the House and yourself, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) introduced the 50 per cent. conditional release scheme for Northern Ireland in 1976. It has operated there for the past six years. Subject to good behaviour, prisoners there are released after serving 50 per cent. of their sentence instead of the previous two-thirds, which still applies in England and Wales. If prisoners in Northern Ireland commit a further offence while on remission they are taken back into custody to serve the remainder of their orgininal sentence as well as whatever sentence may have been imposed for the further offence. Release can normally be delayed only by loss of remission.
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The scheme is simple and, easy to understand and works without any great bureaucratic apparatus. It


emphasises the individual offender's personal responsibility for his actions and for his release date. If he does not commit disciplinary offences while he is in prison, he knows with certainty the date of his release. If he is not released at the 50 per cent. point, he has the reason in the commission of those disciplinary offences. When he is released after serving. 50 per cent. of his sentence, he can live in the community like any other citizen, but subject always to the sanction that if he commits a further offence he will return to prison not just for a period appropriate to the commission of that offence but for the remaining 50 per cent. of his original sentence.
Ministers with responsibility for Northern Ireland of both parties, not least the right hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Raison), the Minister of State, Home Office, when he was Private Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, have said that this scheme has worked effectively and successfully. The percentage of those released after the first year of the scheme and who committed offences after two years was about 32 per cent. Some hon. Members may regard that as perhaps unsatisfactorily high. In fact, it compares well with the 55 per cent. rate of recidivism under the previous one-third remission scheme. The introduction of a 50 per cent. conditional release scheme has not resulted in a greater recidivist rate among those released than was the case in Northern Ireland and is currently the case in England and Wales. Nor, on the testimony of Ministers with responsibility for Northern Ireland, has the Northern Ireland judiciary responded to the introduction of this scheme by imposing longer prison sentences in order to compensate for the 50 per cent. remission.
The practice in Northern Ireland over the past six years has shown England and Wales the way in which we can introduce a scheme for the early release of prisoners without endangering the public, without leading to an increase in recidivism, without leading to an increase in the level of crime, and, significantly and importantly, reducing the prison population. In the appalling conditions in our prisons today, when the Government have tried but failed significantly to reduce that population, I submit that the scheme that has been found to work successfully in Northern Ireland can equally work successfully in England and Wales.
I am suggesting tonight that we should extend good practice in one part of the United Kingdom to another part of the United Kingdom and in doing so reduce our prison population and help towards the creation of a civilised, fair and humane prison system in England and Wales.

Mr. Grieve: I shall be brief. Although the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) spoke not only for himself but for the group of which he is a distinguished chairman, his new clause is wholly misconceived. At a time of rising crime rates, nothing is more likely to shake public confidence in the administration of justice than a 50 per cent. cut in the sentences imposed by the courts. I shall not go into the crime statistics, but we all know that over the years they have risen appallingly. The hon. Gentleman's provision would interfere with the administration of justice, negate the decisions of the courts and shake public confidence. I hope that the Minister and the House will not accept it.
I agree that prison conditions are appalling and I am at one with the hon. Member for Ormskirk in that observation. However, at a time of rising crime we should

deal with that by providing proper modern prison accommodation and not by interfering with the judgments of the courts.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: I had not intended to take part in the debate until I heard my lion. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk). AL the beginning of his speech he said that we all agreed. What right has he to say that? He may say that he agrees, or and that the all-party group agrees, and he is entitled to express his view. However, he has not expressed my view and my opinion. We do not all agree.
Do-gooders want to release prisoners and reduce prison sentences. Why release those who have sometimes been convicted of serious crimes when under the Labour Government and this Government 5,000 people have been kept in closed prisons awaiting trial although they have never been convicted of any crime? They are in prison because of the neglect and/or the trade union activities of lawyers, who love to look after their own interests. They delay cases. The cases are not heard and some of those people, believe it or not, have been in prison for more than 18 months, awaiting trial although they have committed no crime.
His lordship who has committed a crime is sentenced and sent straight to an open prison. Good food and caviare are sent in and he can use the telephone. Ex-commanders of police, such as Commander Drury, are sent to open prisons. The parliamentary all-party penal affairs group and others who want to release convicted criminals should have a go at releasing those 5,000 people, or should arrange for their trials. Are we or are we not Members of Parliament, elected by the people? Are we not entitled to seek the view of the people on the street? Tomorrow morning hon. Members should stop the first elderly couple that they meet—whether or not they are well dressed—and ask them their views. They should walk down some of the London streets in my constituency and ask people whether they think that prisoners should be released and whether they think that they should serve, in effect, only 50 per cent. of their sentences. I read in the newspaper tonight that an old lady of 89 had been raped. I hope to God whoever did that is caught. If he is caught, what will happen? He will get a nominal prison sentence. Why? I do not know.
Only yesterday we heard that one of our learned judges had remarked how beastly and wicked a skinhead was for knifing and killing an Asian who was standing in the street doing no harm to anyone. The judge said he would be seriously dealt with. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. He will get one-third off for good conduct. Fifty per cent. is now suggested. I would shoot such people. I think it wicked to sit here and talk about this when we know that one cannot walk through certain streets in London. Some old people cannot even leave their houses. Some of them are frightened to open doors. I am not talking about the wilds of Africa or the backward, developing countries. I am talking about Westminster, Lambeth, Hackney and my constituency of Newham, where old people are scared of opening their front doors.
I have read of one case of an old lady who had been attacked eight times and has had to be moved out of her home. What do we do about it? We are all united in cutting down the prison service. When this bloke gets caught—I hope to God he is—he will get three years. It was three years for murder. He will probably not get three years. He


will probably find at some time in his life he did not have a couple of pounds to buy a packet of cigarettes. We will say "Poor boy, he had a deprived background".
Do my hon. Friends know that I was born and bred not far from here in the 1930s? There was more unemployment, poverty, starvation and misery. There were none of the clubs and social welfare facilities that now exist, but one could walk at any time of the day or night in any part of London without fear. Ladies could go to the ladies' areas. They did not go to the red patch areas. They could still walk with all their finery. They cannot do it today.
In those days there were more severe sentences and there were fewer people in prison, because they did not like long sentences. Has my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk ever spoken to some of those vicious, wicked animals and discussed their attitude? Has he been told by them how they despise the sort of people who try to do good for them?
I do not agree with the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) that prisons are deplorable. Some of them are. I was on the Home Affairs Select Committee and I toured some prisons. I went to some in Scotland and I wish to God that many of my old-age pensioners had such good accommodation and were so well looked after. Many of us have pensioners who do not get enough heat. That does not apply to those in prison. Many of us have pensioners who do not get enought to eat. That does not happen in prison. Many of them cannot afford to have their places cleaned. They, too, have to slop out. Many of them have to go into the back garden to the toilet. Who would have believed that we in the House of Commons would be more concerned with looking after bestial criminals than people who have given 40 or 50 years of their lives to building up money to pay taxes to give those people a relatively good and comfortable life in prison?
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Prisoners get meals, clothing, heating and colour television. How many old-age pensioners can afford colour television? How many can even afford the licence? Yet they are to be taxed still more, because somebody must pay for all these services for the poor people in prison. Let us not kid ourselves that the rich, capitalist Tories are taxed the most heavily, because they are not. It is the ordinary men and women who pay. It is the poor, the sick, the disabled and the blind who pay relatively more tax. When they have to pay 15 per cent. on their limited incomes, they pay relatively more than the rich to help provide these conditions for prisoners.
We need far more severe sentencing. People should be kept in prison far longer. They should be given some——

Mr. David Winnick: Hang them.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, if the crime warrants it, why not?

Mr. Winnick: Flog them.

Mr. Lewis: Yes, why not? My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) may snigger, but I have more respect for the old-age pensioners who are mugged. I would not like to see my hon. friend treated in that way. Yet what do we do? We must look after these poor prisoners with their deprived backgrounds. Not on your life.
At Aldgate, not far from here, the Bangladeshis and the Indians now live in the same houses that years ago were occupied by Jews. They never rioted or cut people's throats, because sentencing was more severe. If people did wrong, they knew that they would be caught and punished. Most people knew and accepted that.

Mr. Tony Durant: Even the criminals?

Mr. Lewis: Yes, even the criminals. The hon. Gentleman may laugh, but I have spoken to criminals who say that if they go out on a job they know what to expect. If they get caught they will take their medicine, and most of them do.
Let us make sure that the medicine is strong and that the punishment fits the crime. By no means should sentences be reduced. They should be increased. Let us get back to the 1930s. If we had the sentences that we had then, there would be less crime and bestiality in our society.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: Although I would not express my views in quite such dramatic language as the hon. Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Lewis), I entirely agree with his general argument. I believe that the new clause is entirely unacceptable—to the country, to the judiciary and, not least important, to the majority of those who practise in the courts.
It is important that we should be clear about the purpose of the new clause. It does not merely empower the Secretary of State to order an early release; it requires him to do so. In other words, he has no choice or discretion. He must cut sentences by half. I cannot believe that the House would wish to permit that.
Many offences require very long prison sentences, for a variety of reasons—to mark society's disapprobation of the offence, to serve as a deterrent and also simply as a punishment. I believe that society has the right to punish. Generally speaking, it is right that terrorists, very serious rape cases and those who embark on armed robbery with shotguns should receive sentences of 20 to 30 years. The idea that those sentences will be reduced by half because of an arbitrary act this evening is nonsense. If the House is ill advised enough to do that, public respect for the law will be greatly undermined.

Mr. Pitt: We have heard two eloquent reasons to why we should not support the new clause but both of them are completely wide of the mark. It is not the intention of this new clause, as the sponsors see it, to release excessively violent criminals, rapists or terrorists—those who merit sentences of 20 to 30 years because they are violent criminals attacking society. They should not be released until they have expiated their crimes. That is what the new clause does not do. [HON. MEMBERS: "It does".] If hon. Members wish to speak they can do so in their own time.
The new clause provides a system of 50 per cent. compulsory release, on conditions. It does not mean that a prisoner will automatically be released if his crime or his behaviour while in prison do not merit it. However, it deals with the pressing need to reduce our prison population. I shall give the House some examples. The certified normal accommodation in Birmingham prison is 596. On 30 April 1980 the actual population was 1,003. Brixton prison's certified normal population is 696. Its


actual population on that date was 975. Liverpool prison's normal certified population is 1,016 but on that date it was 1,608.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: Can the hon. Member for Croydon, North-West (Mr. Pitt) tell me how many prisoners in Brixton or elsewhere are there not because they have been convicted of a crime but because they are awaiting trial? The Home Office will not tell me. Many of those in Brixton prison are unconvicted prisoners and I am more interested in them.

Mr. Pitt: I agree with the hon. Member for Newham North-West (Mr. Lewis), who has made a good point. Most of those in Brixton prison are awaiting trial. Far too many people are awaiting trial in closed prisons and we should also discuss that issue, but it is not included in this clause. The new clause will take from our prisons not the excessively violent criminal or the terrorist but the person who can, having been assessed, take his place in society.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: rose——

Mr. Pitt: I shall be finishing in a moment and the hon. Gentleman may speak then.

Mr. Hogg: rose——

Mr. Deputy Speaker: (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): Order. The hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) has made his speech and it is obvious that the hon. Member for Croydon, North-West (Mr. Pitt) is not giving way.

Mr. Pitt: A large proportion of those in prison should not have been placed there in the first place. We should try to find methods of sentencing so that people can account for their crimes in the public domain. That is why I support the clause. There is a pressing need to reduce our prison population and we must take radical measures. I take the point of the experiment that has already been successfully carried out in Northern Ireland. I suggest that the House should support the new clause and introduce it into the Criminal Justice Bill.

Dr. Summerskill: None of those who have opposed the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) have dealt with his point that this measure is already working successfully in Northern Ireland. It has served to reduce the prison population without showing any rise in recidivism among those who have been released after half their sentences and without showing any effect upon public order. It is serving two extremely useful purposes—one of reducing the prison population and keeping it low, and the other of not increasing crime. People who work with offenders agree that a very long sentence is no more effective in preventing recidivism than is a shorter sentence.
The House should at least consider the merits of the new clause. One of the main aims of the Bill should be to bring about a significant and permanent reduction in the prison population. If we can do that without increasing crime and without increasing recidivism, the Bill will have served a useful purpose.
I hope that when the Minister replies he will deal with Northern Ireland, where this same measure is operating successfully.

Mr. Dubs: My hon. Friend the Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Lewis), in his speech a few moments ago, spoke about people in prison who were there on remand and who had not been found guilty. I simply say

on behalf of the all-party penal affairs group that that matter was covered in our recent report, where we said that we should seriously consider adopting the system in Scotland, so that there was a 110-day limit on custodial remands. As far as I can remember, that was also the subject of an amendment Committee. It was also a recommendation of the Home Affairs Select Committee. The proposal contained in this new clause in no way conflicts with my hon. Friend's suggestion that people should not be kept in custody for long periods before being brought before the courts.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: I thank my hon. Friend for what he says, but I would go one step further. I would prefer to release them, rather than accept this new clause. I cannot support the new clause while 5,000-odd people who have committed no crime are still in prison.

Mr. Dubs: I understand what my hon. Friend is saying.
It is not being soft on criminals to say that our prisons are so overcrowded that the situation has gone beyond acceptable limits. Indeed, the Home Secretary has said as much more than once. Moreover, it is not strictly in line with my experience—I have visited a number of prisons—to say that they are soft institutions. Anyone who doubts that should visit Wandsworth prison in my constituency, Wormwood Scrubs, or a host of other prisons, certainly in the London area, which are tough and nasty institutions. They are in no way a soft option for the people inside them.
Our prisons are bursting at the seams and it is therefore sensible to consider ways in which the prison population can be reduced. After all, we have steadily increased our average prison sentences over the years. Sentences are much longer now than they were in the days when, according to my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, North-West, they were adequate. We have more people, in prison in this country than in any other country in Western Europe, with the possible exception of Germany—indeed, it might also include Germany. By any standards, we have more people in prison and for longer periods than most other countries with which we could reasonably be compared. The only exception is the United States where there are more people in prison per head of the population than in this country.
The purpose of the new clause is to bring the prison population down to manageable numbers before there is a serious explosion in the prison system. On that basis I would have thought that the clause was a reasonable way of giving effect to the oft-stated wishes of Home Office Ministers.

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Ordered,
That, at this day's sitting, the Criminal Justice Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour.—[Mr. Gummer.]

Question again proposed, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Timothy Raison): It is with some trepidation that I make my first intervention on the Bill. I should like to reply to the brief but spirited debate that we had during the last half hour or so.
We accept that on the face of it the scheme which has been put forward has obvious affinities with the conditional release scheme which operates in Northern


Ireland. However, there are, I understand, significant and important differences. In particular, the scheme in Northern Ireland is not automatic. It may be compared with the scheme for remission for good conduct in that release normally takes place unless there are good reasons why it should not, but it is not automatic. As my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) made clear, the whole point about automaticity—to use a rather ugly word—is of considerable importance.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Is the Minister sure that he is correct? What does he mean when he says that it is not an automatic scheme? It is not automatic, of course, in the sense that the prisoner does not get 50 per cent. remission if he has not behaved himself during his time in prison. That is precisely the same condition that applies here. If that is what the Minister means about it not being automatic, he is correct. The same considerations apply to this new clause: otherwise it is automatic.

Mr. Raison: My understanding is that there is a difference. The new clause is automatic except in certain conditions, whereas in Northern Ireland the scheme is not automatic; it has to be proved that the person is eligible for release. There seems to be a real difference between the two.
It is important when considering the merits of the scheme to distinguish between its application to those who are at present eligible for parole under current legislation and to those who are not. A large part of the prison population is currently not eligible for parole; and the debate surrounding the desirability of a reduction in the prison population has rightly focused on them because if a reduction is to be achieved it must operate on sentence lengths in that range. It is in that range of sentences that the courts themselves, under the leadership of the Lord Chief Justice, have shown that there is room for shorter sentences in appropriate cases.
But when we are considering the upper end of the sentencing range, including many of those at present eligible for parole, we are looking at some of the most serious cases—cases where the courts have the protection of the public most in mind. I think it is fair to say that the scheme as proposed could operate only as a direct alternative to parole in such cases. That is the first point at which the Government would find themselves in disagreement with the concept of the scheme.
The conditional release scheme in Northern Ireland has been successful in providing for early release when there would be special difficulties in selecting prisoners for parole and in supervising them after release. In the wider context of the criminal justice system in England and Wales, I simply do not believe that we could rely on public acceptance of a scheme which offered automatic half remission and a further one-sixth of the sentence to be served on licence in the community without supervision as an alternative to the consideration given to cases prior to release and the subsequent supervision arrangements under the parole scheme. I think that my hon. Friends will support me when I say that that is a fundamental objection. Apart from this objection in principle, a change from parole to the system proposed in this new clause would have little impact on the prison population in terms of its application to such offenders. The parole scheme can,

incidentally, also be operated more flexibly since in appropriate cases prisoners can be released after they have served one-third of their sentence.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I know that he is not familiar with the subject, but he is answering for the Government. Will he say why it is extravagant to suggest that we have 50 per cent. remission, although, as he concedes, it operates successfully in Northern Ireland, when only six months ago the Home Secretary suggested that we should have an automatic system of release on parole after one-third of the sentence had been met? The Home Secretary was proposing to introduce a scheme of automatic release after one-third of the sentence had been served, whereas we are being much more conservative and cautious in suggesting only 50 per cent. Why has that system suddenly become not possible in this country?

Mr. Raison: The hon. Gentleman knows at least as well as anyone that that matter has provoked a great deal of debate over the past few months. My right hon. and hon. Friends have been persuaded by the argument that this is a better approach. There is an important question of public confidence. My arguments are reinforced by what my hon. Friends have said. Inevitably this is a sensitive area in penal policy. To take steps that the public will not accept does not help us to deal with that problem.
I turn to the question of prisoners who are not at present eligible for parole. The objections that the Government see against a scheme of the kind proposed are much the same as those that we see against a scheme of supervised release. That matter has been discussed intensively, and I shall not go over all the arguments again. The main point, however, is this. Any scheme—such as the one under consideration—which automatically increases the gap between the notional sentence passed by the court and the effective sentence served may lead the courts to react by increasing the overall length of the sentences that they pass, particularly in cases where they have the protection of the public in mind.
Any notional savings in terms of the prison population that such a scheme might be thought likely to achieve would almost certainly, therefore, in practice be eroded. But in the Government's view it is wrong to approach the problem of the need to punish offenders and yet to take account of the dreadful situation in our prisons by looking simply at what may or may not be expedient. We believe, as I have said, that the right way to approach the problem is on the one hand to increase the flexibility of the courts so that they can take account of the period of custody to be served when sentencing offenders, which we have done by implementing the power to suspend part of a prison sentence; and on the other hand to open up the possibility that eligibility for parole might be extended to more prisoners.
We prefer to move forward, not with mandatory schemes, which would be rigid in their effect, but by preserving the discretion of the court when sentencing and the discretion of the Executive in relation to the release of offenders under the parole scheme—and in a statutory framework that offers both more flexibility in the exercise of that discretion. This represents the most sensitive and effective response to the need both to preserve public confidence in the sentencing and treatment of offenders and taking account of the problems of prison overcrowding.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: May I ask the Minister to deal with a point that was raised by his hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) and supported by his hon. Friends in triplicate? Is the system mandatory?

Mr. Raison: My understanding is that it is mandatory. We cannot recommend that the new clause be accepted.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: At a time when the prison population, by all accounts and from the testimony of the Home Office, the inspector of prisons and the prison service, is appallingly high, at crisis point, and when the Home Secretary is going up and down the country calling for shorter sentences and a reduction in the prison population, the Government's response to the proposal has been unsatisfactory. It is no good the Minister and his hon. Friends suggesting that this is a radical or new proposal because it is not. It already operates successfully and effectively in Northern Ireland and it has been doing so for the past six years.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: How many bombs have dropped in Northern Ireland in the past six years?

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Successive Ministers in the present Government as in the Labour Government, have paid public testimony to the efficacy of the scheme, and to the fact that it has not led to an increase in the recidivist rate, to an increase in crime or to a lapse or diminution of confidence on the part of the judiciary. There is a lower level of recidivism among those released after the operation of the scheme than among those released previously in England and Wales under the two-thirds parole scheme. Certainly the judiciary has not imposed longer sentences.
This is not a particularly radical proposal. After all, it was the Home Secretary who said that he wanted to introduce a scheme of automatic release on parole after the serving of a third of a sentence. It was the deputy director of the prison service, Mr. Faulkner, writing in the journal of the Prison Board of Visitors only last year who said that sentences were becoming shorter but not short enough and that they were relying on automatic release on parole after one-third.
All we suggest is that there should be automatic release on licence after 50 per cent. of the sentence—subject to good behaviour—had been served. That is needed if we are to deal effectively with the prison crisis. It is a sensible, moderate and reasonable proposal. Given the unsatisfactory nature of the Minister's response, I ask that we divide the House on the new clause and urge my right hon. and hon. Friends to join me in supporting it in the Lobby.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:

The House divided: Ayes 72, Noes 137.

Division No. 148]
[10.11 pm


AYES


Allaun, Frank
Davidson, Arthur


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Davis, Terry (B'ham, Stechf'd)


Atkinson, N, (H'gey)
Deakins, Eric


Beith, A.J.
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)

 
Bennett, Andrew (St'kp'tN)
Dixon, Donald


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Dormand, Jack


Callaghan, Jim (Midd't'n &amp; P)
Dubs, Alfred


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
Eadie, Alex


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)
Eastham, Ken


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)


Crowther, Stan
Evans, John (Newton)


Cryer, Bob
Ewing, Harry


Cunningham, Dr J. (W'h'n)
Flannery, Martin


Dalyell, Tam
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)





Forrester, John
Miller, Dr M.S. (E Kilbride)


Foster, Derek
Morris, Rt Hon C. (O'shaw)


Golding, John
Morton, George


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Hamilton, James(Bothwell)
Parry, Robert


Hardy, Peter
Pitt, WilliamHenry


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Powell, Raymond(Ogmore)


Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Richardson, Jo


Haynes, Frank
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Hooley, Frank
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


John, Brynmor
Skinner, Dennis


Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Soley, Clive


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Spearing, Nigel


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Strang, Gavin


Lamborn, Harry
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Leadbitter.Ted
Tinn, James


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Wainwright, E.(DearneV)


McCartney, Hugh
Welsh, Michael


McKelvey, William
Winnick, David


MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Young, David (Bolton E)


McNamara, Kevin



McWilliam, John
Tellers for the Ayes:


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Mr. Allen McKay and Mr. Lawrence Cunliffe.


Millan.Rt Hon Bruce 





NOES


Aitken, Jonathan
Hamilton, Hon A.


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Hamilton, Michael(Salisbury)


Arnold, Tom
Hampson, Dr Keith


Aspinwall, Jack
Haselhurst, Alan


Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)
Hawkins, Paul


Atkinson, David(B'm'th, E)
Hogg, Hon Douglas(Gr'th'm)


Bendall, Vivian
Howell, Ralph (NNorfolk)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (T'bay)
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Benyon, Thomas(A'don)
Jessel, Toby


Benyon, W.(Buckingham)
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael


Berry, Hon Anthony
Kershaw, Sir Anthony


Bevan, DavidGilroy
Knox, David


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Lang, Ian


Blackburn, John
Lawrence, Ivan


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
LeMarchant, Spencer


Bright, Graham
Lester, Jim(Beeston)


Brinton, Tim
Lewis, Arthur(N'ham NW)


Brooke, Hon Peter 
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Brotherton, Michael
Loveridge, John


Brown, Michael(Brigg&amp;Sc'n)
Lyell, Nicholas


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Macfarlane, Neil


Buck, Antony
Major, John


Budgen, Nick
Marlow, Antony


Bulmer, Esmond
Marshall, Michael(Arundel)


Cadbury, Jocelyn
Mather, Carol


Carlisle, John (LutonWest)
Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (R'c'n)
Mawby, Ray


Chapman, Sydney
Mawhinney, Dr Brian


Clegg, Sir Walter
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Cockeram, Eric
Mayhew, Patrick


Cope, John
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Costain, Sir Albert
Mills, Iain(Meriden)


Cranborne, Viscount
Miscampbell, Norman


Crouch, David
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)


Dorrell, Stephen
Morgan, Geraint


Douglas-Hamilton, LordJ.
Mudd, David


Dover, Denshore
Murphy, Christopher


Dunn, Robert(Dartford)
Needham, Richard


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
Nelson, Anthony


Elliott, Sir William
Newton, Tony


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Onslow, Cranley


Farr, John
Osborn, John


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'ghN)
Parris, Matthew


Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles
Pattie, Geoffrey


Forman, Nigel
Percival, Sir Ian


Gardiner, George(Reigate)
Pollock, Alexander


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Goodhew, Sir Victor
Price, Sir David(Eastleigh)


Grieve, Percy
Proctor, K. Harvey


Griffiths, Peter Portsm'thN)
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Grylls, Michael
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Gummer, JohnSelwyn
Renton, Tim






Rhodes James, Robert
Stanbrook, Ivor


Rossi, Hugh
Stevens, Martin


Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Stradling Thomas, J.


Shaw, Michael (Scarborough)
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Silvester, Fred
Temple-Morris, Peter

 
Sims, Roger
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Speed, Keith
Thompson, Donald


Speller, Tony
Thorne, Neil (IlfordSouth)


Spence, John
Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)


Stainton, Keith
Waddington, David

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 11

LEGAL AID FOR BAIL APPLICATIONS

'(1) In section 28 of the Legal Aid Act 1974, after subsection 5 there shall be inserted the following subsection—
"(5A) Where a person who is in the custody of a magistrates' court and who has been refused bail by that court desires to apply to the Crown Court for bail, either of those courts may order that he shall be given legal aid for the purpose of that application".

(2) In section 81(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, after paragraph (e) there shall be inserted the following paragraph—
(f) who has been refused bail by a magistrates' court
and remanded in custody".'.—[Mr. Kilroy-Silk.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would provide defendants remanded in custody by magistrates' courts with a legally aided right of appeal to the Crown court.
For many years the system of judicial review of a magistrates' court decision to refuse bail has been allowed to remain in what everyone agrees to be a highly unsatisfactory state. A defendant refused bail at a magistrates' court has a right of appeal to a High Court judge. There are two separate procedures for applying for that bail.
One procedure is through the Crown Office, with about 500 applications being made each year. In practice, this procedure is usually available only to those who are privately represented, because criminal legal aid is not available for this purpose. Although civil legal aid is technically available, until recently it was virtually never granted. The Law Society has recently made some limited moves to make civil legal aid also available for this purpose, but it remains to be seen how narrowly or extensively it will be granted in practice.
The second procedure, which is available to defendants without sufficient means to employ a solicitor privately, is an application for bail through the Official Solicitor. Over 5,000 such applications were made in 1980. However, in that year the success rate of applications made to the Official Solictor was 9 per cent., while the success rate for applications made through the Crown Office was 68 per cent. A partial explanation of this difference is no doubt that the Official Solicitor puts all applications before the judge, irrespective of their merits, whereas counsel briefed privately would presumably regard it as his duty to advise the would-be applicant whether the matter was worth pursuing, and therefore acts as a sieve for cases going forward. In spite of that, as the Cobden Trust report "Bail or Custody", published in 1971, observed:
It is probable that the wide difference between these figures is fundamentally a reflection of the fact that the applicant who pays for his appeal is represented by professionals who are aware of what aspects of the case are likely to lead the judge to grant bail, and secondly of the most effective ways of presenting information favourable to the defendant.
In a memorandum produced in 1979 entitled "Bail Applications", the Law Society described the present arrangements for applying for bail to a High Court judge in chambers through the Official Solicitor as "quite unsatisfactory" and observed:
The defendant makes his application for bail on a misleading and inadequate form. Any objections by the police to bail are not communicated to the defendant but direct to the Official

Solicitor. The defendant is neither present nor represented and therefore has no opportunity to respond to objections to bail of which he is likely to be entirely ignorant.
The "misleading" aspect of the form referred to by the Law Society is that it specifically asks the Official Solicitor to act for the applicant, leading the applicant, the prisoner, often incorrectly to believe that he is being represented in some way.
At present, a defendant who has been committed in custody to the Crown court for trial or sentence may apply for bail to the Crown court, and the cost of such bail applications is covered by the Crown court legal aid order. However, defendants who are still on remand before a magistrates' court have no right of application for bail to the Crown court. This new clause would give them such a right.
The advantages of a Crown court application over the High Court procedure are clear. It is more accessible, and therefore speedier, because the fact that Crown court centres in England and 'Wales are often in the same building as the magistrates' court means that a Crown court judge is more likely to be near at hand.
In 1979, the Royal Commission on legal services adopted a much more positive attitude towards this
proposal in its final report. It stated in paragraph 14·21:
It has been proposed by the Law Society that, when a defendant has been remanded in custody by a magistrates' court, his solicitor should be able to make a single oral application to a Crown court judge in chambers, recovering the fee From criminal legal aid funds … We recommend that this procedure be adopted as an interim measure, and that the system as a whole should be reviewed when the effects of the Bail Act 1976 can be fully assessed".
It is true that the proposal has financial implications. But against this relatively modest cost must be offset the cost of keeping defendants in prison and producing them in court at regular intervals, as well as the improvement which the proposal would make both to the quality of justice and the appearance of justice which are essential to any system of criminal law.
When this proposal was discussed in Standing Committee on 18 March, the Minister accepted that the present arrangements for applying for bail to a judge in chambers are "not fully satisfactory" and said:
I am therefore able to give an undertaking that we shall give the new clause serious and, as I indicated, sympathetic consideration. We must decide the form in which legal aid should be provided, and we must ensure that the necessary resources are available … But if the hon. Gentleman will accept those assurances I shall undertake to consider the possibility of putting down a Government new clause on Report to give effect tc the principle of his new clause"—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 18 March 1982; c. 668–69.]
I accept that the Minister gave assurances only to undertake to consider the possibility of putting down a new clause to give effect to the principle of the new clause we were then debating. I do not therefore chide him for not putting down a new clause. We have therefore put down a new clause covering the principles with which the Minister agreed. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman, having had an opportunity to consider the matter at length, will feel that he can accept not only the principle but the reality of the new clause.

Mr. Mayhew: As the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) said, I gave an undertaking when a similar new clause was considered in Committee that the Government would consider the possibility of tabling their own amendment on Report to meet the gap.
Persons in the custody of magistrates' courts can apply for bail to the High Court, either through the Official Solicitor or the Crown Office procedure. The Official Solicitor acts without any means or merits test being applied, but applicants are normally dealt with on the papers alone. For one reason or another, there is a low success rate by that route. The Crown Office procedure involves an oral hearing and civil legal aid is available for it, but that means that one has to satisfy the local committee that there are reasonable prospects of success and that one's means are below the statutory maximum.
I was persuaded that there was merit in the principle of the new clause moved in Committee. It has not proved possible to complete our examination of the matter in time to do as we hoped, but I can say that a legally aided avenue of application to the Crown court will be provided for persons who have been refused bail by a magistrates'court. We have not yet been able to settle the precise form of the procedure that will operate or how the avenue of application should be formulated in statute.
However, I can give an unequivocal undertaking that we shall table an appropriate amendment in another place to provide for an application, legally aided—subject only to means—to the Crown court. I hope that on the basis of that augmented and improved undertaking the hon. Member for Ormskirk will not press the new clause.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I hope that any scheme will provide that an applicant must show a reasonable case. Otherwise anyone will be able to appeal to try to get a further hearing before the Crown court. It is important to recognise that there must be some protection against applications by those with a worthless case.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: In the light of the Minister of State's welcome, clear, unequivocal and generous assurance that the matter will be dealt with in another place, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 12

POWER OF MAGISTRATES' COURT TO COMMIT OFFENDER TO CROWN COURT FOR SENTENCE FOLLOWING DEFERMENT

'(1) Where a magistrates' court has deferred passing sentence on an offender under section 1 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1) of that section, the court may, instead of passing sentence itself, commit the offender to the Crown Court for sentence in accordance with Section 56 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 or any of the enactments to which that section applies.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (2) of section 1 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, the Crown Court may defer passing sentence in accordance with that section on an offender who has been committed to the Crown Court for sentence in accordance with section 56 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 or any of the enactments to which that section applies following a deferment of sentence by the magistrates' court.

(3) In section 1(8) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, the words "does not extend to committing him to another court for sentence but, subject to that" shall be omitted'—[Mr. Kilroy-Silk.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The clause would enable a magistrates' court that has deferred sentence on an offender to commit him to a Crown Court for sentence at the end of the period of deferment. It embodies a recommendation of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group in its report "Too Many Prisoners" and has the support of the Justices' Clerks' Society and the Magistrates' Association.
Section 1 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1972 gives a court power to defer passing sentence on an offender for up to six months in order to enable it to have regard to his conduct after conviction, including, where appropriate, his making reparation for his offence and any change in his circumstances, such as his impending marriage to someone who may appear to be a stabilising influence.
The decision to defer sentence contains the clear implication that if, after the period of deferment, the court receives a favourable report on the offender's behaviour in the meantime it will be persuaded to impose a more lenient sentence than it would otherwise have passed. Therefore, a deferment enables a court to give an offender an opportunity to obtain a less severe sentence than it might feel obliged to pass if it had no alternative but to sentence him immediately.
In 1975 in the Gilby case an 18-year-old youth was convicted of burglary. The magistrates deferred sentence, but when the offender came back before the court the probation officer's report commented adversely on his behaviour in the meantime. Not unreasonably, the magistrates then committed him to the Crown court for sentence with a recommendation for borstal training, and a borstal sentence was passed by the Crown court. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that, once a magistrates' court had deferred sentence, it could not commit an offender to the Crown court for sentence. In 1977 the Criminal Law Act amended section 1 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 in order to put this decision into statutory form. This new clause would reverse that decision.
In some cases, the choice between a substantial custodial sentence and the clearly bolder, more imaginative step of a probation order is a narrow, fine balancing line. According to those who pass these sentences, there can be a narrow borderline between the imposition of a heavy custodial sentence and the imposition of a probation order. In such borderline cases the magistrates' court may wish to defer sentence instead of committing the offender to the Crown court with a view to the imposition of a substantial custodial sentence to see whether a custodial sentence could be avoided in the light of some likely change in the offender's circumstances or some promised action on the part of the offender, such as reparation. However, the court cannot ignore the possibility that the offender may not live up to his promises, in which case it might consider that a substantial custodial sentence was justified.
The result of the Gilby case is that in such circumstances the court cannot defer sentence without at the same time losing the option of committing the offender to the Crown court at the end of the period of deferment. Indeed, the Justices' Clerks' Society pointed out in its policy statement "Sentencing in the 1980s":
The effect of the present law is to discourage magistrates from deferring sentence in situations when it might have been


most desirable to do so and to encourage magistrates to commit in custody for sentence forthwith when they might otherwise have wished to take a more lenient course.
It is of course, possible that the Crown court would decide to defer sentence, but, even if it did, it has now been held that committals to the Crown court should normally be in custody and that period in custody may effectively kill the chances of a successful deferment because it increases chances of the offender losing his job and therefore of losing whatever hopeful future development may have induced the magistrates to consider deferring sentence.
The only solution for all of those difficulties is to reverse the effects of the Gilby judgment, as this new clause would do. It would allow magistrates to commit an offender to the Crown court following a deferment. That would encourage magistrates to offer a chance of redemption more frequently to offenders on the brink of what might be a substantial custodial sentence.
When this subject was debated in Committee on 25 March 1982, the Minister said that the arguments for and against retaining the present position were "finely balanced". He went on to say:
we should like to give further thought to the matter, and consult again upon it."—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 25 March 1982; c. 782.]
I hope that the Minister has now had the opportunity to make those consultations. I assume that he has spoken to both the Justices' Clerks' Society and the Magistrates' Association, both of which, as I have said, are in favour of reversing the Gilby judgment. I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept the new clause.

Mr. Mayhew: We are persuaded that the balance of advantage lies in giving the magistrates' courts power to commit for sentence to the Crown court after a period of deferment. The opinion of the Lord Chief Justice should clearly carry a lot of weight in this matter. We have consulted him and he has expressed the view that the magistrates should have this power.
The Government therefore accept the principle behind the new clause, but we should like to give further and more detailed consideration to how this decision in principle should be reflected in the statute. Therefore, I am not able to accept the new clause as it stands or to advise the House to do so. I can give a definite undertaking that the Government will table, at a later stage, an amendment that will give effect to the decision to give magistrates' courts the power to commit for sentence after a period of deferment.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: In the light of the Minister's assurance that the matter will be put right in another place, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 15

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 2 OF THE POWERS OF CRIMINAL COURTS ACT I973

'(1) In subsection (3) of section 2 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 at the end there shall be added "and for those purposes the Court may in particular require of the offender one or more of the following requirements:—
(a) to be of good behaviour, keep the peace and keep in touch with the supervising probation officer;
(b) to report forthwith to his supervising probation officer any change of address or employment;

(c)to refrain from conduct and/or from associating with people and/or from visiting places specified in the order for such period of the order as shall be specified in the order provided that the conduct, association or visits specified relate to the facts of the offence for which the offender is being placed on probation.
(d) to report in person to the supervising probation officer at such time and place as required by him, whether in the presence of third parties or not, so that he may pursue his duty to advise, assist and befriend the offender but such reporting shall not be required more than twice in any one week nor for more than one hour at any one time: provided that any instruction given in pursuance of any requirement under paragraphs (c) and (d) above shall so far as is practicable be such as to avoid any conflict with the offender's religious beliefs and any interference with the times at which he works or attends school or other educational establishments; and
(e) to reside at an address to be specified in the order for such period of the order as shall be specified in the order, but before making an order containing any such requirement, the court shall consider the home surroundings of the offender."

(2) Subsection (5) of section 2 shall cease to have effect. '.—[Mr. Kilroy-Silk.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): With this, it will be convenient to take the following:
New Clause 16—Replacement of section 4 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.
New Clause 17—Amendment of section 57 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.
New Clause 18—Amendment to Schedule 1 to the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.

Amendment No. 38: In page 69, schedule 9, leave out line 34.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The new clauses would reverse the decision of the Divisional Court in Rogers v. Cullen, where it was held that courts could not include a condition in a probation order requiring an offender to attend a clay centre—other than a day training centre of the type that exists in only four probation areas.
In a judgment last Thursday, the other place upheld the Divisional Court's decision and also cast doubt on the court's power to include any conditions in a probation order that have not been specifically authorised by statute. The new clauses would make it clear that courts have i he power to require an offender to attend a day centre a3 a condition of a probation order, and that they also have l he power to include a range of other conditions in probation orders. If the courts do not clearly have those powers it will damage the credibility of probation orders as a viable alternative to custody. If the probation service is no longer in a position to recommend to courts in appropriate cases that they should make probation orders with suitable conditions, the service will be very seriously hampered in its attempts to provide positive options to custodial sentences. Therefore, the new clauses attempt to return that power to the courts.
The power to make a condition of attendance at a day centre is particularly important. The potential of thy centres to provide a direct alternative to custody has been recognised in two recent publications of the Home Office research unit. In Home Office research study No. 66, "Persistent Petty Offenders", the researchers stated that their discussions with magistrates
emphasised that day centres are potentially useful resources in enabling homeless petty offenders to be diverted from prison … day centres appear to give the probation and after-care


service a viable basis for containing persistent petty offenders in the community, one that they can present to the courts as a feasible way of substantially reducing the prison population".
More recently, the Home Office research unit paper No. 4, "Day Centres and Probation", published in 1981, concluded:
day centres can constitute a direct alternative to prison".
It is clear from those two quotations that attendance at a day centre, combined with a probation order, can constitute a viable alternative to custody for a variety of offenders. At a time of high unemployment, when in many areas over 75 per cent. of those on probation officers' case loads are unemployed, day centres of various types—varying from those providing work, training and educational opportunities to those providing simpler forms of occupation and activity—are of particular value and importance in reinforcing probation supervision. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will either accept the new clauses or give an assurance that the Government will introduce new clauses along similar lines.
Amendment No. 38 seeks to retain the day training centre order. It is extremely important. As it stands, schedule 9 would repeal the power to make a day training centre order. The amendment would retain that power. The Criminal Justice Act 1972 empowered courts to include in a probation order a requirement that an offender should attend a day training centre, which would provide up to 60 days' intensive full-time training for socially inadequate offenders. That power was conslidated in section 4 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. Four day training centres exist, in London, Pontypridd, Sheffield and Liverpool.
10.45 pm
The current edition of the Home Office handbook on sentencing, "The Sentence of the Court", says:
The centres are directed particularly to the needs of offenders whose criminal convictions seem to stem from an inability to cope with the demands of modern life, and they augment the support provided by a probation order with broad based social education.
In 1978 the House of Commons Expenditure Committee commented favourably on day training centres in its report "The reduction of pressure on the prison system". It pointed out that the Sub-Committee had visited the day training centre at Grove Park in South London and that it had been greatly impressed. Paragraph 191 states:
The offenders themselves expressed the view that, compared with prison, the experience was extremely demanding, though less disruptive of family ties and less destructive. It provides in some cases a breathing space in what has been a steady criminal career during which the offenders can take stock and look at what they are doing to their lives and to others. It is often a very painful process for such inadequate and withdrawn persons.
It continued:
The Sub-Committee believes that these are worthwhile experiments.
It recommended that they should be continued and encouraged.
In their representations to the members of the Standing Committee, the Justices' Clerks' Society and the National Association of Probation Officers expressed the view that day training centre orders are a valuable option which should be retained, even though at present they can be made only in those few areas which have day training centres.
When the issue was briefly discussed in Committee on 9 March, the Minister, while acknowledging that very good work had been done in the day training centres, said:
Because regimes have been directed towards a particular type of offender, the centres have been consistently under-used by the courts."—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 9 March 1982; c. 475]
I hope that the House will forgive me for spending some considerable time on the issue, but the Government's attempt to eliminate that particular facility has aroused a great deal of resentment and opposition amongst the people who run it. Although it is true that in the early days of day training centres the facility was under-used, when all four of them struggled to attract sufficient orders from the courts to maintain their maximum occupancy, that is no longer the case. The Sheffield and Liverpool centres are consistently full, although the Minister gave the opposite impression. Both have waiting lists. The London centre is running at a higher occupancy rate than at any time during the past seven years. The impression created by the Minister during the debate in Committee, that they have been consistently under-used by the courts, is not borne out by the evidence provided from those three areas.
The South Yorkshire and Merseyside probation services have provided detailed figures for the Sheffield and Liverpool centres. The original capacity of the Sheffield centre was 60 offenders a year. In 1980, the number of offenders dealt with had increased to 90. In 1981, 95 orders were made. In that year, because of the long waiting list, the centre increased the size of the groups of offenders going through the course. The current course is full, and there is a waiting list of 30 offenders on whom probation orders with a condition of attendance at a day training centre have been made.
The Liverpool centre has been consistently full throughout the past seven years. When it was opened it took 60 offenders in the course of a year. In the last two years it has increased the number it deals with at any one time and it is now starting groups of 40 offenders every 60 days. As one would expect, the cost per head has decreased considerably.
The Minister quoted the chief probation officer for Mid-Glamorgan as welcoming the opportunity to convert the Pontypridd centre into a day centre to be used on a more general basis for clients of the probation service. If in his judgment, in the light of local circumstances, a day centre would give greater value to the probation service than a day training centre, I see no reason why he should be prevented from altering the function of his centre accordingly.
The Minister did not mention that the chief probation officers for the other three areas with day training centres—inner London, South Yorkshire and Merseyside—all wish to retain the day training centre order and all have written to me expressing that view forcefully.
The Minister said that the facilities of the existing day training centres would not be lost but would instead be used as day centres operating for probation service clients on a more general basis. Day training centres, however, are a specific alternative to custody, whereas day centres, although valuable in their own right, are a more general adjunct to the work of the probation service and do not operate specifically or exclusively as an alternative to custody.
On 5 March, Colin Thomas, chief probation officer for South Yorkshire, wrote to me as follows:
About 50 per cent. of the orders are made by the Crown Court. Our judges tell me that they regard the facility as an alternative to custody; I do not think they would regard attendance at a day centre in the same light … local opinion would argue the absurdity of throwing away one of the few alternatives to custody that we have".
Again, Graham Smith, chief probation officer for inner London, wrote on 4 March:
The London day training centre has been seen by the courts and by the probation service as an alternative to custody, and the fear at the moment is that without supportive legislation this may no longer be the case into the future".
In Committee, the Minister argued that as a result of the Bill the day training centres would be freed from
the present rather rigid and strict format."—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 9 March 1982; c. 475.]
As the deputy chief probation officer, Mr. R. T. Adams, wrote to me on 30 March,
it is this very strict format that is appealing to the courts, and encourages the use of day training centres as an alternative to custody".
I am conscious of the time that I have taken and I apologise, but this is an extremely important issue both to the probation areas concerned and as a matter of principle. At a time when the need for an extensive range of alternatives to custody is greater than ever and when both the Minister of State and the Home Secretary constantly acknowledge that we need more—and more credible—alternatives to custody, not fewer, there can be no justification for depriving the courts in those four areas of an option that they have found so valuable unless a suitable alternative provision is included in the Bill.
I hope, therefore, that the Government will look favourably on the new clauses and, in the light of the expressions of opinion from the four probation areas, will feel able to retain the day training centres and the day training order.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful for the opportunity to deal with the consequences of the case of Rogers v. Cullen, to which the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) referred and the last stage of which was dealt with last week when the House of Lords decided that the courts did not have the power to include conditions in probation orders requiring attendance at a day centre.
The judgment plainly has substantial implications for the requirements that may be attached to a probation order, but we need a little more time to consider the speeches in the House of Lords before we have a clear idea of the action that we wish to take. I should make it clear that the Governmept are well aware of the importance of the judgment and we fully intend to make any legislative changes needed to restore to the courts the power to include certain types of requirement in probation orders. I should make it clear that both in the Divisional Court and in the House of Lords there was no doubt expressed as to the value of those measures. It was simply a matter of interpreting the existing statute to see whether the words that Parliament had used permitted those requirements to be attached to probation orders. To the Government's regret, it proved not to be the case.
The probation order is among the most important of our non-custodial disposals and I need not take time to explain why. Nor, within the ambit of this group of new clauses, is it necessary for me to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of day training centres as opposed to day centres. The matter was touched upon in the brief

debate in Committee. However, I must say, in support of what I then said about the general take-up of available places in day training centres, that in 1981 in Liverpool the average percentage of places available and occupied was 58 per cent., in London 65 per cent., in Pontypridd 63 per cent. and in Sheffield 62 per cent. I understand that there has been a recent improvement, but that is justification for the point that I made in Committee. However, I do not wish to take up the time of the House, nor would it be profitable to do so, in discussing the relative merits of those two sorts of centre.
The new clauses are intended to achieve the same purpose as the Government have achieved. I should be grateful if the Government could have further time to consider the matters. I undertake that we intend to carry the work forward as quickly as possible in order to introduce later any amendments that may be necessary. In the light of that explanation of the Government's intentions and with the assurance that we shall carefully take into consideration the new clauses with which we are dealing, I hope that the hon. Member for Ormskirk will withdraw his new clause.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: In the light of what the Minister has said, and especially his attitude towards new clause 16, clearly the loss of the day training centres, although regrettable, would not be quite as serious as would otherwise have been the case. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 25

ASSAULTS ON CONSTABLES

'There shall be added to Schedule 1 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 the offence of assaults on constables under section 51 of the Police Act 1964. '.—[Mr. Dubs.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Dubs: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The clause tries to change the law whereby a defendant brought before a court on a charge of assaulting a police constable does not have the right of trial by jury, and his trial must therefore take place in the magistrates' court. On the other hand, if the prosecution so chooses, the case can be heard in a Crown court before a jury. The new clause wishes to make the offence triable either way.
It is, by any standards, adjudged to be a serious offence. According to criminal statistics, in 1980 there were more than 12,000 proceedings against individuals accused of assaulting police constables, with 88 per cent. of the men and 86 per cent. of the women so brought before courts found guilty. By comparison 44 per cent. of all men and 35 per cent. of all the women brought before magistrates' courts on charges of common assault were found guilty—a much smaller number. It may not be valid to make a direct comparison between the offence of assault on a constable and the offence of common assault, but it is remarkable that the percentage found guilty of assaults on constables was about double that of the percentage found guilty of common assault.
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The matter was investigated in some detail in a report published in November 1975. That was a report of the interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice James. It was entitled:


The Distribution of Criminal Business between the Crown Court and Magistrates' Courts.
The case in favour of the new clause was made most succinctly in paragraph 156 of that report. I can do no better than to quote it:
On the basis of the existing law the offence would fall within the intermediate category and so carry a right to elect trial by jury. In our view, the present position, whereby in effect the prosecution can choose to take the case on indictment but the defendant has no choice, is indefensible. Where the case is contested there is often a straight conflict between the evidence of the defendant and that of the police; if there is such a conflict, it can be said that the prosecution has a special involvment in the case and that therefore it is particularly suitable for resolution by a jury. If the offence is retained, we recommend that it should carry a right to trial by jury unless the maximum penalties are severely curtailed. We must, however, draw attention to the fact that this recommendation, which was strongly supported in the evidence we received, is likely to result in substantially more of these cases going to the Crown Court for trial on the defendant's election.
I should mention that the James report was concerned with the means of reducing the amount of business going to the Crown court. Nevertheless, that committee recommended that this offence should be such that the defendant could elect for trial before the Crown court.
I want to mention one other argument. As I understand it, where a defendant is up for an assault on a constable, the Crown court has the right to alter the verdict to one of common assault. This discretion is sometimes used, and it is a useful one. However, that discretion does not lie with magistrates' courts.
This issue was dealt with by the Standing Committee considering the Criminal Law Bill in 1977. Regrettably, the Committee did not reach the conclusion that I hope that the House will reach this evening.
Since 1977, we have had the Scarman report. We have had a detailed review of relationships between the community and the police. The whole question of assaults on the police and by the police has come under more detailed scrutiny. It has become a matter of greater concern than previously. In instances where a defendant may be brought before the court because he is alleged to have assaulted a police constable, sometimes the defence is that the police constable had assaulted the person who has become the defendant. Scarman was much concerned with this issue, and it is an issue which is at the heart of some of the difficulties that arise in inner city areas and in the relationships between the police and local communities, particularly the black communities.
It is my contention, supported by the James report, that the present law is anomalous. The fact that there would be more business before the Crown courts would be a small price to pay for getting rid of this anomaly and ensuring that justice in these difficult and controversial cases is seen to be done. I hope that the House will support the new clause.

Mr. Mayhew: I am sorry to tell the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs) that I cannot advise the House to accept the need for his clause.
It has to be remembered that the offence in question has never, since its incorporation into the Police Act 1964, carried with it a right for the defendant to elect trial by jury. Prior to 1977, the offence was a hybrid offence. It was open to the prosecution to seek trial on indictment; but it was not open to the defendant to elect jury trial. At the

same time, the maximum penalties for the offence were considerably higher than they are now. Conviction on indictment carried with it a liability to a penalty of 2 years' imprisonment or an unlimited fine, or both. Following recommendations made by the James committee, to which the hon. Gentleman referred, the maximum penalty available for the offence was reduced to its present level, and at the same time the option of trial on indictment available to the prosecution was abolished. Since the 1977 Act came into force the offence has been a purely summary one.
It is clear from the wording of the amendment and from what the hon. Gentleman has said that his concern is not to increase the penalties available for assaulting a constable but to secure for defendants a right to elect trial by jury at the Crown Court. I am afraid we cannot agree that there is any aspect of this offence that could justify confining the sentencing powers of a Crown court to the range of sentences that is available for a magistrate's court after a summary trial, which would be the effect of the new clause.
I have noted the implication at any rate that the prosecution in these cases has a particular axe to grind. I do not accept it. It is also argued that magistrates are often seen as accepting police evidence too readily and, furthermore, that prosecution of members of ethnic minority groups, and in particular black youngsters, for these offences can badly affect police community relations. I do not think that those arguments are sustainable. I believe firmly that magistrates recognise and fulfil the duty to give to the evidence of a police witness a scrutiny that is no less judicial than that which they must apply to any other evidence. They do not accept the evidence merely because the witness is a policeman or because they see him again and again in their court.
There is no evidence to suggest that magistrates are more likely to convict a black youngster of the offence because of his colour; I do not think that that was argued by the hon. Gentleman, but it is sometimes suggested. Nor, indeed, do magistrates appear more likely to convict youngsters of any race for this offence than for any other. The 1980 statistics show that in cases of assault on constables 90 per cent. of the defendants in the age range 17 to 20 were convicted and 88 per cent. of defendants over 21, figures which are very similar to the conviction rates of over 90 per cent. for all offences tried in magistrates' courts.
I think I understand what lies behind the new clause. The hon. Gentleman has drawn attention to a disparity between the conviction rates for assaults on constables and for common assault on people who are not police officers. Whatever the reason for the disparity, in regard to assaults on people who are not police officers, the question of liability and responsibility may well be one of six of one and half a dozen of the other. I do not think that the arguments adduced by the hon. Gentleman would justify my advising the House to accept the clause.

Question put and negatived.

New Clause 26

FIREARMS OFFENCES

'Notwithstanding anything contained in the Firearms Act 1968 any person found guilty of committing an offence under section 17 or section 18 of the Act shall upon conviction be sentenced to a period of 14 years imprisonment.

On sentencing any person so convicted, the court may at the same time declare the period which it recommends to the Secretary of State as the minimum period which in its view should elapse before the Secretary of State orders the release of that person on licence.'.—[Sir Nicholas Bonsor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The purpose of this new clause is to amend the Firearms Act 1968 in so far as sections 17 and 18 apply to firearms and particularly to lethal firearms. The House will be surprised and probably not a little alarmed to hear that some 15 years ago it was proposed that I might take up a career as a parliamentary draftsman. Had I done so, I hope that some of my work would not have been quite as incomplete as the new clause that I have tabled. I would be the first to concede that the spirit of the new clause and its detailed wording do not agree entirely with each other. Should we divide on this, I hope that the House will grant me the indulgence of voting for the spirit of the new clause and not reject it because of its wording.
In sections 17 and 18 of the Firearms Act 1968 not only are firearms of a lethal nature, such as a shotgun, a rifle or a pistol included, but also air weapons of any nature and imitation firearms. The purpose of the new clause is to introduce a mandatory sentence of 14 years' imprisonment for having a lethal firearm in order to avoid arrest or to commit another indictable offence. It is not proposed that those provisions should apply either to all categories of air weapons or to imitation firearms. Therefore, I hope that we can consider the spirit of the intended new clause and vote accordingly.
It would be right to introduce such a mandatory sentence. I say that having given the matter a great deal of thought and being aware that my hon. and learned Friend the Minister and many other distinguished and senior colleagues at the Bar and in the judiciary do not believe in the principle of mandatory sentencing and are understandably reluctant to make a mandatory sentence in any form of prison sentence.
However, two precedents spring to mind. The first and most obvious is murder. If anyone is sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, that automatically means life imprisonment for 21 years, less remission and parole. There is also the provision, which I have incorporated in my proposal, that a judge can recommend the minimum sentence that could be served as the life sentence. In the case of murder, that minimum sentence can go above 21 years. In this new clause it will apply between the minimum sentence that may be served if 14 years is the sentence passed by the court and the 14 years' maximum that may be served if the whole sentence is carried through.
I can best illustrate why I believe that this is a suitable case in which we could look at extending the principle of mandatory sentencing by comparing the crime of taking a firearm in order to commit a serious offence with that of rape. A great deal of public pressure was put upon the House to extend a mandatory minumim sentence to a

conviction for rape. I would not have supported that. The reason is that I believe in the principle of allowing, the judiciary as wide a scope of discretion in sentencing as is proper. In most cases that is to give it an absolute discretion, from an absolute discharge to whatever the maximum sentence might be for that offence.
In the case of rape there is an enormously wide differential between the degrees of seriousness of which the crime may be constituted. Some cases of rape are among the most dreadful crimes that can be committed, but at the other end of the spectrum there are cases of rape in which the mitigating circumstances—the circumstances in which the rape has been committed—mean that a much more lenient view can properly be taken of the offence. However, the distinction between that and the offence that we consider tonight is that I argue that here there is no 3uch minimum degree of responsibility or seriousness in the offence.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: Will my hon. Friend clarify one point? Can he tell the court—[Interruption.] That was a Freudian slip and served me right. Can he tell the House this? He is contemplating a minimum prison sentence of 14 years in respect of firearms? Does he contemplate a lower sentence if the person is not carrying ammunition?

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: At the moment I would not contemplate that, although I appreciate that that point could be debated. The unfortunate victim who will be looking down the wrong end of a 12-bore shotgun will not know whether the weapon is loaded. The fear that is engendered by the use of that weapon is not affected by whether the weapon is loaded.
The question of the degree of responsibility and of seriousness is not affected by that differential. The intention is there throughout to use that weapon to frighten and terrify anyone who might seek to apprehend the person or anyone who may surprise him when he is going about his crime. Therefore, I do not believe that we can lock at that with equanimity, even if the criminal deliberately has not taken a loaded shotgun. The intention to frighten is present on all those occasions.
11.15 pm
This is a case where there is no question of a sudden impulse. This is one of the most premeditated of all crimes. A person who decides to commit some other offence, or decides that he may be in danger of being apprehended by a police officer or a person lawfully attempting to apprehend him, takes a weapon so that he can frighten off Such a threat. It is proper to take a serious view, whether the weapon is loaded or not, if someone has taken a positive decision before going out to commit a crime.
My second reason for tabling the new clause is that I do not see any other way forward. We failed for the umpteenth time last night to have capital punishment restored. We have failed to increase penalties for serious offences. Successive Governments and the House must share the responsibility for that. We have failed to deter the enormous rise in the increase in crime, which has gone on steadily for more than a decade and which has reached proportions that are unacceptable to the people of Britain and, in particular, to Members of the House. There it no other way forward but to make certain that those who commit this crime know that they will be subjected to a lengthy prison sentence.
I may be asked whether 14 years is too harsh a penalty for this crime. I have already said that I view the matter seriously. While 14 years' imprisonment sounds a long time, it would be subject to the normal period of remission of one-third of the sentence and the normal parole facility would be available for another one-third of the sentence. Therefore, in this as in many other cases, the reality is that if 14 years is passed by the court, the sentence served may be closer to five years.
One of the reasons why the Government and the judiciary are opposed to mandatory sentencing is that it fetters judicial discretion. But in this case we have an adequate area in which judicial discretion could be exercised because of the provision whereby the judge can say what minimum sentence should be served for this offence.
The crime may be such that a comparatively lenient view could be taken—the weapon may not be loaded, or the person at whom the weapon is pointed may know that it is not loaded, or suspect that is it is not loaded, and therefore is not afraid. But even if those matters are taken into account, the person who has been sentenced to 14 years can be let out after four years and eight months.
Judicial discretion still arises because, under the new clause, it would be open to the court to say that a minimum sentence of any period above that and below 14 years should be the sentence served by the offender before he is released. That is an adequate discretion to deal with this extremely serious crime.
I believe that the public must be satisfied that this House is determined to take steps to deal with serious crime and, most essentially, to deal with crimes against the person, crimes of violence, and crimes involving firearms. The public must be satisfied that we are not going to allow the rise in the number of offences over a decade to continue unchallenged and unremedied.
I ask the House to support the new clause, and, I hope, to take a positive step forward in controlling crimes of violence and crimes involving the use of firearms.

Mr. W. Benyon: I warmly support the new clause, and it is a great pity that it is being discussed so late in the evening.
In yesterday's debate, the point was made again and again that capital punishment cannot be proved to be a deterrent in the case of hot-blooded crime but that it serves as a deterrent in that it prevents a criminal from picking up a firearm or any other weapon before committing the crime.
I accept that argument. I voted against the reintroduction of capital punishment and my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) voted for it. I strongly believe that it is incumbent on those of us who voted against to show that we mean business about violent crime. Those statistics have gone through the roof, and my hon. Friend knows that only too well. Something must be done. The public must be reassured. The present situation is a disgrace to a civilised community.
This House will be judged on what it does. I know only too well that the Home Office and judges do not like the new clause. Frankly, the judges are the problem. Criminals are not fools. They read the newspapers and watch television. They are aware of the sentences that are imposed and the remission that is now being given. In

those circumstances, is it any wonder that weapons are used more and more frequently in the commission of crime and that our prisons are full?
I entirely accept that the greatest deterrent of all is the certainty of detection, but almost equally there is the balance between crime and the penalty arising from it. Let me give the House a facetious example. If we imposed a six-month prison sentence for parking offences, there would be no need for parking attendants. I am of the sure and certain knowledge that a minimum sentence for the sort of crime we are now discussing will make criminals think twice. It will also reassure the public.
The argument that mandatory sentences are wrong has been made over and over again. My hon. Friend has mentioned the life sentence. I draw attention to the penalty for drink driving offences, which has undoubtedly deterred, as it was meant to do. The same applies in this case.
I strongly repeat my view that those who do not want capital punishment have a duty to put something in its place and to produce some sort of alternative that will prevent these shocking figures for violent crime. The new clause does just that, and I hope that the House will support it.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: The new clause was moved persuasively, and the loss to the Parliamentary Counsel Office has been the gain of this House. However, I cannot accept either of the principles contained in the new clause, notwithstanding the fact that I attach precisely the same importance to the need to deter who would otherwise arm themselves to commit an offence.
The new clause infringes a number of principles and in effect introduces a totally new principle into our criminal system. The hon. Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor), anticipating the criticism that in certain circumstances it might be too harsh to inflict 14 years' imprisonment, said that in effect the sentence served would be very much less—only a third of that under the parole system.
By accepting this principle, we should be introducing into our law the principle that some American states have, of a minimum and maximum sentence for a particular offence. I feel that to do that would be inevitably to set a precedent for other types of offence. In supporting the new clause, the hon. Gentleman drew attention to the fact that there were already one or two other circumstances in which a mandatory sentence could be imposed.
The attention of the House was also drawn to the idea that a mandatory sentence should be imposed for rape. We should be edging open that much wider the door towards mandatory sentence, and be setting a precedent. If we are to do that we must ask ourselves whether that is a desirable precedent to set.
In taking the view that it is not, I am not understating or underemphasising the gravity of committing offences armed with firearms. I take the point about whether the firearm is loaded, and that there may be mitigating circumstances other than that the firearm is not loaded. I ask myself whether it is so much graver an offence to commit robbery armed with a firearm of some kind, or armed with a heavy metal weapon or a knife. If we apply this principle to the firearm, why not to the heavy metal weapon or to the knife?
The reality is that we should introduce by the new clause a principle that would necessarily fetter the sort of discretion that we always say the judiciary ought, rightly,


to have. It should have the discretion to examine the circumstances of each offence and decide, in the light of those circumstances, whether the appropriate penalty is the maximum or something below the maximum. We are handing over that discretion in a way that was opposed again and again in Committee when there was any attempt from the Labour Benches to introduce any diminution of the flexibility of the courts. That was opposed on the ground that the judiciary ought to have an ample discretion. The Minister will recall that that was a principle that I always accepted, even though there were circumstances in which I felt that there could be some exception in detail from it.
The second principle that I should object to in the new clause, as a general principle and as setting a precedent, is in the second part—the introduction of the recommendation. We have accepted that in the case of life imprisonment for murder and for special circumstances which the House accepted as an alternative to capital punishment, which was being abolished at the time. Special reasons prompted the House to do that.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree with me that, whatever the special circumstances may have been, that has proved to be an invaluable provision and one without which the court would have great difficulty in effectively enforcing the laws relating to murder?

Mr. Silkin: We had some argument about that in Committee. There are many different points of view about that. I think that I said in Committee—if I did not I ought to have—that many judges do not like that power and do not exercise it these days for that reason. They feel it is wrong, at the moment when someone is sentenced, to determine what his future ought to be, perhaps 10 years or, in this case, 14 years ahead. What should be done depends so much on his reaction to the penalty that is imposed upon him. Indeed, the very fact that such a recommendation may be made at the point of consideration of the offence means that all the valuable work done by the Parole Board in considering the individual circumstances and the time when it is right for someone to be released, looking at the gravity of the crime in addition to all the other circumstances, is vitiated by a recommendation from which it feels it is difficult for it to depart. The Secretary of State is under the same inhibition, as I know from the number of constituency cases with which I have to deal.
11.30 pm
I do not see why we should set this further precedent in relation to this offence. I support strongly the view that carrying a firearm should be regarded as a very serious offence. There has been ample legislation over the years making it more serious. I cannot, however, agree with what is proposed in either part of the new clause.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: Despite my great respect for the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) I must support the objections put forward by the former Attorney-General, the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin). The arguments that the right hon. and learned Gentleman put against the new clause are compelling.
The object of the new clause is to deprive the courts of effective discretion and to stipulate a mandatory minimum

sentence of 14 years in respect of offences under sections 17 and 18 of the Firearms Act 1968. I regard than as objectionable. The precedents are extremely limited. They are murder and drunken driving. There may be others but they are not significant. I am very much opposed to extending the precedent. We should not remove from judges the discretion that they now possess. If one is to have a system of criminal law that imposes substantial prison sentences it is important that the sentences reflect the degree of culpability of the defendant. A sentence that does not take account of the degree of culpability on the part of the offender means that the system is defective.
As the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich pointed out, and as my hon. Friend for Nantwich rightly stressed, most cases involving firearms are serious and should attract a very long prison sentence. At the same time, I can conceive of other situations when the degree of culpability is less. I should like to put to my hon. Friend and Member for Nantwich the possibility that an offender would not be carrying ammunition. I would regard that as a factor that greatly reduced the degree of culpability. There are other instances. For example, a relatively young offender might be prevailed upon by a forceful companion to carry a weapon. I would regard that as mitigation.
We should not take away from the judges the power to impose a sentence that reflects as accurately as possible the degree of culpability. If however, that is done—this is the purpose of the new clause—one brings the criminal into disrepute.

Mr. W. Benyon: My hon. Friend is voicing—I intend no disrespect—a typical lawyer's argument. How does he suggest that we deal with the present problem? How do we seek to deter criminals using these weapons?

Mr. Hogg: That is a fair question and I shall respond to it. I am not opposed to heavy prison sentences. As ray hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Mr. Benyon) probably knows, the maximum sentence that can be imposed for offences under sections 17 and 18 of the 1968 Act is only 14 years. There is something to be said for increasing substantially the maximum sentence that can be imposed. I am opposed to a minimum sentence. We must have a system that reflects culpability, and if we do not we shall destroy respect for the law. That will be the result if excessive sentences are imposed in some cases.

Sir Albert Costain: My hon. Friend is using legal language and those of us who are not learned gentleman use practical language. We want to deter. If a criminal knows that the is bound to get 14 years' imprisonment for certain offences, will not that stop him from carrying a firearm?

Mr. Hogg: There was anxiety that I should be brief and I was given four minutes. To intervene in my speech to prolong the exercise seems a slightly curious performance. As I said earlier, I think that in certain circumstances the courts should impose very long sentences. However, I am against very long minimum mandatory sentences that do not take account of the blameworthiness of individual offenders. If such sentences are made mandatory, we shall destroy respect for the law.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: With great respect, I think that my hon. Friend is missing the point that was made so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Sir. A. Costain). Surely it is the certainty of the length


of the sentence that will constitute a deterrent. My hon. Friend will know as well as I do from his experience in the courts that the criminal is by nature a born optimist and always thinks that the judge will be lenient with him until he discovers too late in the day that he was over-optimistic.

Mr. Hogg: That is a fair point. However, I do not believe in the deterrent theory of punishment to the extent that my hon. Friend does. I believe in long prison sentences but not necessarily because they will serve as a deterrent. There are many other good reasons for imposing long sentences, but my hon. Friend should not harbour the belief that such sentences necessarily act as a deterrent. If the law is to be effective, it must be respected. If we impose sentences that are disproportionate to the degree of blameworthiness, we shall destroy the public's respect for the law.

Mr. Best: My hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) has said that the criminal is a born optimist and believes that he will always be dealt with leniently. Surely he believes that he will never even be caught. The criminal that my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) and I see in the courts is the unsuccessful one. We should be interviewing the successful criminals whom we never meet.

Mr. Hogg: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I agree with him entirely. I do not want to persist with this line of argument because I have already occupied a good deal of the time of the House.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: It is clear that there will be no need for a ministerial reply in view of the extent of my hon. Friend's speech. My hon. Friend says that he does not accept the deterrent theory. If that is so, what is he doing supporting the possession of Trident missiles and other nuclear weapons?

Mr. Hogg: I shall not embark on a wholly different subject. We can discuss that issue on another occasion.
If we impose a minimum 14-year sentence for offences under sections 17 and 18 of the 1968 Act, it will be wholly out of balance with other prison sentences, and that will be unacceptable. If we impose a sentence for the simple possession of firearms that is disproportionate to an offence of serious rape, for example, we shall bring the law into disrepute. The effect of the clause is unsatisfactory.

Mr. Parris: May I, with my customary brevity, spring to the defence of my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg)? My hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Mr. Benyon) accused him of using a typical lawyer's argument. I do not think that it was a typical lawyer's argument and, as one who is not a lawyer, I should like to support what I believe to be the commonsense argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham.
We cannot know the possible range of crimes involving firearms that may be committed. Many may be serious, but many may have strong mitigating circumstances. We have to leave it to the judiciary to order punishments that fit the circumstances. It is imponderable what sort of crimes will be committed and it is not for us to tie the hands of the judiciary. That is not a lawyer's argument; it is a commonsense argument.

Mr. Nicholas Lyell: I agree with my hon. Friends the Members for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) and for Buckingham (Mr. Benyon) that severe sentences for armed robbery are important, but I support my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) in saying that it is wrong to fetter the discretion of the judiciary to decide what sentences to impose in individual cases.
If the public saw a 14-year sentence being imposed on a young man who had been forced to carry a firearm that he may never have used——

Mr. Teddy Taylor: Oh, come on!

Mr. Lyell: Let us assume it for a moment. The public might think that such a sentence was extremely unjust. Cases of manifest injustice bring the law into disrepute and lower the deterrent effect and good effect of severe sentences in appropriate cases.
We need to establish that we deeply disapprove of the carrying of firearms and that we have the will, through the judiciary, to impose severe sentences in appropriate cases. It is no good my hon. Friends saying that the judiciary does not have the will. I do not believe that. Those who take part in armed robberies are usually severely dealt with, and they certainly ought to be, but it should be for the discretion of individual judges. When a long sentence is imposed and is not cut short by the Home Secretary or the Parole Board, that has good effects.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: May I take the opportunity to congratulate my hon. and learned Friend on the judicial career on which he is shortly to embark? I am sure that those who appear in a court that he is administering will get their due deserts.
Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that what he has said about the possible unfairness of a mandatory sentence applies also to the life sentence for murder and the driving disqualification in breathalyser cases? Is it not right that the public interest should override the occasional unfortunate case?

Mr. Lyell: In only the rarest of cases should we have a mandatory minimum sentence. We need a long maximum sentence available, but we should leave it to the judiciary to impose that in appropriate cases and we should show that we expect long sentences in such cases.

Mr. Mayhew: We all understand the concern that lies behind the new clause and every hon. Member who has spoken in the debate has expressed his horror of offences in which firearms are used. We all seek to reduce that aspect of crime, along with all others.
I hesitate to speak, in view of the strictures about lawyers' language from my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Sir A. Costain), but I must say that the new clause is unacceptable to the Government.
There was a flaw in the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) when he said that he would not support mandatory sentences for rape, although he acknowledged that it could be one of the most serious offences. He gave as his reason for opposing such mandatory sentences the wide degree of culpability that was to be found. I think that he would find that to be a fairly controversial view in certain quarters, but I accept the argument for the purpose of what I wish to say.
11.45 pm
I believe that most people would regard there as being a wide degree of culpability in offences committed by somebody carrying a firearm. There must be a wide difference in the blameworthiness of someone who goes out to rob a bank armed with a Luger with the appropriate ammunition, and somebody who goes out carrying an imitation gun or an air pistol, with no possibility, if he is panicked, of doing any harm to anybody. That must be accepted as pointing the need in this type of offence, as was acknowledged in the case of rape, for a recognition of different degrees of blameworthiness.
I agree with those hon. Members who say that the law should provide for heavy maximum sentences for this type of offence but should not be so rigid that it cannot distinguish the appropriate sentence for the less blameworthy as distinct from the more blameworthy criminal.
Many people talk as though judges are unable to pass long sentences of imprisonment for this type of offence. It should be known more widely that section 17 of the Firearms Act 1968 prescribes two offences, first, using a firearm with intent to resist arrest with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment—which, incidentally, would be abolished by this new clause and for which 14 years would be substituted—and, secondly, possessing a firearm on arrest for or in the commission of a scheduled offence which has a maximum sentence of 14 years' imprisonment. Section 18 contains the offence of carrying a firearm with a criminal intent, which is also subject to a maximum sentence of 14 years.
Those are hefty maximum sentences, and rightly so. It is said that the judges do not impose sufficiently high sentences. However, in an organised robbery where a premises or a vehicle is attacked by men armed with weapons such as a sawn-off shotgun with the objective of stealing large sums of money and valuable property, the ordinary penalty is 15 years' imprisonment, which is a year more than would be mandatory under this clause. Robbery, of course, carries a maximum of life imprisonment and that sentence is frequently awarded. On occasion determinate sentences of longer than 15 years are imposed for that offence.
Therefore, although it is widely held that soft sentences are passed, I suspect that that is because people have noticed, because of publicity that has been given, a case where, no doubt for special reasons, a relatively low sentence has been passed. The special reasons do not come over in the publicity, which instead leads people to suppose that that is the normal pattern for such offences. The norm does not come over.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: Will my hon. and learned Friend accept that of the 15,000 robberies recorded in 1980, 1,149 involved the use of firearms? Will he not also accept that in those circumstances, whatever sentences courts might hitherto have been passing, they have not proved adequate to deter?
Will my hon. and learned Friend accept, too, that although 15 years is longer than the mandatory 14 years, the provision enabling the judge to ask for a minimum sentence to be served would make it a significantly more dangerous penalty for the criminal than 15 years under the present system?

Mr. Mayhew: By definition, in those 1,400 or so cases the existing sentences that have been passed have not been

adequate to deter. The offences would not have occurred had those responsible for them been deterred from committing them.
An important point that is not generally understood is that in 1980 the proportion of all robberies in which firearms featured was 7·7 per cent., almost identical to the proportion 10 years earlier in 1970 which was 7·6 per cent. There has been little variation in the intervening years. The increase in the use of firearms—worrying though it is—has gone hand in hand with the general increase in crime. It has not overtaken it. The question therefore is whether we are confident that by imposing a mandatory sentence of 14 years' imprisonment we will deter. I believe that the disadvantages of breaching the principle of not imposing mandatory sentences far outweigh the possible advantages that form the basis of the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich.
The idea behind the provision for licences, which forms the second limb of the new clause, comes from the mandatory life sentence scheme for murder whereby a minimum term may be declared by the trial judge. That provision has not been used to any great extent. Only about 8 per cent. of life sentences for murder include any recommendation. The expectation would be that the declaration would be used more frequently for the offences we are now talking about, both as mitigating the harshness inherent in a mandatory sentence of 14 years which would have to be imposed, for example, in a case of criminal damage committed even with an air weapon, and for marking the gravity of some offences.
How in practice would the power to recommend a minimum term be exercised? As drafted it would be discretionary. It would be used in some cases and not others. Given the wide variety of cases there is a real danger of inconsistency of approach. Should the minimum term be subject to appeal thereby giving it the status of a sentence in its own right? What implications would that have for the nature of the recommendation when it came to the question of release on licence? I believe that these are important questions to which anyone advocating the imposition of mandatory sentences of imprisonment must address himself.

Mr. Best: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. Is not the real test by which my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) stands or falls whether in the past mandatory sentences have proved to be a deterrent? Will my hon. and learned Friend say whether any argument has been advanced to show that existing mandatory sentences have proved to be a deterrent? Has it proved to be the case with drinking and driving?

Mr. Mayhew: I noticed that my hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) relied upon the analogy of the mandatory disqualification for drinking and driving. I do not have those statistics. All I know is what I have frequently read, that it has not proved to be a deterrent. Initially, the numbers dropped but they have very rapidly increased. I do not know whether it is a deterrent.

Mr. W. Benyon: Is my hon. and learned Friend saying that if there were not a mandatory sentence in drink and drive cases there would not be a large increase in those incidents? Can I ask him about the statistical argument? Seven per cent. of a much higher figure of total offences must mean that the number RS increasing rapidly?

Mr. Mayhew: My hon. Friend misunderstood me if he supposed that I did not say that the number was increasing. We all know that the numbers have gone up. My hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich has quoted the numbers. The point that has to be made is that the proportion of offences in which firearms have been carried has remained over the past decade at between 7 and 8 per cent. I do not say that long sentences cannot be expected to have a deterrent effect. They plainly have. They keep people out of circulation, but I do not believe that a legal system that imposes mandatory sentences for offences other than murder is one that we should support. I well respect and understand the contrary arguments. I understand those who say "We have not gone for the death penalty so let us go for something really swingeing." For the reasons that have been given I am afraid that once we did it in this case we could not distinguish knives, blunt instruments or any other weapon, and we would then be on the road to mandatory sentences and away from the judges' discretion.
My argument will not improve by repetition. I must advise the House that, however sympathetic one must be towards its intent, this is not a new clause that should be accepted.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 12, Noes 98.

Division No. 148]
[10.11 pm


AYES


Allaun, Frank
Davidson, Arthur


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Davis, Terry (B'ham, Stechf'd)


Atkinson, N, (H'gey)
Deakins, Eric


Beith, A.J.
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)

 
Bennett, Andrew (St'kp'tN)
Dixon, Donald


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Dormand, Jack


Callaghan, Jim (Midd't'n &amp; P)
Dubs, Alfred


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
Eadie, Alex


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)
Eastham, Ken


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)


Crowther, Stan
Evans, John (Newton)


Cryer, Bob
Ewing, Harry


Cunningham, Dr J. (W'h'n)
Flannery, Martin


Dalyell, Tam
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)





Forrester, John
Miller, Dr M.S. (E Kilbride)


Foster, Derek
Morris, Rt Hon C. (O'shaw)


Golding, John
Morton, George


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Hamilton, James(Bothwell)
Parry, Robert


Hardy, Peter
Pitt, WilliamHenry


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Powell, Raymond(Ogmore)


Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Richardson, Jo


Haynes, Frank
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Hooley, Frank
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


John, Brynmor
Skinner, Dennis


Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Soley, Clive


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Spearing, Nigel


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Strang, Gavin


Lamborn, Harry
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Leadbitter.Ted
Tinn, James


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Wainwright, E.(DearneV)


McCartney, Hugh
Welsh, Michael


McKelvey, William
Winnick, David


MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Young, David (Bolton E)


McNamara, Kevin



McWilliam, John
Tellers for the Ayes:


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Mr. Allen McKay and Mr. Lawrence Cunliffe.


Millan.Rt Hon Bruce 





NOES


Aitken, Jonathan
Hamilton, Hon A.


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Hamilton, Michael(Salisbury)


Arnold, Tom
Hampson, Dr Keith


Aspinwall, Jack
Haselhurst, Alan


Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)
Hawkins, Paul


Atkinson, David(B'm'th, E)
Hogg, Hon Douglas(Gr'th'm)


Bendall, Vivian
Howell, Ralph (NNorfolk)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (T'bay)
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Benyon, Thomas(A'don)
Jessel, Toby


Benyon, W.(Buckingham)
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael


Berry, Hon Anthony
Kershaw, Sir Anthony


Bevan, DavidGilroy
Knox, David


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Lang, Ian


Blackburn, John
Lawrence, Ivan


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
LeMarchant, Spencer


Bright, Graham
Lester, Jim(Beeston)


Brinton, Tim
Lewis, Arthur(N'ham NW)


Brooke, Hon Peter 
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Brotherton, Michael
Loveridge, John


Brown, Michael(Brigg&amp;Sc'n)
Lyell, Nicholas


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Macfarlane, Neil


Buck, Antony
Major, John


Budgen, Nick
Marlow, Antony


Bulmer, Esmond
Marshall, Michael(Arundel)


Cadbury, Jocelyn
Mather, Carol


Carlisle, John (LutonWest)
Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (R'c'n)
Mawby, Ray


Chapman, Sydney
Mawhinney, Dr Brian


Clegg, Sir Walter
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Cockeram, Eric
Mayhew, Patrick


Cope, John
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Costain, Sir Albert
Mills, Iain(Meriden)


Cranborne, Viscount
Miscampbell, Norman


Crouch, David
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)


Dorrell, Stephen
Morgan, Geraint


Douglas-Hamilton, LordJ.
Mudd, David


Dover, Denshore
Murphy, Christopher


Dunn, Robert(Dartford)
Needham, Richard


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
Nelson, Anthony


Elliott, Sir William
Newton, Tony


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Onslow, Cranley


Farr, John
Osborn, John


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'ghN)
Parris, Matthew


Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles
Pattie, Geoffrey


Forman, Nigel
Percival, Sir Ian


Gardiner, George(Reigate)
Pollock, Alexander


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Goodhew, Sir Victor
Price, Sir David(Eastleigh)


Grieve, Percy
Proctor, K. Harvey


Griffiths, Peter Portsm'thN)
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Grylls, Michael
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Gummer, JohnSelwyn
Renton, Tim






Rhodes James, Robert
Stanbrook, Ivor


Rossi, Hugh
Stevens, Martin


Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Stradling Thomas, J.


Shaw, Michael (Scarborough)
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Silvester, Fred
Temple-Morris, Peter

 
Sims, Roger
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Speed, Keith
Thompson, Donald


Speller, Tony
Thorne, Neil (IlfordSouth)


Spence, John
Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)


Stainton, Keith
Waddington, David




Wakeham, John
Tellers for the Noes:


Wall, Sir Patrick
Mr. Alastair Goodlad and Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones.


Warren, Kenneth



Watson, John



Wells, Bowen



Wheeler, John



Wickenden, Keith



Williams, D.(Montgomery)



Wolfson, Mark

Division No. 149]
[11.54 pm


AYES
 

Beith, A. J.
Marlow, Antony


Bevan, David Gilroy
Penhaligon, David


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Carlisle, John (LutonWest)
Wall, Sir Patrick


Cockeram, Eric



Goodhart, Sir Philip
Tellers for the Ayes:


Grylls, Michael
Mr. W. Benyon and Mr. Vivian Bendall.


Kershaw, Sir Anthony





NOES


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Gardiner, George(Reigate)


Atkinson, David (B'm'th, E)
Griffiths, Peter Portsm'th N)


Bennett, Andrew(St'kp'tN)
Gummer, JohnSelwyn


Bennett, Sir Frederic (T'bay)
Hamilton, Hon A.


Berry, Hon Anthony
Hampson, Dr Keith


Blackburn, John
Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Bottomley, Peter (W'wichW)
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael


Bright, Graham
Kilroy-Silk, Robert


Brinton, Tim
Knox, David


Brooke, Hon Peter
Lang, Ian


Brotherton, Michael
Lawrence, Ivan


Brown, Michael(Brigg&amp;Sc'n)
Lester, Jim (Beeston)


Brown, Ronald W.(H'ckn'yS)
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Budgen, Nick
Lyell, Nicholas


Butcher, John
Lyons, Edward (Bradf'dW)


Cadbury, Jocelyn
Macfarlane, Neil


Campbell-Savours, Dale
McKelvey, William


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (R'c'n)
Major, John


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th.S'n)
Marshall, Michael(Arundel)


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Mather, Carol


Cope, John
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Costain, Sir Albert
Mayhew, Patrick


Cranborne, Viscount
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Cryer, Bob
Morton, George


Davidson, Arthur
Mudd, David


Dorrell, Stephen
Murphy, Christopher


Douglas-Hamilton, LordJ.
Needham, Richard


Dover, Denshore
Nelson, Anthony


Dubs, Alfred
Neubert, Michael


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Newton, Tony


Elliott, Sir William
Osborn, John


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'ghN)
Parris, Matthew


Forman, Nigel
Pitt, William Henry





Proctor, K. Harvey
Stradling Thomas, J.


Raison, Rt Hon Timothy
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Rees-Davies, W. R.
Temple-Morris, Peter


Renton, Tim
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Rhodes James, Robert
Thompson, Donald


Richardson, Jo
Waddington, David


Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Watson, John


Shaw, Michael (Scarborough)
Wells, Bowen


Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
Wheeler, John


Silvester, Fred
Wickenden, Keith


Sims, Roger
Williams, D. (Montgomery)


Skinner, Dennis
Wolfson, Mark


Speed, Keith



Speller, Tony
Tellers for the Noes:


Stanbrook, Ivor
Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones and Mr. Alastair Goodlad.


Stevens, Martin

Question accordingly negatived.

New clause 39

CURFEW ORDER

`(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a person under 17 but not less than ten years of age is convicted of an offence which is punishable with imprisonment in the case of a person aged 21 or over, the court may make an order confining the offender to his place of permanent residence for such hours of any day and for such day or days of the week as they think fit; provided that:—
(a) the offender has consented to the order;
(b) where the offender resides with his parent or guardian such parent or guardian has consented to the order;
(c) where the offender resides in the care of any other person or authority such person or authority has consented to the order;
(d) having regard to the circumstances of the case it considers the requirement necessary for securing the good conduct of the offender or for preventing repetition by him of the same offence or the commission of other offences;
(e) the court has the benefit of a social inquiry report upon the offender.

(2) An order under this section shall be known as a curfew order.

(3) The periods within a day within which confinement may be imposed under this section shall be:—
(a) Mondays to Fridays—6 p.m. until 6 a.m. on the following day;
(b) Saturdays and Sundays—noon until 6 a.m. on the following day.

(4) The maximum duration of such an order shall be three months. The maximum number of days within such a period of three months shall be 42.

(5) An offender subject to a curfew order shall, at the request of a person acting as an officer of the court or a police officer who calls at his place of permanent residence to which he has been confined during the hours prescribed by the order, present himself to such person in order to establish his presence; and failure to do so shall constitute a breach of the order.

(6) Where such an order has been made and it appears on information to a justice acting for a relevant petty sessional area that the offender has been in breach of the order, the justice may issue a summons requiring the offender to appear at a place and time specified in the summons before a magistrates' court acting for the area or, if the information is in writing and on oath, may issue a warrant for the offender's arrest requiring him to be brought before the court.

(7) If it is proved to the satisfaction of the magistrates' court before which the offender is brought under this section that he has without reasonable excuse been in breach of the order then that court may:—
(a) impose upon the offender any sentence or make any order which it might have imposed or made for the original offence of which he was convicted;
(b) commit the offender to the Crown Court for sentence.

(8) A magistrates' court which deals with an offender's case under subsection 5(2) of this section shall send to the Crown Court a certificate signed by a justice of the peace giving particulars of the offender's breach of the order together with


other particulars as may be desirable, and a certificate purporting to be so signed shall be admissible as evidence of the breach before the Crown Court.

(9) Where by virtue of subsection 5(2) above the offender is brought or appears before the Crown Court and it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that he has been in breach of the order the Court may impose upon the offender any sentence or make any order which it might have imposed or made for the originial offence of which he was convicted.

(10) Nothing in this section shall prevent a court imposing an order under this section in addition to other penalties that it is empowered to impose save that where the offender is subject to a supervision order any such confinement to his place of permanent residence shall be imposed as a condition of that order and not under this section.

(11) In proceedings before a Crown Court under this section any question whether there has been a breach of the order shall be determined by a court and not by the verdict of a jury.

(12) An offender who is in breach of a curfew order shall be liable to arrest by a police officer.'.—[Mr. Lyell.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Lyell: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is getting late—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear"]—and this new clause was fully discussed in Committee. I note that the lowing herd is not wholly absent. I move the new clause now because, despite the Minister's friendly and encouraging words in Committee and the fact that the matter is being considered seriously with a view to bringing it forward in an acceptable form, I have made some changes to the original clause and I wish to mention briefly its objects and provenance.
The object of the clause is to add what I believe would be a valuable weapon to the courts' armoury of non-custodial sentences for dealing with juvenile crime. The House is well aware of the rise in juvenile crime, and I am sure that we all agree about the importance of parental responsibility in trying to curtail juvenile offences. We recognise that in some cases the parent or parents simply cannot control their youngsters and I do not suggest that the clause is appropriate for such cases. However, many offences occur when a young person goes out late at night, drinks rather too much, causes criminal damage or gets into trouble at a bar, disco or on the streets. If he could be restrained and kept at home on appropriate days, such as Friday or Saturday—or kept away from a football match where he might have got into trouble—by order of the court, enforceable and supported by such a clause, he could be greatly benefited. Not only would the disapproval of society be marked by an appropriate penalty but the youngster could be saved from himself.
The idea for the clause was not mine. The kind words of the Minister should go to the Magistrates' Association, which passed a resolution saying that it would wish such a non-custodial option to be added to the sentences that magistrates could impose, especially on juveniles. That has been reinforced by the views of the inner London juvenile court panel, which is in an especially good position to know the sentencing needs for such offences. I have had discussions with many magistrates. Although the original clause does not have the blanket support of all organisations, I have received much support from chief probation officers and directors of social services, including those from my county of Hertfordshire, where the idea for the clause arose.
The objects of the clause are to enhance parental responsibility and to make provision for another non-custodial sentence. There is a growing realisation in Britain that we have something to learn from the

Americans in the wide range of non-custodial options that they make available to their courts, especially for juveniles. We should be ready to go down that wad.
As I wish to be brief, may I move on to deal with some of the changes that appear in the present draft of the clause compared with the draft before the Committee. The principal point raised by those who voiced objections—I recognise that some of them were valid—was about enforcement.
In Committee I made the point that is valid in many cases, but not all, that to a great extent a curfew order would be self-enforcing, in that if the young person on whom it was imposed broke it that person would rapidly go back to old haunts and habits, and thus rapidly come to the notice of the police again and be brought back before the court for an alternative penalty or some other suitable punishment—non-custodial, one hopes. However, that is not always the case.
I agree with the criticism that there should be a check-up system. Consequently, subsection (5) suggests that a person subject to a curfew order should be ready to make himself known to someone who comes to check up. That should not necessarily or normally be a police officer. The form of words is
a person acting as an officer of the court".
We have this in the fines enforcement officer who is used by some courts. If the offender were ordered to remain at home between certain hours, it would be possible for a person acting as an "officer of the court" to come at random and do a spot check—not to enter the dwelling, because I am sure that the House would think that that was unnecessary and unjustified, but to come to the door. There would then be an obligation on the offender to make his presence known.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: I am fascinated by my hon. and learned Friend's interesting idea. What will the officer of the court or the police do if he arrives at the house, rings the bell, and there is no answer? If the bell does not work, what does he do?

Mr. Lyell: I did not want to read the whole of subsection (5). Failure to present himself would constitute "a breach of the order", and a summons would then be issued and the offender brought back before the court. If there was a reasonable excuse—for instance, that he was ill and unable to get out of bed—there would be no breach because of the way in which the clause is drafted. II the bell was not working, that would be a reasonable excuse, and no offence would be committed. That is covered by the clause. It is important to have a check-up system that does not fall on the police.
I want to thank senior members of the Association of Chief Police Officers with whom I have had an opportunity to discuss the clause since the Committee stage, and the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, from which I have had a number of constructive suggestions which are included in the clause as drafted. I am also grateful to the other bodies which have made submissions which, where possible, have been taken into account in the present form.
There is a second point about enforcement. If a police officer should recognise someone as being in breach in the street, it is obviously right that there should be a power of arrest. That was not originally included, but is now included.
I do not envisage that the general method of enforcement should be by trawls by the police in the streets. The police do not want that. It would be unnecessary in local communities outside the great conurbations, and it would be impractical within the great conurbations. It is not proposed. Thus, one of the potential difficulties of the new clause has been avoided in the new draft.
The second point made was that it is important that the court should use such an order in appropriate cases. It was pointed out that in certain cases the parents would be quite inadequate or the young person would be wholly out of control, and that in such cases the courts should not use such an order. I accept that. First, there is a change, in that the consent not only of the parents but of the young person is now required. Secondly, the new draft provides for a social inquiry report. Thirdly—and here I am grateful to NACRO for the suggestion—it provides that it should be imposed only in cases where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the court
considers the requirement necessary for securing the good conduct of the offender or for preventing repetition by him of the same offence or the commission of other offences.
That is a rigmarole used in other sentencing options. It is highly appropriate to this order because it is exactly for those objects that the order would in any event be imposed by a court. One sees embodied in the clause its whole purpose.
12.15 am
This could be reinforced by a Home Office circular. When there is a new sentencing option, particularly one which to some extent breaks new ground, it is desirable that the kind of circumstance in which it should be employed should be made known to the justices, although, since the idea emanated from the magistrates, I take the same view as was taken by the Minister in Committee that the courts can be trusted to use it in appropriate cases. In so far as safeguards are needed, they are embodied in the clause.
A third point which was made was that the restrictions which would be imposed by such an order should not be in conflict with a supervision order. I recognise the force of that. For that purpose, where a supervision order is either to be imposed for the same offence or is already in force and one wishes to avoid a conflict, the clause as drafted provides that the keeping in which would be required by the order should be imposed only as a condition of the supervision order and not as a separate matter, thereby avoiding the conflict which might come from two distinct and possibly, though not likely, conflicting penalties.

Mr. Lawrence: Why would not the end that my hon. and learned Friend seeks be achieved by having a supervision order when the curfew could be supervised?

Mr. Lyell: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. I was coming to that point. I hope that we shall get the supervision order law into such a form that that can be done.
As the House knows, the probation service is under considerable stress. I have the greatest respect for the kind of intermediate treatment that is to be found in schemes such as the Medway close support scheme and schemes which emanate from ideas from the University of

Lancaster and other ideas which are put into effect in different areas. But these intermediate treatment schemes, excellent as they are, are highly intensive and require a great deal of probation officer time.
What we are seeking to do is in appropriate cases to harness the good will and efforts of parents. There is a large number of juvenile offences. I am not suggesting—and I do not think the magistrates have put this forward—that this order would be used in a huge number of cases, but it could be used in a significant number where intensive use of the probation service would not be appropriate. That is one reason why the magistrates are anxious to have the provision. That is why it is desirable to have it as a curfew order separate from and additional to a supervision order. The suggestion of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) is sensible, and I hope that we shall see that achieved, but in a significant number of cases it is right and proper to seek to go further.
I have made it clear in my opening remarks that it is not my intention to divide the House. This is a new non-custodial option and a new sentencing option. I hope that it will be considered constructively by the House. I know that it will be examined constructively by my hon. and learned Friend the Minister. I hope that before the Bill completes all its stages an opportunity will be found, perhaps in another place, to bring the clause forward in a polished form that will have the approval of the other place and, in due course, of ourselves. It may thereby find its way on to the statute book to be of that benefit to the courts in the sentencing options which we know that magistrates seek.

Mr. William Pitt: This new clause is a considerable improvement on the one that we discussed in Committee. However, I cannot support it wholly. I have some reservations about its efficacy and the ability of people to carry it out.
Under subsection (1)(a), the offender must consent to the order and under (1)(b) the offender's parent or guardian must consent to the order, if the offender resides with him. That would be admirable if that consent were both given and accepted all the way through the currency of the order. I am worried that the offender may consent to the curfew order at one moment—perhaps to get himself off the hook—but two or three weeks later when the curfew order started to bite, the offender might decide to remove his consent. He may say to himself "Blow this, I am going out and I shall face the consequences."
I am concerned about how, especially in the large conurbations, which is where the curfew order would be used most, if it were put into operation, anyone could find the young offenders who were breaking the curfew order other than by making large police trawls of the streets or—dare I say it in the Chamber?—by making people carry some form of identification. That would be impractical.
I would accept the order if it were part of a supervised activities order. However, it is not considered in the clause that it should be part of a supervised activities order. I can see no other reason why young people should be curfewed in this way. It reminds me of sending children to bed with no tea. It is not a creative way of performing a non-custodial sentence. I have used the word "creative" several times in Committee and in the House when talking about the matter. We should be looking for the creative use of


a young offender's time, to make him aware of the crimes that he has committed, of his debt to society and that he has to do something constructive to expiate those crimes.

Mr. John Carlisle: The hon. Gentleman has mentioned the word "creative", which he used ad nauseam in Committee. Does he agree that denying an offender the pleasures of freedom is creative, by confining him to his home for that length of time?

Mr. Pitt: I agree that denying the offender the pleasures of freedom has a certain appeal. However, this method of denying the offender the pleasures of freedom is coupled with nothing else and depends upon the offender being on his honour to stay at home. In times of financial hardship and when there are Government cuts, where will we find the court officers to knock up those people and find out whether they are responding to the curfew? Will we allow policemen to knock on people's doors to find out? The offender is restricted on his honour and that of his parents. What happens if the parents decide to go out one evening to enjoy themselves, and leave the boy or girl at home? The boy or girl is tempted to clear off——

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Chain them to the sink.

Mr. Pitt: Indeed. I shall use the word that I have used ad nauseam—I would not call that a creative use of curfew.
While the order has a superficial attraction and while I can see that the new clause is a marked improvement on the original one tabled in Committee, I still feel that unless the order is part of a supervised activities order and a general trend to use that person's time in properly expiating his crime, it is an impractical proposition. I cannot support it.

Mr. John Carlisle: I am delighted to support new clause 39, tabled by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell). I pay tribute to him for the amount of work and time that he has put into the clause, and for his eloquence this evening and in Committee.
The question has been rightly raised by my hon. Friend and learned Friend and by the hon. Member for Croydon, North-West (Mr. Pitt) about the enforcement order. Although that point would worry the police and is acceptable, I feel that if the principle were applied to those offenders we would have gone some way to giving the courts an additional weapon and form of deterrent that they have—entirely at their discretion—the ability to use. Some form of curfew already exists in the orders that can be made preventing football hooligans from attending a game on a Saturday, and making them report to a centre. Where they are enforced, there have been problems, but on the whole they have been extremely successful.
I suggest to the hon. Member for Croydon, North-West that if the clause puts parents and the offenders on their honour, that is a part of the clause that we should support. But the main thrust of my hon. Friend's argument, like the spirit of the Bill, has been to put responsibility back with parents for the actions of their offending children.
Most hon. Members, certainly Conservative Members, would agree that we have gone too far down the road which gives that responsibility to others and which blames the State, the school and the social worker for children's offences. This small measure, which has been well

thought out by my hon. and learned Friend, will begin to correct that and begin to put the responsibility back with parents so that they have to make the decision.
With regard to enforcement, I do not envisage, and my hon. and learned Friend does not envisage, a large force of snooping court officers or policemen going around a district. If an offender is made subject to this type of order, he will think twice about breaking it. Under the new clause, an offender who breaks the curfew can be brought back to the court and punished for that offence.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: The hon. Gentleman is making a great point of parental responsibility. How does that arise other than in the initial grant of consent by the parents? Surely, once that has been granted, the parents do not come into the matter. They have no continuing responsibility for ensuring that the curfew is enforced.

Mr. Carlisle: That is rather an unfortunate path to take, because the spirit of the Bill is to try to make the parents more responsible. It would go against the spirit of the curfew if the parents, even under the terms of the Flew clause, relinquish that responsibility to the courts. It is another form of deterrent which would be a useful weapon for the courts. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will look at it sympathetically, possibly under the new draft—I congratulate my hon. and learned Friend on the changes that he has made—and even if, in another place, some other form of new clause is tabled, we have today established a principle which must be continued.

Mr. Lawrence: We must avoid at all costs non-enforcement of this proposal so that young hooligans cock a snook at the law and just laugh at the decision of the magistrates when an order is made. Therefore, everything turns on its enforceability. While I do not wish to derogate from the sensible view which has been expressed by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell), and which has been persuasively presented and argued, the fact remains that unless this proposal can be properly supervised, we shall continue one of the themes of the breakdown of order in our society—the complete lack of respect for authority which young people have developed. We cannot rely on the responsibility of parents to put everything right just because we might introduce a new clause in the Bill.
Unless my hon. and learned Friend can give an assurance that the police and the other forces of law and order will be able to enforce this provision, I must repeat the question that I asked: is not the best way of bringing this about by way of supervision orders? Then the little thugs and hooligans will not treat the law with the disrespect which is the foundation of later criminality.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: I rise briefly to make one or two comments on the new clause. I shall not take long in view of the hour.
For a considerable time I lived in Oldham where at that time there was great parental responsibility. Parents often imposed a strict curfew on many of the young people and it all worked well until the traditional Wakes holiday when the parents went away and left the young people at home, often with great misgivings that they were to look after the house for the fortnight. One was amazed at the amount of mischief and mayhem that occurred at all the parties that were organised at those houses while the parents were away.
The police often found it harder to control what went on in many of those houses than they did when the young people went to recognised places of entertainment, because at least most of the people running those places wanted them to be orderly and well run and wanted to discourage any disorder or mischief. In addition, the police were able to supervise them.
Some of those young people will accept the order but will quickly become bored by the imposition of a curfew. They will encourage others to visit them. As I understand the new clause, that would be perfectly all right. As a result, a lively party could take place with no restriction at all on the person on whom the curfew had been imposed. It might well be a considerable inconvenience to other people in the neighbourhood, but there is a big difference between an inconvenience to the neighbours and an issue on which the police can intervene. That is at least one of the areas that must be looked at.
This is an attempt to find a new punishment, and there are strong arguments to support the view that we should be looking for new ways of persuading people that they have a duty to conform to the law rather than behaving in an irresponsible way. However, not enough thought has been given to the new clause. Far too many people would quickly be able to demonstrate that it did not work. It would be laughed at and brought into disrepute.
The organising of parties in the homes of those under a curfew order is one example. The problems of enforcement are another. Grave difficulties would be involved in knocking on doors well into the evening and being certain that the person coming to the door was the person on whom the curfew had been imposed.
I can think of several teenagers in my constituency in respect of whom it would not be easy, especially on the doorstep in the evening, to tell whether it was brother A or brother B.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Or whether it was a boy or a girl.

Mr. Bennett: My hon. Friend may have that problem, but in my constituency the difficulty would be to identify two brothers, particularly if the person checking had not met them before.
Police officers have told me that quite often they have difficulty trying to arrest a young person, and are sometimes not certain whether they have got the right brother. Therefore, enforcement could well prove difficult. Once one starts to get into difficulties, having to knock at the door, wanting to go into the house to be certain that one has checked up and seen the person on whom the curfew order was imposed, one again begins to cause difficulties. I suspect that one would not be very popular with the neighbours if there were a row or something of a disturbance because of an argument about whether the right son was there.
This would be particularly the case as some parents at that time of night may not be in the most sober of minds. They may be rather more inclined to jump to the protection of their son than they would be the following morning in the cold light of day, when they reflect that the son was breaking the order and should not have been doing so. In many areas it would be true to say that there would be quite a few parents who would not answer the door in the calmest and coolest of ways, and might quickly get into

a dispute. It is amazing the number of times when a discussion on the doorstep in this sort of area in the evening——

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: It is not an easy thing to do.

Mr. Bennett: —can lead to a situation in which tempers can become frayed and what is a small incident becomes a major one.
There are many snags in the new clause. Once those snags are demonstrated, the law in total comes into contempt because one part of it is seen not to be working effectively.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: I do not want to be difficult, when my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) has spent a great deal of time in writing out the clause, but I hope that the Minister will not, with his usual kindness, give a commitment to implement this because it is probably one of the most ridiculous ideas that we have seen for a long time.
How on earth will the checking up be done? In the present state of lawlessness, not only is it unusual for large numbers of people to answer doors after 7.30 pm, but any parent would be well advised to tell their children, particularly if alone in the house, not to answer the door.
Apart from that, have we thought of where responsibility would lie if there was no answer? What is the situation if a youngster is out breaking the curfew if he has been instructed to do so by his parents? Is there a liability on the parent, or on the youngster?
As far as I know, there is a law that makes it unlawful to leave a child under 14 years of age by himself. If the parents are going out because they want to go out, or because there has been a sudden call, because granny has been taken ill, or they have to go to see someone urgently, what is their responsibility in relation to a child of 10, 11 or 12, who could be covered by the curfew?

Mr. John Carlisle: I cannot see how that could possibly be any objection. The law is, as my hon. Friend says, that a child under the age of 14 should not be left alone. The law would not be any different. The parents should not be going out in the first place.

Mr. Taylor: All that I am saying is that sometimes, due to unusual circumstances, perhaps because of a sudden phone call, a mother has to go out. Does she take the child with her, breaking the curfew, or does she leave the child at home and try to avoid the problem? Next, how will the identification take place? Will someone go around and try to identify the individual? Finally, is it fair and reasonable?

Mr. Parris: I congratulate my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) on the cautious and careful way in which he moved the new clause. If some of my hon. Friends had listened more carefully to the way that it was moved they would have realised that my hon. and learned Friend was careful in his description of his aims. The principal impediment to its passage into legislation has been the way that it was oversold, not by my hon. Friend but, particularly, by the press. It has been described as a draconian and all-purpose new clause, applicable in all manner of circumstances to all manner of young offenders. That is not what is proposed. This is an alternative to custody that would be applicable in certain cases, which would be few in number. It is necessary only to accept that there will be


some cases in which this penalty might be considered suitable and that the courts will be able to distinguish them.
I do not agree with the view of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) that the crucial test of the new clause is its enforceability. If he had listened more carefully, he would have understood that this is essentially not an enforceable measure. Its success will depend upon the willingness of the offender and his parents to try to make it work. It could not be enforced against the will of the offender or his parents any more than is the case with supervision or probation orders. The measure would work only where everyone agreed to give it a try. There are circumstances where it might be a suitable punishment. It is worth trying. I commend it in the hope that the Government will be able to implement something of this nature.

Mr. Edward Lyons: I am unhappy about this proposal. I feel that magistrates will be tempted to impose the new sentence on a child aged 11 or 12 when they might otherwise impose nothing at all. If the child who is expected to exercise adult self-control at home then decides to go out because some of his friends have called round, he can be brought back to the court a second time. He is already becoming familiar with court procedures. An extra strain is imposed on the time and resources of the court. This seems an unfortunate path to pursue with youngsters of that age.
It is also necessary to consider one-parent families. I know of a case in my constituency where a man works on night shift and has to leave a boy aged 10 at home on his own. If a child of that age is to be subject to this sort of order, who will police the child? This proposal implies that parents should police their children. Sometimes the parents are not there to police their children. Sometimes the parents are not so law-abiding as to want to police their children. Sometimes they have no control over their children.
There is a distinct possibility that youngsters will be brought back repeatedly before the court and that they will become almost criminals simply because they cannot resist at a young age, dashing out to play with their friends. Those youngsters at the top end of the scale, say those aged 16 and 17, might be tempted to play ducks and drakes with the curfew order to show they are not frightened by it. Their friends might dare them to break it. If that happens, they are back in court.
It is all very well to say that a reasonable excuse for the youngster not being at home will be accepted by the magistrates as a reason for acquitting. Often, however, the explanation will be tested only in court. In other words, court proceedings have to take place before the young person can be acquitted. A boy might be deaf. That is not so unusual. A boy might not hear the knock at the door because he is at the back of the house or in the bathroom with the radio playing. However, because a policeman has come to the door and received no reply, that young lad is back in court. How can that be a sensible way of proceeding?
12.45 am
I am against a curfew innovation that is capable of expansion. Curfews are enforced for adults in places such as South Africa and totalitarian regimes. Once the public are used to the idea of curfew orders, a Home Secretary

in about five years' time will be able to say "The scheme has worked rather successfully and we shall extend it to persons up to 21 years and to adult offenders."

Mr. Parris: If the hon. and learned Gentleman regards the curfew as such a draconian measure, how does he characterise open prisons?

Mr. Lyons: The open prison is a different concept because it is a custodial sentence. A curfew would put a substantial strain on those who would be called upon to police themselves. If a person is placed on probation, he can go where he pleases for the most part, provided that he does not commit crime. He knows that crime is wrong. A person who is subject to a curfew will not feel that going outside his home is a criminal offence or is wrong. We shall be making a crime of something that for most of us is a completely innocent activity—for example, leaving one's home to play a game of football.
If we want youngsters to become slaves to the television set, the curfew will be a marvellous provision. The Lord Chief Justice says that youngsters are slaves to the television screen. That is exactly what will happen if this proposal is accepted. Youngsters will have to stay at home, and for most of the time they will be gazing at the television screen. If a child is in an unhappy home in which the parents fight and squabble and he wants to get out, he will, none the less, be forced to stay in that unhappy domestic atmosphere and witness domestic squabbles, which will do him no good.
If the child leaves his home and is subsequently returned to the magistrates, will he be expected, in the presence of his parents, to give a truthful explanation? Will he dare to say "I had to get out because my parents were fighting. My father was hitting my mother. At times my father was getting drunk and I knew that there might be violence at any moment'? Will he dare to say that in court in front of his parents?
There are many difficulties about this proposal and I hope that the Government will think again. The law should not be brought into disrepute. Laws should not be passed that are so tempting to break and when those who will be subjected to the discipline that is proposed will be so young that they will find it difficult to adhere to it. This proposal should be dropped.

Dr. Summerskill: Several of my hon. Friends in Committee and tonight have drawn attention to the practical difficulties that will be faced by families, be they one-parent or two-parent families, if the proposal is operated. The scheme relies for its success upon the full co-operation of the young offender and of his parents or guardian. That is something that we hope will materialise, but in practice it probably will not. The young offenders who will be involved will already have been convicted of an offence that is punishable with imprisonment if committed by a person aged 21 or over. The new clause lays much emphasis on the role of parents and so have As supporters laid such emphasis. They have stressed that they want to see more parental responsibility, but they have not mentioned the role of the police in the enforcement of the clause.
I do not know whether the hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) and the Minister of State have consulted the police about their role, but they will be involved in surveillance following an offender's court appearance, and that is a new concept. Do the police have


the manpower or desire to operate the arrangement? Has the Minister even consulted the police about their enforcement role? If the provision is not enforceable and effective we should not put it on the statute book.

Mr. Mayhew: I offer my congratulations to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) on his constructive and helpful contributions to our debates in Committee and on Report. I welcomed the new clause that he moved in Committee as an original and promising addition to the options available to the courts for dealing with young offenders without having to send them to custody. That is one of the themes of the Bill. The other is that there must be custodial sentences, in suitable gradations and variety, for those whom the protection of the public requires should go into custody.
We have consulted widely on the proposals. I said in Committee that we would have to listen carefully and pay attention to what was said about them. I have certainly consulted the police and have received comments from a number of organisations to which I am grateful. The volume of comments that we have received illustrates the importance of the proposals.
I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will not think me discourteous if, as the curfew tolls the knell of passing night, I do not take as long to reply as the subject justifies.
From the consideration that the Government have given to the curfew and from the discussions that we have had, there have emerged three main areas of concern and possible difficulty. The first is the enforcement of a curfew, and I have noted, without surprise, that that is the major concern of those who have expressed anxiety about the new clause. The second possible area of difficulty is the proposal's impact on relations between the police and young people, and the third is its possible effect on relations between young offenders and their parents.
Many organisations have emphasised that young offenders often suffer from personal difficulties at home, and many come from difficult family circumstances, with such problems as one-parent families and inadequate accommodation. It is widely felt that an order that, as a punishment—as distinct from a constructive package of supervision requirements—confines a young offender to home for long periods in such circumstances would worsen family relationships rather than reinforce parental responsibility and control.
The courts would certainly have to use such a power with great discrimination, but that ought not to be beyond them, especially as the new clause provides for a social inquiry report, as well as for the consent of both parent and offender to the making of an order. Therefore, I am not too discouraged on that aspect.
The most crucial difficulties that a curfew would raise relate to enforcement. If enforcement were left to the detection of breaches on the streets, the curfew could be ignored with a high degree of impunity, which would undermine the credibility of the order. The police would not be able, in the normal course of policing, to identify offenders who broke curfew, particularly in areas of population concentration like the inner cities and large towns where the crime problem is most acute. That has been forcefully represented to us on behalf of the police who feel that it would have an adverse effect on respect for the law generally.
It is proposed in the new clause that there should be reinforcing provisions enabling the police to arrest a juvenile whom they think is in breach of a curfew, which would also confer a power to arrest on reasonable suspicion and would enable checks to be made at the offender's home to ensure that he was there. I fully appreciate that the power to check up at home does not amount to a power of entry and that it is proposed that such checks might somehow be carried out by someone, other than the police, described as "an officer of the court" in the clause.
The prospect of requiring juveniles to present themselves, even at the doors of their own homes to satisfy a curfew inspector if their presence during the night, on pain of prosecution for breaching the order, raises some difficult practical questions, some of which have been touched upon tonight, as well as the question whether a random check is right in principle.
One asks who would carry out the checks. The police do not have the resources to take on additional duties of this kind, and it is questionable whether they should do so. It is clear that they do not want to. The courts too do not have the staff for that purpose. I do not overlook the fact that if a curfew order were used as an alternative to custody, savings would result from the reduction in the population of detention centres or youth custody centres, for example. However, I expect, if custody were seen as possibly appropriate, that a supervision order rather than a curfew order would be made.
The new clause also proposes that the police should have power to arrest the young offender who is out in breach of curfew. I am sure that that would be necessary if it were to be enforceable. It will only rarely happen that the police unmistakably recognise on the street a juvenile whom they are certain should be at home under curfew at that time on that date. Their suspicions will usually be much less certain and checks will need to be made. That raises serious and uneasy questions about the influence which attempts to enforce suspected breaches of curfew might have on the ability of the police to establish and maintain the relationships that they need with young people in their areas.
I have consulted my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead about these objections. I was anxious that the original idea should have the best possible chance of success. Following the Standing Committee, and as these comments and misgivings were made known to us, I naturally consulted my hon. and learned Friend. I acknowledge the effective and ingenious way in which in the revised new clause he has sought to meet some of those objections. There are much more promising prospects for the concept of a curfew as a condition of a supervision order. However, as a free-standing power of the nature of a penalty, the Government have come reluctantly to the conclusion that a separate curfew power would not be an effective addition to the powers available to the courts to deal with young offenders.
I say that with great regret, because the new clause is clearly intended to provide a helpful and imaginative extension to the powers of the courts. Many of the objections that have emerged might well be overcome if a curfew condition were included in a constructive package of requirements contained in a supervision order under clause 19 to be monitored as a whole by the supervisor nominated by the sentencing court. That


solution is hinted at in subsection (10) of the new clause. It is my hon. and learned Friend's initiative that has prompted us to look urgently to see how clause 19 may be adapted to provide this as an additional option for the courts if they should wish to avail themselves of it.

Mr. Dubs: The Minister talks of linking a curfew order with a supervision order, but is he aware that the National Association of Probation Officers is concerned about this because it feels that a curfew order would prejudice and alter for the worse their relationship with their clients?

Mr. Mayhew: I am aware that that is the view of the National Association of Probation Officers. I am also aware, as is my hon. and learned Friend, that there are probation officers who see that in a proper case it could be a useful addition to a supervision order. I am also aware that although the Association of Directors of Social Services has serious reservations about the proposal in its present form, it feels that its prospects would be much more promising if it were to form part of the constructive package of supervision that would come with a supervision order, widened as clause 19 proposes. I hope that that will prove practicable. If so, we shall endeavour to provide for it in the other place.
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Therefore, I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead will not feel that I have poured too much cold water on the new clause. I think that he knows that I am anxious to see whether the measure can be made a success. It is with reluctance that I have felt obliged to say that we cannot accept the new clause in its present form. However, there is a prospect for the idea as part of a supervision order, and I hope that we shall find that that is a practicality.

Mr. Lyell: With the leave of the House, may I say that I understand what my hon. and learned Friend the Minister has said and I am grateful to him for the diligent way in which he has continued to consider the new clause?
I should point out that 25 per cent. of all Metropolitan Police arrests are of young people between the ages of 10 and 16. That shows more clearly than anything else what a big problem the young offender represents for society, how many offences must be dealt with, and how vital it is to get the parents involved whenever that is possible. Enforceability is one of the major points to consider in the curfew clause. I reiterate my gratitude to the senior members of the Association of Chief Police Officers. Those to whom I spoke had enormous knowledge of the major conurbations and of the particular difficulties that might occur. However, I do not think that I misrepresent them—they will make their own further representations—when I say that they did not see overwhelming difficulties in the check-up provisions. Indeed, they considered the matter more constructively and positively than that. They saw no serious difficulty in the check-up provisions.
A new clause of this nature can be brought forward only after serious consideration. I am glad that that consideration will continue and that some measure may be introduced in the other place. In those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3

CONSECUTIVE TERMS AND AGGREGATE PERIODS OF DETENTION.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 4, in page 4, line 9, leave out from 'shall' to 'effect' in line 10 and insert—
'(a) make a detention centre order in respect of an offender who is subject to another such order; or
(b) give a direction under subsection (1) above, if the'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatherill): With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 5 to 8.

Mr. Mayhew: These are drafting amendments. The necessity for them is self-evident and I commend them to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 5, in page 4, line 13, after `court', insert
'makes such an order or'.

No. 6, in page 4, line 14, leave out 'term' and insert
'aggregate of all the terms of detention in a detention centres to which he is subject'.

No. 7, in page 4, line 16, after 'court', insert
`makes such an order or'

No. 8, in page 4, line 19, leave out from 'all' to end of line 21 and insert
`the terms of detention in a detention centre to which lit is subjece.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Clause 10

ACCOMMODATION OF YOUNG OFFENDERS AND DEFAULTERS ETC.

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move amendment No. 10, in page 9, leave out lines 11 and 12.
The amendment would ensure that all male offenders sentenced to youth custody are detained in youth custody centres, and not in prisons, for the whole of their sentences. It is inappropriate for offenders as young as 15 or 16 to be in adult prisons. Youth custody centres should be providing work, educational and recreational activities and rehabilitation and training for young people and not simply incarceration.
Therefore, if there is to be a new youth custody sentence, it should be accompanied by a new, improved regime, and not just by the existing borstal regime. One assumes that if there is a new sentence with a new name the young people will be submitted to a different and better regime. In Committee, the Minister said that there would be about 30 youth custody centres for young men and boys, but there would be parts of the country without one. Perhaps the Minister could say whether there are any more planned or whether he feels that 30 is the required number? I am not sure how he arrived at that figure. Does he feel that it will be sufficient to accommodate young people for many years? The improved facilities and regime which they offer should prepare them for life outside. We hope they will prevent them re-offending in a more effective way than the present borstals or their presence in grossly overcrowded adult prisons, which are certainly not the environment for 15 or 16-year-old boys.
The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that a sentence of youth custody literally means a sentence in a youth custody centre.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I wish to support my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill). Clearly the Government are making provision in the Bill for the new youth custody centres and for what they regard as the new and more positive and constructive regime that will exist in those centres. In those circumstances it seems to me only reasonable and appropriate that the Government should guarantee a place to every juvenile who is sentenced to a youth custody centre.
We regard that as important when one considers that the alternative to that guarantee is for the juvenile to be incarcerated in a local adult prison. Conditions in local adult prisons are the most appalling in the whole of the penal system. They have the highest level of overcrowding, with two or three prisoners to each cell. The sanitation is the most inadequate and outdated, and if young boys are to be held, for however long a period, in adult prisons instead of youth custody centres they will not get the specialised facilities that would otherwise be at their disposal. They will not get the training, the education or the vocational guidance that would be appropriate and that one would expect them to receive in a youth training centre.
For those reasons, I believe it to be incumbent upon the Government—introducing a new sentence and new youth custody centres as they are—to come to the House and say "We have this new sentence and these new centres. We are introducing this new positive regime for young male offenders and we can guarantee that every young offender will have a training place." I should regard it as being highly inappropriate for young boys to be held in adult prisons. I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept my hon. Friend's amendment.

Mr. Mayhew: This amendment seeks to delete a provision that the Government would prefer not to have had to put in the Bill. It provides that places in a youth custody centre, with a proper training regime, can be guaranteed only for those with sentences of over four and up to 18 months. It would have been much more satisfactory if we had not had to restrict the guarantee in that way, but it would have been unrealistic not to do so. it will be the Government's objective to extend the sentencing range to which the guarantee applies.
Young offenders serving sentences of four months or more are at present in diverse accommodation, ranging from detention centres, borstals and separate young prisoners' centres to young offenders' wings or sections of adult prisons.
It would have been possible to call all of those places youth custody centres simply as a matter of nomenclature, but that would have been misleading. The Government therefore decided that an establishment should be designated as a youth custody centre for the purpose of a youth custody sentence only if it provided a constructive training regime. Not all of those places can provide such a regime and they cannot all be brought up to standard quickly. It is important not to disguise that fact. It will simply not be possible to hold all the young offenders in youth custody centres as defined in the Bill. The courts

must be made aware of that so that they know in broad terms to what types of establishment the young people whom they sentence will go.
That is why clause 10 takes an admittedly somewhat complex form. The provisions that the amendment seeks to delete are, in a sense, a sad but necessary acknowledgement of the long-standing shortcomings in the accommodation available for young offenders. Clause 12(1)(c) provides power to delete those provisions. As I have said, the Government will pursue that objective and nothing will please us more than to be able to use that power as soon as possible.
The hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) asked whether any more centres were planned, why we chose to provide 30 and whether that number would be sufficient. The 30 are so placed as to provide a reasonable geographical spread throughout England and Wales. More are planned in that we plan to bring up to standard the institutions and establishments used to house offenders in this age group but which at present cannot provide a training regime of the sort guaranteed to those serving sentences of between four months and 18 months. We cannot yet say whether the number will be sufficient, as for a long time the courts have been unable to impose determinate sentences of between four months and 18 months on young offenders. As the hon. Lady knows, section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 prevents the courts from imposing determinate sentences of between six months and three years. Instead, they have had to give the indeterminate sentence of borstal training. That restriction will be repealed by the Bill, but we shall have to wait and see the numbers involved before we can say whether 30 will be enough.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I understand, with regret, that due to the lack of resources the hon. and learned Gentleman is not able to guarantee a training place for every young offender, but is it not more important to guarantee training for those receiving sentences of more than 18 months, as they will be separated from their families, their friends, their environment, their jobs and so on for a longer period and run a greater risk of becoming institutionalised? Does the Minister agree that a constructive, positive, training regime may therefore be more important for them than for those with sentences of four or five months?

Mr. Mayhew: A choice must be made between the two categories. I believe that it is most important that the younger end of the market, if I may so put it, should be protected from the admittedly adverse influence of adult prisons. It is undesirable for any offender under the age of 21 to be placed in such an establishment, but, if a choice must be made, I believe that it is preferable to exclude the younger end of the market and those serving shorter sentences. It should not be imagined, however, that those serving longer sentences will be excluded from training. It is our purpose, and it will be open to us, to provide training to one degree or another in the other establishments. However, the guarantee will exist for those serving a shorter period of custody, which will mean younger people.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: It is undesirable that the Government cannot give a training guarantee to all young people. To what timetable is the Minister working and when can he give us that guarantee?

Mr. Mayhew: Hope springs eternal and we travel in hope. We believe that if we are permitted to pursue our present economic policies there will be a much better chance of the resources being available to accelerate those matters. That is something that all reasonable people will share as an objective.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 11

CONVERSION OF SENTENCE OF YOUTH CUSTODY TO SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 11, in page 11, line 3 after 'conditions', insert 'mentioned'.
This is a drafting amendment and its purpose is self-evident.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Stevens: I beg to move amendment No. 84, in page 11, line 10, leave out subsection (3).
The amendment relates to a young offender who has been "starred up" while in custody. The term "to star up" means that a young offender has been transferred from that status to adult status. That may occur either because he has reached the age of 21 or, under section 2(b), because he has been deemed disruptive.
No one objects to the starring-up procedure, but the crux of my case is that once the prisoner is deemed to be an adult he should be treated as an adult on release. Subsection (3) states that once the changed status prisoner has been released, he should revert to the status of young offender for the purpose of clause 14 of the Bill, and that he should be under supervision until the end of the supervision period.
My hon. and learned Friend will tell us that the purpose of the supervision order is to ensure the welfare of the young offender. From the point of view of the offender, he has been treated as an adult while in prison and has thereby forfeited a number of advantages, if not privileges, that he would have enjoyed as a young offender. On release, he suddenly finds that he has reverted to his original status, and must be under supervision for a period of under 12 months. He usually regards supervision as an extension of the punishment.
It follows that young prisoners on release in those circumstances have a renewed sense of injustice, which I share. They take up a great deal of the time of the probation service, but are in no mood to co-operate.
There may be young offenders who have been starred up and released from detention and who wish to have the benefit of the probation service for a period after release. That benefit should not be denied them. However, when a young offender who has been treated as an adult in prison, suddenly finds on release that he is treated again as a young offender, he feels that he is being punished again. Unless he seeks probation facilities, he should not be required to serve out a supervision order on release. For the young man about to be returned to the street, it is a case of once an adult always an adult.
We in this country believe in fairness—fairness in its common meaning, not the esoteric fairness of the legislature—and it does not seem fair that the young person should revert to this former status and suffer what he regards as a continued penalty.
I have spoken to my hon. and learned Friend about this matter privately, and I know that he is sympathetic to what I am saying. I therefore hope that he will meet me over the amendment.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Stevens) for the way he moved the amendment, and for the way he put the case when he came to see me recently about it. I understand the concern that underlies the amendment.
The purpose of clause 11 is to ensure that an offender can be held in circumstances appropriate to his age or his behaviour. An offender sentenced just before his twenty-first birthday might be a mature married man with a family. He might well be more at home with adult prisoners than with young offenders, and it would be more appropriate to treat him, under clause 11, as if he had be en sentenced to imprisonment. However, the same might not be true of an exact contemporary of his, who would be better off in a young offender establishment. It does not seem right that one should be liable to supervision on release, and that the other should not.
Supervision is an integral part of a young offender's sentence and it should not be dispensed with simply because the offender is, for what are essentially management reasons, treated under clause 11 as if he had been sentenced to imprisonment. I see the point that my hon. Friend makes about fairness and the way that is normally understood in that it tends to be equated with equality. The argument can be advanced just as well in support of the proposition I have attempted to put forward.
The same argument applies with perhaps even more force to a young offender whose sentence has to be treated as one of imprisonment because he is such a bad influence in a young offender establishment, or disrupts the regime there to the detriment of the other inmates. In such a case, it is the offender's own bullying or uncontrollable behaviour which leads to reclassification.
That brings me to another point that needs to be made. Young prisoners can now be reclassified as adults under an administrative scheme that operates on rather wider grounds than those set out in clause 11. This does not affect their liability to supervision. It is often the case that young offenders positively prefer to be treated as adult prisoners. They might therefore seek reclassification under clause 11 with, if this amendment succeeded, the added incentive that they would then be free of supervision on release.
Having spoken to my hon. Friend, I appreciate that many young offenders do not particularly like being supervised and that, if they are resentful of it, the supervising officer does not have an enviable task. All the same, young offenders are, on release from custody, vulnerable to bad influence. They need help with finding accommodation and employment and in managing their affairs. We continue to see the value of supervision for people of that age, however they may have been classified and for whatever reasons special classification may hive occurred.
While nobody could have put the case more fairly, comprehensively or persuasively than my hon. Friend, who takes a great interest in these matters, I am afraid we cannot agree that some young offenders should not be supervised simply because they were, while in custody, treated as if they were sentenced to imprisonment.
Accordingly I must ask the House not to accept the amendment.

Mr. Stevens: I greatly regret my hon. and learned Friend's response. The point he omitted was that the circumstances in which a person convicted as a young offender serves his sentence after reclassification, for whatever reason, are more onerous than the form of detention suffered as a young offender. It would not be practical for me to press the amendment. I hope to return to the fight at a later stage. Perhaps it may be taken up in another place.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13

RELEASE ON LICENCE OF YOUNG OFFENDERS

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 12 in page 12, line 12 after 'offenders)' insert—
'(a) the words "subject to subsection (5B) of this section" shall be inserted at the beginning; and
(b)'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it is convenient to take Government amendment No. 13.

Mr. Mayhew: These are drafting amendments. I think that their purpose is self-evident.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 13, in page 12, line 20 at end add—

'(2) The following subsection shall be inserted after the said subsection (5A)—
"(5B) The date specified in a licence granted to a person falling within subsection (5A)(b) of this section shall not be later than the date of the expiration of his sentence."'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Clause 16

ATTENDANCE CENTRE ORDERS

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I beg to move amendment No. 14, in page 14, leave out lines 24 to 31.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it is convenient to take amendment No. 15, in page 14, line 31 at end insert
'unless it appears to the court that there are special circumstances (whether relating to the offence or to the offender) which warrant the making of such an order in his case'.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Amendment No. 14 repeals the prohibition on making an attendance centre order if an offender has previously served a custodial sentence. It embodies a recommendation in the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group report "Too Many Prisoners". Amendment No. 15 is a more restricted version of the proposal which would permit a court to make an attendance centre order on someone who had previously served a custodial sentence if there were special circumstances which would justify this course of action.
In general, as the Minister knows, I welcome the provision in the Bill concerning attendance centres, in particular the extension to the Crown court of the power to make attendance centre orders. I also welcome the Government's apparent positive attitude towards the expansion of the concept of attendance centres. They

provide a simple, straightforward and easily understood penalty which does not have the undesirable side effects of custody. They are also extremely cheap to administer. The average cost of an attendance centre order in 1979–80 was as little as £35.
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Although I warmly welcome the expansion of the attendance centre system, I consider that the centres could be used more flexibly and effectively by the courts if the current prohibition upon using them for young people who have already served a custodial sentence were repealed. That is also the view of the Magistrates' Association. It considers that the question whether an attendance centre order would be appropriate for an offender who had previously served a custodial sentence should be left to the discretion of the courts.
As the Minister will be aware, the Government have often stressed their view that the courts should be given greater flexibility in sentencing. Logically, therefore, I should have thought that the Government would welcome the proposal, especially as the removal of a fetter on the courts would enable them to use attendance centres more often as a genuine and specific alternative to custody.
The principal argument that traditionally has been advanced against making attendance centre orders available for those who previously served custodial sentences is that they might contaminate the less delinquent offenders attending the centres. I do not accept that that is a sufficiently strong argument for ruling out this option in every case where an offender has previously had a custodial experience.
At present the majority of juvenile offenders sent to detention centres have two or fewer previous convictions. Under the Bill the courts will be able to make a detention centre order for as little as three weeks—two weeks with full remission. I do not believe that anyone, certainly not the Minister, would seriously suggest that a young offender appearing in court for a second or third offence who has served two weeks in a detention centre—and no more than that—will inevitably be so hardened that the courts should in no circumstances impose an attendance centre order upon him. I do not accept that. I do not believe that anyone could accept that as reasonable or fair, yet unless the amendments are accepted and the present law is repealed that will continue to be the position.
When the proposal was discussed in Committee on 25 February, it received strong support from hon. Members on both sides. The Minister, replying to the debate, said:
I accept that there may be circumstances in which somebody, notwithstanding that he has a custodial sentence, would be a suitable candidate for an attendance centre order.
He also stated:
There is probably a way of expressing this thought, perhaps through the concept of special circumstances or special reasons. I emphasise that the general rule must remain, but I give an undertaking to look with care and sympathy at the possibility of giving guidance to courts so that they will realise that, while the general rule must be as I have stated, there may be special circumstances which warrent a departure from that."—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 25 February 1982; c. 280–81.]
Those were sympathetic remarks by the Minister. I suppose that they would be a sufficient answer to the amendments. I hope that the Minister will go further and accept the principle of both amendments. I see no reason why he should not do that. In view of the remarks that he made in Committee and the undertaking that he gave, I


hope that the Minister, having thought about the matter at greater length, will accept at least one of the two amendments.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) for the fair way in which he has moved the amendment. The restriction that is now contained in clause 16(3), which amendment No. 14 would remove, has applied since attendance centres were introduced in 1948.
In Committee the hon. Gentleman paid tribute to the Government's much more positive attitude to attendance centres compared with that of the Labour Government. We remain opposed to the deletion of subsection (3) because it serves an important function.
Junior attendance centres take children from the age of 10 and some centres now take girls. We must ensure that, in general, they do not mix with older and tougher offenders. The welcome expansion of attendance centres that has been achieved in the past three years, particularly the extension to cover offenders up to the age of 21, means that special care must be taken to ensure that only suitable offenders are sent to attendance centres. They are not designed to offer elaborate provision. As the hon. Gentleman knows, they are staffed in the main by police officers in their spare time. The capability of looking after widely differing categories of offenders is not open to them. It is important that, in general, we do not allow offenders with experience of custody of one form or another to go to the attendance centres.
However, after consulting those concerned, I am glad to be able to say that we agree that there is a strong case for introducing an element of discretion in the application of the principle. We believe that there should be a presumption that an offender who has had custodial experience is unsuitable for an attendance centre. That ought to be the presumption, but we agree that the courts can safely have a discretion in this matter. We therefore agree that the courts ought to be able to impose an attendance centre order on a young offender, despite the fact that he has already served a custodial sentence, when the court considers that there are special circumstances which make this appropriate. Amendment No. 15 meets this purpose admirably. Therefore, I am glad to be able to say that we are content to accept and we hope that the House will do so.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: In view of what the Minister has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 15, in page 14, line 31, at end insert
`unless it appears to the court that there are special circumstances (whether relating to the offence or to the offender) which warrant the making of such an order in his case. '—[Mr. Kilroy-Silk.]

Clause 19

REQUIREMENTS IN SUPERVISION ORDERS

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 16, in page 19, line 10, leave out 'paragraph' and insert `subsection'. This is a drafting amendment. Its purpose is self-evident.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I beg to move amendment No. 17, in page 20, line 19, at end insert 'and—

(d) it is satisfied, after considering a report by a probation officer or by a social worker of a local authority social services department about the offender and his circumstances and, if the court thinks it necessary, hearing a probation officer or a social worker of a local authority social services department, that provision can be made for the offender to participate in any activities specified in the requirements ' 
This amendment would require a court, before imposing supervised activities requirements on a young person, to satisfy itself in the light of a report either by a probation officer or a social worker that provision could be made for the offender to participate in those activities. The power to include supervised activity requirements in supervision orders, which is contained in clause 19, is designed to increase the courts' confidence in intermediate treatment schemes as a constructive alternative to custody or residential care for juvenile offenders. The Opposition strongly support that aim. However, if the arrangements are to work well, that will depend greatly on good cooperation and communication between the courts, the probation service and the social service departments which will be supervising young people's activities.
This was recognised in the White Paper "Young Offenders", which was published in 1980. In paragraph 50, it states:
The Government proposes to give the courts a specific power to order a juvenile offender under supervision to undertake a programme of specified activities … which has been agreed between the supervising probation officer or social worker and the court as being suitable for that particular child or young person".
The clause as it stands merely requires courts to consult the supervisor before including the supervised activities requirements, and not to agree the programme with him as the White Paper proposed. The reasons for that are understandable. The Minister said in Committee on 28 February, that to require a supervisory agreement
would be to place the supervising officer over and above the courts."—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 25 Febn ary 1982; c. 289.]
That seems fairly reasonable and acceptable. Nevertheless, if the provisions are to work successfully, it is clearly essential to ensure that the partnership between the courts on the one hand and the supervising officers on the other in drawing up the programmes of specified activities is in practice effective.
Doubtless, the consultation between the courts and the supervising officers will generally be realistic and effective, but it is important that we should now take the opportunity to do everything that we can to ensure that that is always the case, since if 'the consultations are merely of a token kind, and if the supervisor's recommendation; as to the desirability or practicality of imposing certain requirements are unreasonably disregarded by the court, it would seriously detract from the effectiveness of these powers.
To implement a supervision order effectively and with enthusiasm, the supervisor must be committed to the nature of the order. If not, there is a danger that the requirements might be implemented in a half-hearted way; the supervisor might not be inclined to teach juveniles who do not comply with the requirements; or if the supervisor considers the requirements impractical, he may make: no serious effort to implement them at all.
If that happened, even if only in a small, limited number of cases, it would seriously undermine the confidence of magistrates in the ability of the probation officers and social workers to provide effective


supervision for juvenile offenders in the community. Labour Members do not want that to happen, and I am sure that the Minister and the Government share our concern.
Therefore, the amendment would require the court to consider a report from a probation officer or social worker before imposing supervised activities requirements, and in the light of that report to satisfy itself that it is practical to make arrangements for the young offender to participate in the particular activities specified.
Similar provision already exists in the case of community service orders and is contained in section 14 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. The wording of the amendment is similar to that provision. I believe that the amendment reduces the risk of the undesirable circumstances that I have mentioned and would reinforce the intention of the clause, which I support, to increase the confidence of the courts in community-based alternatives to custody.
I therefore hope that the Minister will be able to extend his common sense and the co-operation that has been evident in our proceedings so far and again accept the amendment.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful for what the hon. Gentleman has said, and I am able to accept the amendment in principle. He rightly said that the purpose of clause 19 is to try to restore the confidence of courts in the supervision order in areas where there is some evidence that it has sagged in recent years.
Accordingly, the purpose of the clause is to give the courts some say in what will happen to the offender under supervision. One of the reasons why the clause is already very complicated is that we have built into it all sorts of safeguards. There are limits on various things, including the number of days on which requirements can be imposed, the facilities that can be used and so on. Of course, the court must consult whoever will be the supervisor before settling upon the package that will form the supervision order.
The court must be satisfied that the requirements are necessary for specific purposes. There is, therefore, a wide area of overlap between what is proposed in the amendment and the existing provision.
I appreciate that the purpose of the amendment is to make quite sure that a supervision order will not be made which will, for example, require the offender to do something for which provision does not exist in the area in which he will live or work so that it would either be a nullity or a great difficulty, thereby detracting from the quality of the supervision he receives and the effect of the supervision order generally.
Therefore, I am happy to accept the principle of the amendment. However, there are defects in its drafting that prevent me from accepting the clause in toto. We are anxious to get clause 19 right, and in accepting the spirit of the amendment we undertake to amend the clause to incorporate a provision that will give affect to its purpose. I hope that that assurance will enable the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: It is marvellous what one can get done at this time of night. There seems to be a prevailing attitude of co-operation and of a well intentioned spirit. In

the light of what the Minister has said, and the assurances that he has given, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 20

PROVISION OF SUPERVISION FACILITIES

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 18, in page 21, line 19, leave out 'and after-care'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this amendment it will convenient to take Government amendments 19, 20 and 21.

Mr. Mayhew: These are drafting amendments. Their purpose is self-evident.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 19, in page 21, line 45, leave out 'and after-care'.

No. 20, in page 23, line 7, leave out 'and after-care'.

No. 21, in page 23, line 8, leave out 'and after-care'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Clause 25

PRISON SENTENCE PARTLY SERVED AND PARTLY SUSPENDED

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 24, in page 27, line 32, leave out '"part", in the second place where it occurs,' and insert '"that"'.
The purpose of this amendment is no less self-evident than the previous four amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 26

EARLY RELEASE OF PRISONERS

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 82, in page 28, line 26, leave out 'imprisonment for life' and insert—
'(a) imprisonment for life; or
(b) imprisonment to which they were sentenced—
(i)for an extended offence;
(ii)for attempting to commit such an offence;
(iii)for conspiracy to commit such an offence; or
(iv)for aiding or abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of such an offence;'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this amendment it will be convenient to take amendment No. 25, in page 28, line 26, after 'life', insert—
'unless that sentence was imposed for a crime involving violence'.
and Government amendments Nos. 44 and 47.

Mr. Mayhew: These amendments relate to clause 26 and to the provision in the Bill for the early release of prisoners.
In the course of the Committee proceedings much anxiety was expressed by my hon. Friends. They felt that the assurances that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary had given, to the effect that the provisions in clause 26 for early release would not be used for those who had been convicted of offences of violence, might not, perhaps, be as watertight as they would like in the event of another Government taking office.
Accordingly I gave an assurance that I would see whether we could incorporate in some schedule a list of those offences of violence that would be exempt from the provision for early release contained in clause 26. That has now been done and the schedules and accompanying amendments form the substance of this group of amendments. That was a matter of interest to my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Bendall) and I have reason to believe that his anxieties will be met by the amendments.
The group of amendments relates to that part of our transactions in Committee on clause 26. They now meet the proper anxieties then expressed. I understand the reason for the anxieties and I am glad that they were pointed out. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North will feel that the cause of his anxieties has been removed.

Mr. Bendall: I was extremely concerned about this matter in Committee. I am grateful for what the Minister has said. The comprehensive lists in the schedules that have been provided adequately cover the point that I made.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 44 in page 28, line 32, at end insert—
'(1A) In this section "excluded offence" means—
(a) an offence (whether at common law or under any enactment) specified in Part I of Schedule [Offences excluded from section 26] to this Act; and
(b) an offence under an enactment specified in Part II of that Schedule.
(1B) No person may be released under this section if—
(a) he is subject to more than one sentence of imprisonment; and
(b) at least one of the terms that he has to serve is for an offence mentioned in subsection (1)(b)(i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) above. '.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 45, in page 29, line 20, at end add—
`(b) the expedient procedure conditions are satisfied.
(7A) The expedited procedure conditions are satisfed if—
(a) the order does not provide for the release of any persons before one month earlier than they would otherwise be released; and'.
This amendment also relates to what one might call the urgency or the expedited procedure. In the shorthand that is appropriate for this hour of the morning, I can perhaps say that anxieties were expressed about the provision that permits the Secretary of State to make an order for the release of prisoners within a certain category to be specified in the order which normally has to be laid before Parliament but which, in the case of urgency and where the order itself specifies or certifies that there is an urgent need for release to take place, can be done without the prior approval of Parliament.
The Government recognised the validity of those anxieties. The effect of the amendment is to restrict the Home Secretary's power of release without the prior approval of Parliament in urgent cases to prisoners who are not convicted of violent offences and to prisoners who have no more than one month of their period in custody still to serve. This matter was argued in Committee by in particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor). It is in response to his representations and to those of the Magistrates' Association that the application of this expedited procedure has been drastically cut down. I am glad to have had the opportunity

to consider the matter. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich for raising it. I believe that his anxieties will be greatly, if not wholly, allayed.
It is essential to have this safety valve which would be called into use in circumstances of some urgency during the Summer Recess when Parliament was not sitting. The safety valve will continue to exist, but its size will be reduced considerably. I hope that the proposal will be accepted by the House.

Mr. Parris: My hon. and learned Friend the Minister recalls correctly that a number of hon. Members, principally my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor), were concerned about the proposals. We were concerned not that the Government might wish to take action of this kind but that such action might be taken without the sanction of Parliament. I understand from the remarks of my hon. and learned Friend that the type of prisoner who will be released without the sanction of Parliament is greatly reduced in scope and that such a person could be released in any case only one month before his sentence was due to expire. That is satisfactory to me. I assume that it is also satisfactory to my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich. I am grateful to the Minister for bringing forward the amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 29

THE STANDARD SCALE OF FINES FOR SUMMARY OFFENCES

Mr. Roger Moate: I beg to move amendment No. 26, in page 31, line 30, at end insert—
'(4) For the purposes of subsection 3(a) above, "Act' includes a harbour revision order, a harbour empowerment order and a harbour re-organisation scheme (coming into operation after the passing of this Act) as respectively defined by sections 14,16 and 18, of the Harbours Act 1964 and, accordingly, those sections shall be construed as enabling such an order or scheme to provide that a person convicted of an offence under that order or scheme shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine (not being a daily fine) not exceeding a specified level on the standard scale other than level 5".
I hope to present the case briefly. I am encouraged to be brief by the hope that the amendment will be acceptable to my hon. and learned Friend the Minister or that it will at least evoke a sympathetic response from him. I acknowledge immediately that the authorship of the amendment belongs to the British Ports Association, which represents all the ports of commercial significance, and other ports, in the United Kingdom. It has played its role with considerable professionalism and responsibility, especially since the demise of the National Ports Council.
The object of the amendment is to try to reduce certain serious anomalies that could be created by the Bill in its present form. The House will be aware that the Bill provides for the increasing, standardisation and indexing of fines that may be imposed under Acts of Parliament, including local Acts. However, in its present form the Bill does not provide similar indexation or standardisation of penalties under harbour revision orders and schemes that may be made under the Harbours Act 1964. This is despite the fact that it seems always clearly to have been the intention that all orders and schemes made under that Act should achieve exactly the same objective as full Acts, of Parliament, and full local Acts which may have been introduced by port authorities.
As I understand it, it was intended that the object of harbour revision orders was to render unnecessary the more expensive alternative of promoting local Acts of Parliament. Port authorities have been actively and consistently encouraged to promote such orders and schemes in preference to local Acts of Parliament. They have been assured that all such orders and schemes are in all respects equivalent to full Acts of Parliament. Prior to 1964 the penalty provisions were contained in full legislation. They will now be subject to the inflation-proofing provisions of the proposed legislation that is before us.
Orders that are introduced after 1964 will, in effect, be downgraded by the effect of inflation. I suggest to my hon. and learned Friend that that is an undesirable anomaly. Harbour authorities might well be encouraged to proceed by way of local Acts in future rather than by orders or schemes under the 1964 Act. I cannot believe that that is something that the Government wish to encourage. The object of the amendment is to try to ensure that schemes and orders under the Act can be inflation proofed.
I am advised that there are strong technical difficulties in trying to inflation-proof penalty provisions under existing harbour orders, but the amendment provides that future harbour orders will be inflation proofed, which will ensure that future schemes will not be inferior to a local Act.
It may seem that this is a technical and complex matter. There may be technical difficulties in the way of proceeding in the manner suggested. However, I suggest to my hon. and learned Friend that the standardisation of subsidiary legislation of this sort in the manner that I am suggesting could produce considerable advantages to the Government and considerable savings of time and expense in the- preparation and updating of subsidiary legislation. Those who, like me, have served on the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments will welcome anything to reduce the volume of statutory instruments. I suggest that the amendment offers one way forward. It would save much time and expense.
I hope that my hon. and learned Friend can offer some hope for progress in this area generally, and specifically in regard to harbour revision orders. There is a strong and unique case for dealing with these orders in the manner suggested in the amendment. I hope that at this stage, or at a later stage, my hon. and learned Friend will be able to incorporate this provision or a similar one into the Bill.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) for tabling this important amendment and for the way in which he moved it. As he knows, there are technical and practical difficulties in attempting to apply the measures in the Bill to maximum penalties in subordinate legislation.
I appreciate that there would be some advantage to those concerned with the management of ports if we were able to make an exception in relation to harbour revision orders and similar instruments that have been brought into effect in the interests of convenience. I am generally sympathetic to the objectives that underly the amendment.
2 am
We cannot take the amendment on board—to use a suitably nautical metaphor—in the Bill, but I assure my hon. Friend that we shall take the matters that he has raised

into account in the further work that the Home Office and other Departments will be undertaking on penalties in subordinate legislation.
We are grateful for my hon. Friend's efforts. I think that they will bear fruit in the work that we have to do. I hope that that assurance will justify the trouble that my hon. Friend has taken and will enable him to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Moate: I welcome the prospect of further study of the subject and, in the light of that assurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Bendall: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I tabled amendment No. 27, in clause 32, page 34, line 27 at end insert—
'(7A) Notwithstanding subsections (5) and (7) above, the specified amount in respect of any bye-law made by virtue of section 9 of the Airports Authority Act 1975 relating to the selling or distributing of anything, the offering of anything for sale or hire or the making up of any offer of services by any person without permission of the British Airports Authority, shall be increased to Level 4 on the Standard Scale.'.
I have been in correspondence with my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State on this matter and he has given me assurances that it could be considered in another place. There are one or two anomalies about which I am still a little unhappy, but in view of the assurances I do not wish to move the amendment.

Clause 40

REVISION OF PENALITIES FOR SUMMARY OFFENCES AND OF CERTAIN OTHER SUMS

The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Alexander Fletcher): I beg to move amendment No. 48, in page 40, line 9, after `subsections', insert '(1A),'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Government amendments Nos. 49 to 59.

Mr. Fletcher: Part IV of the Bill includes provisions in clauses 39 to 41 that are applicable only to Scotland. It has been necessary to draft separate provisions for Scotland because of differences in how the changes in fines are affected by the Criminal Law Act 1977 and are applied to the different jurisdictions and, in particular, because the Scottish provisions in the Bill are, like those in the 1977 Act, to be inserted into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975. The amendments are, therefore, of a drafting or technical nature.

Mr. George Foulkes: It has been a long night and we have at last reached something that is relevant to Scotland. However, I am not too happy about that, because I cannot understand why the Government did not introduce the amendments into the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill in 1980. I hope that the Under-Secretary will tell us why they appear in this dog's breakfast of a Bill.
Clause 54, which outlines the extent to which the measure applies to various parts of the United Kingdom, is one of the most complicated such clauses that I have ever seen. Those of us who know and respect the difference in Scots law and in the administration of justice in Scotland do not like legislation for Scotland being packed into what are principally English Bills. If we have legislation which applies only to Scotland and if we have


Scottish Standing Committees to deal with it, it is wrong that it should be squeezed in as a codicil to a basically English Bill.
Many of my colleagues who are unable to be here this morning agree with me. [Interruption.] One is enough to put the case on behalf of many, as the hon. Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg) knows only too well. My hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. McKelvey) may wish to add something or express his support from a sedentary position.
Scottish legislation, as much in the criminal field as any other, should be dealt with separately by separate Scottish Standing Committees so that it can be discussed by Scottish Members who know what they are talking about. I say that with no disrespect to my hon. Friends on the Front Bench who discussed these matters efficiently and elegantly. However, it is more appropriate for these matters to be dealt with in a Scottish Standing Committee.
What makes the position even more ludicrous is that on the Standing Committee which considered the Bill—I am open to correction—there was not one hon. Member representing a Scottish constituency. Part IV of the Bill, with a substantial number of clauses concerning Scotland, was passed in Committee without any Scottish Member having an opportunity to discuss it and to put the points of view that should be put in the consideration of such matters.
I would also like to talk about the amazing provisions on page 48 of the Bill which affect certain enactments concerning the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, but I would be out of order. However, that demonstrates what a real dog's breakfast of a Bill this is.
I would like to put on record a strong protest on behalf of many Scots Members of the fact that Scottish legislation is being dealt with in so perfunctory and cavalier a manner by the House.

Mr. Alexander Fletcher: There is no excuse for the indignation of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Foulkes). He knows as well as most hon. Members in the House this evening that Scottish legislation, particularly of this kind, is dealt with separately. A United Kingdom Bill is being made use of—as is occasionally done by both parties—to update legislation. He will know that the purpose of the Bill is to provide, among other measures, for a broad uprating of the maximum fines for summary offences, together with powers to provide for subsequent increases in line with inflation. No fundamental change is being made to Scottish legislation, but we are taking the opportunity presented by the Bill to bring the fines in Scottish legislation into line with inflation.
The hon. Gentleman is being unnecessarily critical of what is a convenient legislative opportunity that has been taken in respect of a very small part of the Bill which applies to Scotland. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be delighted to know that the then Solicitor-General for Scotland attended the Committee on these and other matters.

Amendment agreed to:

Amendments made: No. 49, in page 40, line 22, at end insert—
'(1A) Where any Act—
(a) provides or confers a power to provide for a penalty or a maximum penalty which would, but for the operation of section 289C(5) of this Act, be different in the case of a second or subsequent conviction from the penalty

or maximum penalty provided for or for which provision may be made in the case of a first conviction; and
(b) otherwise fulfils the conditions of subsection (1) above; this section applies to that penalty or maximum penalty as if the amount referred to in subsection (3)(a) below were the greatest amount to which a person would have been liable or could have been made liable on any conviction immediately before the commencement of the said section 289C.'.

No. 50, in page 41, line 15, leave out
'of, or not exceeding, a specified amount'
and insert
`or a maximum fine of a specified amount, or a fine Or a maximum fine which shall not exceed a specified amount,'.

No. 51, in page 41, leave out line 21 and insert—
`(i) section 289A of this Act;
(ia) section 289C of this Act (except where section 239E (1A) of this Act applies);'.

No. 52, in page 41, line 39 leave out from 'for' to in' in line 41 and insert
, on conviction of an offence triable only summarily, a fin; or a maximum fine of a specified amount, or a fine or a maximum fine which shall not exceed a specified amount,'.

No. 53, in page 42, line 17, leave out
`of, or not exceeding, a specified amount'
and insert
`or a maximum fine of a specified amount, or a fine or a maximum fine which shall not exceed a specified amount,'.

No. 54, in page 42, line 21, at end insert—


`1972 c.20.
(bb) sections 40(5) and 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972;'.

No. 55, in page 43, line 14, at end insert—
'(2A) Any reference in the Criminal Justice Act 1982, or in any enactment passed or made after the passing of that Act, to a specified level on the standard scale (including such a reference inserted by that Act or any such enactment in an earlier enactment) shall be construed as referring to the amount which corresponds to that level on the standard scale referred to in subsection (2) above.'.

No. 56, in page 43, line 21, after 'amount', insert
, or a fine or a maximum fine which shall not exceed a specified amount, corresponding to an amount'.

No. 57, in page 43, line 30, leave out from 'or' to end of line 32 and insert
`confers a power to provide for, on conviction of an offence triable only summarily, a fine or a maximum fine of a specified amount, or a fine or a maximum fine which shall not exceed a specified amount,'.

No. 58, in page 43, line 39, leave out 'or'.

No. 59, in page 43, line 40, at end insert
';or
(c) so much of any Act as (in whatever words) makes a person liable or provides for a person to be made liable to a fine or a maximum fine or a specified amount, or a fine or a maximum fine which shall not exceed a specified amount, for each period of a specified length during which a continuing offence is committed.'.—[Mr. Alexander Fletcher.]

Clause 47

ABOLITION OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LOITERING AND SOLICITING FOR PURPOSES OF PROSTITUTION

Amendment made: No. 46, in page 47, line 16, at end insert—
`(2) The subsection substituted by subsection (1) above for section 1(2) of the Street Offences Act 1959 shall have effect in relation to offences committed before, as well as after this section comes into force.'.—[Mr. Mayhew]

Clause 48

CONSTRUCTION OF REFERENCES TO STATUTORY MAXIMUM"—ENGLAND AND WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Mr. Alexander Flethcer: I beg to move amendment No. 60, in page 47, line 26, at end insert—
`(2) In any provision of this Act or of any enactment passed or made after the passing of this Act (including any provision inserted in an earlier enactment by such a provision) "statutory maximum", in relation to a fine on summery conviction in Scotland of an offence triable either summarily or on indictment, means the prescribed sum within the meaning of section 289B(6) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (£1,000 or another sum fixed by order under section 289D(1) of that Act to take account of changes in the value of money).'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 65 to 74.

Mr. Fletcher: The new subsection achieves for Scotland what is already achieved for England, Wales and Northern Ireland by clause 48. The other amendments to the schedule are consequential.

Amendment agreed to.

New Schedule

OFFENCES EXCLUDED FROM SECTION 26

PART I

GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS OF OFFENCES

1. Manslaughter.

2. Rape.

3. Kidnapping.

4. Assault (of any description).

5. Riot.

6. Affray.

PART II

ENACTMENTS

1. MALICIOUS DAMAGE ACT 1861. (c. 97)
Section 35, 47 and 48 (criminal damage).

2. OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON ACT 1861. (C. 100)
Section 16 (making threats to kill).
Section 18 (wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm or to resist apprehension).
Section 20 (wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm).
Section 21 (garotting).
Section 23 (endangering life or causing harm by administering poison).
Section 28 (burning, maiming etc. by explosion).
Section 29 (causing explosions or casting corrosive fluids with intent to do grievous bodily harm).

3. Explosive Substances Act 1883. (c. 3)
Section 2 (causing explosion likely to endanger life on property).

4. Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. (c. 34)
Section 1 (child destruction).

5. Infanticide Act 1938. (c. 36)
Section 1(1) (infanticide).

6. Sexual Offences Act 1956. (c. 69)
Section 12 (buggery with a male under the age of 16). Section 12 (buggery with a male over 16 without consent).
Section 17 (abduction of female by force).

7. Firearms Act 1968. (c. 27)
Section 17(1) (use of firearms and imitation firearms to resist arrest).

8. Theft Act 1968. (c. 60)
Section 8 (robbery)
Section 10 (agrivated burglary)

9. Criminal Damage Act 1971. (c. 48)

Section 1(2)(b) (criminal damage, including arson, endangering life).

10. Hijacking Act 1971. (c. 70)
Section 1 (hijacking).
Section 2 (violence towards passengers).

11. Road Traffic 1972. (c. 20)
Section 1 (causing death by reckless driving).

12. Protection of Aircraft Act 1973. (c. 47)
Sections 1 to 3 (offences relating to aircraft).

13. Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.
Section 85(2) (shooting at naval or revenue vessels).'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule

AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULE 3 TO IMMIGRATION ACT 1971

`The following shall be added after paragraph 3—

Powers of courts pending deportation

4. Where the release of a person recommended for deportation is directed by a court, he shall be subject to such restrictions as to residence and as to reporting to the police as the court may direct.

5.—(1) On an application made—
(a) by or on behalf of a person recommended for deportation whose release was so directed; or
(b) by a constable; or
(c) by an immigration officer, the appropriate court shall have the powers specified in subparagraph (2) below.

(2) The powers mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) above are—
(a) if the person to whom the application relates is not subject to any such restrictions imposed by a court as are mentioned in paragraph 4 above, to order that he shall be subject to any such restriction s the court may direct; and
(b) if he is subject to such restrictions imposed by a court by virtue of that paragraph or this paragraph—
(i) to direct that any of them shall be varied or shall cease to have effect; or
(ii) to give further directions as to his residence and reporting.

6.—(1) In this Schedule "the appropriate court" means, except in a case to which sub-paragraph (2) below applies, the court which directed release.

(2) This sub-paragraph applies where the court which directed release was—
(a) the Crown Court;
(b) the Court of Appeal;
(c) the High Court of Justiciary; or
(d) the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland.

(3) Where the Crown Court or the Crown Court in NorthernIreland directed release, the appropriate court is—
(a) the court that directed release; or
(b) a magistrates' court acting for the commission area or county court division where the person to whom the application relates resides.

(4) Where the Court of Appeal or the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland gave the direction, the appropriate court is the Crown Court or the Crown Court in Northern Ireland, as the case may be.

(5) Where the High Court of Justiciary directed release, the appropriate court is—
(a) that court; or
(b) in a case where release was directed by that court on appeal, the court from which the appeal was made.

7.—(1) A constable or immigration officer may arrest without warrant any person who is subject to restrictions imposed by a court under this Schedule and who at the time of the arrest is in the relevant part of the United Kingdom—
(a) if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that that person is contravening or has contravened any of those restrictions; or
(b) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is likely to contravene any of them.

(2) In subparagraph (1) above "the relevant part of the United Kingdom" means—
(a) England and Wales, in a case where a court with jurisdiction in England and Wales imposed the restrictions;
(b) Scotland, in a case where a court with jurisdiction in Scotland imposed them; and
(c) Northern Ireland, in a case where a court in Northern Ireland imposed them.

8.—(1) A person arrested in England and Wales or Northern Ireland in pursuance of paragraph 7 above shall be brought as soon as practicable and in any event within 24 hours after his arrest before a justice of the peace for the petty sessions area or district in which he was arrested.
(2) In reckoning for the purposes of this paragraph any period of 24 hours, no account shall be taken of Christmas Day, Good Friday or any Sunday.

9.—(1) A person arrested in Scotland in pursuance of paragraph 7 above shall where-ever practicable be brought before the appropriate court not later than in the course of the first day after his arrest, such day not being a Saturday, a Sunday or a court holiday prescribed for that court under section 10 of the Bail etc. (Scotland) Act 1980.

(2) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a person arrested in Scotland being brought before a court on a Saturday, a Sunday or such a court holiday as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) above where the court is, in pursuance of section 10 of the said Act of 1980, sitting on such day for the disposal of criminal business.

10. Any justice of the peace or court before whom a person is brought by virtue of paragraph 8 or 9 above—
(a) if of the opinion that that person is contravening has contravened or is likely to contravene any restriction imposed on him by a court under this Schedule, may direct—
(i) that he be detained; or
(ii) that he be released subject to such restrictions as to his residence and reporting to the police as the court may direct; and

METROPOLITAN PUBLIC CARRIAGE ACT 1869 (c.115)


Offences under section 7 (use of unlicensed carriages)
Section (7)





(a) First offence
£20
£500



(b) Second and subsequent offences
£50
£1,000'.

There have been discussions in connection with the amendment and I understand that the Minister is thinking of making suggestions in the other place. Perhaps I could have that assurance.

Mr. Mayhew: I am happy to confirm what I have told my hon. Friend privately.

'HOUSING ACT 1957 (c. 56)


Offences under section 27(1) (Permitting premises to be used in contravention of a Closing Order).
Section 27(1).
£100 and £20 per day following conviction.
£1,000 and £50 per day following conviction.'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it is convenient to discuss the following amendments:

'HOUSING ACT 1957 (c. 56)


Offence under Section 16(6) (using or permitting the use of premises in contravention of an undertaking).
Section 16(1).
£20 and £5 per day following conviction.
£1,000 and £50 per day following conviction'.

No. 78, in page 52, line 25 at end insert—

(b) if not of that opinion, shall release him without altering the restrictions as to his residence and his reporting to the police.".'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Schedule 2

MAXIMUM FINES TO BE INCREASED BY MORE THAN THE GENERAL INCREASE

Mr. Bendall: I beg to move amendment No. 31, in page 51, leave out lines 13 and 14.
The amendment deals with the Town Police Clauses Act 1847. The hour is late and I hope for some assurances that this matter will be further considered.

Mr. Mayhew: I am most grateful to my hon. Frimd for the considerate way in which he has moved the amendment. We have had conversations about it. Detailed points are referred to in the amendment. My hon. Friend has my assurance that his amendment merits, and is being given, close attention. We shall do what we can to meet his concern—which he has carefully explained to me—within the bounds of drafting possibility. I know that he appreciates that. On the basis of that assurance, I hope that he will find it possible to withdraw his amendment.

Mr. Bendall: On that assurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Bendall: I beg to move amendment No. 32., in page 51, line 16, at end insert—

Mr. Bendall: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Wheeler: I beg to move amendment

No. 78, in page 52, line 25 at end insert—

'HOUSING ACT 1957 (c. 56)


Offences under section 22(4) (using or permitting the use of premises in contravention of a demolition order).
Section 22(4).
£20 and £5 per day following conviction.
£1,000 and £50 per day following conviction'.

Mr. Wheeler: In view of the hour, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I seek the permission of the House to include amendment No. 34 for discussion with this group.

'LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT 1962 (c. 50).


Offences under section 4 (failure to provide a Rent Book or prescribed information in a Rent Book.
Section 4(3).
£50 on first conviction £100 on subsequent conviction.
£500'.

Mr. Wheeler: Section 27 of the Housing Act 1957 created the offence of permitting for human habitation the use of premises that are subject to a closing order. Premises may be subject to a closing order for one of two reasons: either because the premises are statutorily unfit for human habitation; or because they form part of a house in multiple occupation which is not provided with means of escape in case of fire, usually because it is impracticable to provide one. I refer, for example, to attic rooms in large houses. The present maximum penalty for permitting the use of such premises in breach of a closing order is £100 with the possibility of a further maximum fine of £20 for every day on which the use continues after conviction. Those penalties, which were set in about 1910, were last revised by the Criminal Justice Act 1972 when they were raised from £20 and £5 respectively.
2.15 am
The principal reason for advancing the amendment is in connection with closing orders made in the interests of fire safety. The arguments equally apply in the case of the use of unfit premises. Under the provisions for the general increase of fines under the Bill those penalties would rise to £200 and £25 respectively. Those penalties are grossly inadequate to deter unscrupulous landlords who can charge rents which provide more than that sum in two weeks. If unscrupulous owners are to be deterred from using unfit premises, or premises which have not been provided with a means of escape in case of fire, the penalty should reflect the rent yield from such a house.
There is also an argument based on consistency. One should compare the penalties under section 27 with similar legislation. For example, section 7 of the Fire Precautions Act 1971 imposes a maximum penalty on summary conviction of £1,000 for persons using premises without a fire certificate. It is submitted that the use of premises in breach of a closing order is not dissimilar and should be therefore subject to the same maximum penalty.
I go on now to consider amendment No. 34. The Landlord and Tenant Act 1962 imposes a duty on the landlord of any weekly tenant to provide a rent book or other similar document. The Act also provides that the rent book shall contain specified information, including the name and address of the landlord, particulars of the rent, other conditions of the tenancy and such matters as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State.
The maximum penalty for non-provision of a rent book or the information required to be provided therein was set by the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1962 at £50 for a first conviction and £100 for a second or subsequent

Mr. Deputy Speaker: As it is the wish of the House, we shall also discuss amendment No. 34, in page 52, line 25 at end insert—

conviction. Those penalties have remained unchanged. Under the general provisions of the Bill for increasing fines the penalty would rise to £200. Enhanced penalties for a second or subsequent conviction have been abolished. There is evidence that the Act is being flouted on a fairly wide scale particularly in the City of Westminster. That evidence has been gained by environmental health officers and tenancy relations officers. When investigating those matters they ask to see the tenant's rent book and they are invariably told that it does not exist. The existence of a rent book is important in the enforcement of the general housing and public health laws. Most of the provisions dealing with the service of the notices requiring works to be carried out authorise such service on persons who are defined as receiving rent. The rent book is the simplest and most effective way of determining who that is.

There is, again, the argument of the need to be consistent in specifying maximum penalties for similar offences. Two similar offences come to mind, the first under section 121 of the Housing Act 1974, under which provision is made for a tenant to require a landlord to disclose his identity. The maximum penalty for failing to comply was then fixed at £200, and by the Housing Act 1980 was increased to £500. Secondly, section 7 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 enables any person to serve notice on an agent named in the rent book or any person who receives rent, requiring that person to disclose the full name and address of the landlord. In schedule 2 the Government propose to increase the penalty for failure to give that information to £500 from the present level of £5. It is submitted, therefore, that on the grounds of consistency and deterrent effect the penalty for non-provision of a rent book should be similarly increased.

Amendments Nos. 78 and 79 are largely consequential on amendment No. 33 which seeks to increase the fine for using or permitting the use of premises in contravention of a closing order. It is submitted that if that amendment is accepted these amendments should also be accepted in the interests of consistency. Historically, all three offences have their origin in the Housing Acts passed shortly after the turn of the century. These were subsequently consolidated in the Housing Act 1936 and again in the Housing Act 1957. All of them provided for a penalty of £20, to be followed by a fine of £5 for each day following conviction.

Section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972, which I believe was inserted as an amendment by Lord Stow Hill as a result of representations from, among others, the


London borough of Islington, raises the penalty in respect of the closing order offence to £100 and £20 per day. No action was taken at that time, however, to deal with the two similar offences. It is submitted that if the penalty is now to be changed, it is opportune to deal with all three.
The two offences referred to in amendments Nos. 78 and 79 are, respectively, the breach of an undertaking given not to use unfit premises for human habitation and the use of premises in contravention of a demolition order, such order having been made by reason of the unfitness of the premises for human habitation.

I should perhaps mention that it is possible procedurally, when the environmental health department gives notice that it considers premises to be unfit for human habitation, for the owner or any person having an interest in the premises to make representations as to why a closing order should not be made and to give an undertaking not to use the premises for human habitation. Such an undertaking is registrable as a land charge just as though a closing order had been made. Thus, for all practical purposes, the effect is identical.

This group of amendments arises from the serious situation that persists in central London and follows the experience of Westminster city council in endeavouring to enforce the law. It is strongly held that urgent action is required to improve the penalties. Westminster city council has the support of the London Boroughs Association in urging that the amendments be made.

Mr. Stevens: Once again, I wish briefly to give the fullest possible supoort to my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington (Mr. Wheeler). I wish to make two points.
I do not remember the last time that I saw a rent book that had been properly filled in, although, like other hon. Members, I see many in the course of a year. That is the prime defence of a private rented tenant and it is up to the House to ensure that the penalties for non-compliance with the law are such that landlords, especially larger landlords, should be minded to comply with the legal requirements.
I do not wish any hon. Member to suppose that my hon. Friend and I are pursuing a vendetta against private landlords. The contrary is true. The proposed increased penalties are maxima, and the minority of landlords who exploit their tenants would be subject to them. However, it would not necessarily mean that the courts would be obliged to impose those penalties in every case. For the tiny number of bad landlords, who are mostly to be found in the centres of our great cities, the present penalties are manifestly too low.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful to my hon. Friends the Members for Paddington (Mr. Wheeler) and for Fulham (Mr. Stevens) for the way in which they have spoken to the amendments. They relate to maximum penalties for a number of offences under housing provisions. My hon. Friends will know that the responsibility for underlying policy in such matters rests with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment.
I understand that if a local authority is satisfied that a house which is unfit for human habitation cannot be made fit at a reasonable cost the owner is given the opportunity to submit proposals for making the house fit or for its use for some purpose other than residential. The authority can accept an undertaking from the owner that he will carry out the necessary works within a specified period or that the house will not be used for human habitation until it is

made fit and the undertaking is accordingly cancelled. If the owner is not prepared to carry out the necessary renovation works, the local authority can make an order under part II of the Housing Act 1957 requiring him to demolish the property or, in certain circumstances, a closing order.
Furthermore, under schedule 24 to the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, local authorities can deal with houses in multiple occupation that do not possess adequate means of escape from fire. If the means of escape would be adequate if part of the house was not used for human habitation, the authority could make a closing order in respect of that part. Enforcement and other consequential provisions in part H of the 1957 Act are applied to such closing orders on part of a house in multiple occupation. The fines for contravention of a closing order also apply here.
It is an offence to use a house knowingly in contravention of an undertaking that it will not be lived in or knowingly to permit such use. The present fine of £50 and £5 a day for a continuing offence under section 16(6) of the Housing Act 1957 was increased by the Criminal Law Act 1977, as was the fine for knowingly entering into occupation of a house subject to an operative demolition order under section 22(4). The Government remain of the view that there is no immediate need for those fines to be increased beyond what was provided in the 1977 Act, although my hon. Friends will know, as I have;aid already, that each of those fines will be subject to an increase when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State exercises the power conferred by this Bill to alter, by order, the levels of the standard scale in line with changes in the value of money. That power will apply to this maxima and can be expected to be exercised early next year.
The penalty for contravention of the closing order under section 27(1) of the Housing Act 1957 was not, however, put up on the 1977 scale by the Criminal Law Act. It was instead specifically uprated by section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972, because there was evidence to suggest that in some areas it was not sufficient to deter landlords who could pay the fine and continue to make a good profit. Section 30 will now ensure that it is put on the 1977 scale. The penalty of £100 will increase to £200.
The amendment is concerned with the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1962, which makes it an offence for a landlord to fail to provide a tenant whose rent is payable weekly with a rent book containing prescribed information. A landlord found guilty of that offence is liable to a fine of £50 for a first offence and £100 for subsequent offences. The Bill already provides for these fines to be uprated to £200 for a first and any subsequent offence. That uprating is in line with our proposals for other fines currently at similar levels.
I accept that it is important that landlords should obey the law and be punished if they do not do so. It is equally true that other laws should be obeyed and that people who contravene them should be punished. Landlords are no exception. I do not accept that there should be a special increase in the fine for this offence. However, I emphasise that these matters are within the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment. I have no doubt that he will want to give careful consideration to what has been said by both my hon. Friends tonight. I do not doubt that he will be happy to


consider these matters in the context of a review of housing provisions, which many be regarded as a more appropriate vehicle for uprating of fines than this Bill.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: When my hon. and learned Friend puts these points to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, will he also stress than non-compliance with the obligation to provide a properly completed rent book often prejudices the civil rights of tenants?

Mr. Mayhew: My right hon. Friend will read in the Official Report what my hon. Friend has said.
I realise that what I have said is not what my hon. Friends would like, but I hope that they will understand the basis of my arguments. In the circumstances, I hope that they will feel able to agree to withdrawal of the amendment.

Mr. Wheeler: I know that my hon. and learned Friend always tries to be helpful, and, in view of the hour, I do

Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c.12)


Offences under section 39(2) (newspaper reports indentifying juveniles in court proceedings).
Section 39(2).
£500.
£1,000


Offences under section 49(2) (newspaper reports identifying juveniles in juvenile courts).
Section 49(2).
£500.
£1,000.

I was grateful to the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) for focusing the Standing Committee's attention on these two provisions. Sections 39(2) and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 concern the unauthorised publication of newspaper reports identifying juveniles involved in court proceedings. These provisions apply to juveniles taking part as witnesses and victims as well as to those involved as defendants. They also apply to sound and television broadcasts under the operation of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963.

The present penalty is £500, in line with the penalty in section 4 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 for publishing or broadcasting material likely to lead to the identification of complainants in rape cases. The section 4 penalty will increase to £1,000 under the general

RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES ACT 1948 (c. 37) 



For the words from "twenty pounds" to the end substitute " 
(a) for a first offence, £50;



10A. Section 8 (1) (obstruction of person exercising power of entry).
level 4 on the standard scale".
(b) for a second or subsequent offence, £100.
£500



For the words from "one hundred pounds" where first occurring to "one hundred pounds"
(a) for a first offence, £100.



10B. Section 8 (3) (other summary offences under Act).
where secondly occurring substitute "level 4 on the standard scale"
(b) for a second or subsequent offence, £100 or 3 months or both.
£500 or 3 months or both.

As well as amending penalties in purely Scottish legislation, schedule 6 effects for Scotland amendments to penalties in Great Britain or United Kingdom Acts which are effected for England and Wales by schedules 2 and 3.

not propose to take more of the time of the House other than to say that these are matters of the greatest urgency and importance. I trust that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment will cease to be slothful, will look at these matters, and will learn from the evidence and opinion of the council of the City of Westminster and of the London Boroughs Association that there is a problem that needs to be dealt with and that it should not be pushed to one side.

On the assumption that my hon. and learned Friend will do his utmost to convey this information to the Secretary of State, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 3

SPECIAL INCREASES OF MAXIMUM FINES

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 36, in page 55, line 9, at end insert—
uprating provisions of clause 30 of the Bill. The penalties in sections 39(2) and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, which were increased from £50 to £500 in the Criminal Law Act 1977, will not increase unless they are included in the list of special penalty increases in schedule 3 to the Bill.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 6

SCHEDULE TO BE INSERTED AS SCHEDULE 7D TO THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT 1975

Mr. Alexander Fletcher: I beg to move amendment No. 61, in page 59, line 26, at end insert—
By virtue of an amendment made in Committee, schedule 2 effects for England and Wales increases in the penalties for certain offences under the Radioactive Substances Act 1948. This amendment is designed to effect those increases for Scotland also.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 8

AMENDMENTS OF MAGISTRATES' COURT ACT 1980 RELATING TO REMANDS IN CUSTODY

Mr. Edward Lyons: I beg to move amendment No. 80, in page 67, line 31, leave out `fourth' and insert `second'.
In the Bill there is a major change in court practice in that instead of accused persons being brought for remand to court every eight days they can, under certain conditions, be brought to court every fourth week. That change means that an accused may remain in prison and not see the light of day, or should I say the light of a court, for four weeks.
The purpose of the amendment is to change that situation. It is accepted that because of the strain on prison resources and on prison officers it is difficult to keep to the traditional system of bringing people to court every eighth day. On the other hand, it has never been explained satisfactorily, even in Committee, why the Government have jumped from eight days to a maximum of 28 days.
While I concede that there should no longer be a need to bring prisoners to court every eighth day, they should be brought every second week. That goes some way to meet the Government's case, but it would be better than bringing them to court every 28 days.
Although the consent of the accused is necessary for this procedure, those accused who are not professional criminals and who do not know the ropes are more likely to give their consent. Once a person is in prison he may not be visited regularly by his legal adviser. Accordingly, he may not be granted bail as early as might otherwise be the case. Information may reach him in prison which, if the magistrate were told of it, might result in bail being given. Because the information does not reach the solicitor or because the solicitor does not act on it immediately because of other pressing problems, the person may be kept in prison a week or two longer than would otherwise be the case. That is my major objection to the proposal, which would lead to our prisons being filled up even more.
There are other objections. Lawyers may forget prisoners when they are out of sight. It is advisable that lawyers should see their clients regularly. This is one way of ensuring it. I hope that the Government will listen to the arguments in favour of the amendment.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: I support what the hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Lyons) has said. I expressed my views forcefully in Committee, so I do not need to go into detail now. As I said in Committee, it is a thoroughly retrogressive and unnecessary step for the Government to do away with the present system of the accused appearing in court every eight days. That has been a safeguard over the years in ensuring that no one suffers unnecessary and unlawful imprisonment. The reason that the Government gave for that radical change was one of administrative convenience and not of substance. A change as important as that should not be contemplated unless there are real reasons of substance.
The hon. and learned Gentleman's proposal that instead of the accused appearing only once every 28 days he should at least have the benefit of appearing once every 15 days seems a sensible compromise, which has my

support. The Law Society, members of which I spoke to only last week, still maintains its opposition to the removal of the necessity for an appearance every eight day s. It does not regard the system set out in the schedule as workable.
The arguments in favour of a regular court appearance every eight days are these. I shall put them shortly and simply. If the debate had taken place earlier in the evening, I am sure that many hon. Members on both sides of the House would have had a great deal to say about this serious change. There is no doubt that the presence of the accused ensures, and is the only way to ensure, that his case is properly presented. That cannot be left solely to, the legal representative. It certainly cannot be left to the courts.
That is the right of the accused. We are dealing with people who have not been convicted and who might be found not guilty. It is the right of the accused to ensure that he has an opportunity properly to instruct his solicitor, particularly about any change of circumstances that may have taken place since he last saw his solicitor. If the accused is held in custody he is at a severe disadvantage because he does not see his solicitor as frequently as he should, not only to give him adequate instructions but to ensure that his case is prepared properly and witnesses are traced, and, above all, to ensure that his solicitor puts his case properly in court.
The interests of justice will not be properly served by this radical change in what has been an important safeguard for the liberty of the subject. I do not see how any court can ensure that an accused person has given his consent and agreed not to appear in court every eight days, and has continued to give that consent. That is certainly the Law Society's fear. As well as the Law Society, the Legal Action Group, the Society of Labour Lawyers and the National Association of Probation Officers are strongly opposed to these proposals.
2.45 am
I do not intend to say anything more, because earlier we had a long debate on the subject. I was unable to carry all my hon. Friends with me, but I carried some. However, I strongly urge the Government to accept this sensible proposal—on which I compliment the hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West—even if they are not prepared to go the whole way and scrap a damaging, dangerous assault on civil liberties in general.

Mr. Mayhew: I am surprised that the hon. and learned Member for Accrington (Mr. Davidson), at this hour in the morning, is able to assemble and deploy sufficient enthusiasm to describe this proposal in such extreme terms. His view is not shared by the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group, of which we have heard so much, nor by the Home Affairs Select Committee, each of which suggested a period of 21 days between appearances. Apparently they failed to observe the great inroad into basic civil liberties that the hon. and learned Gentleman has been describing.
That is not surprising, because we are talking about a provision whereby the court may authorise the non-appearance of someone on bail only in circumstances in which he is over 17, in which he consents to this procedure, in which it is satisfied that he continues to consent to it and in which he is legally represented throughout. Even so, every fourth week he must be brought before the court. Therefore, there is a certain element of hyperbole in what the hon. and learned


Gentleman has said. After all, the amendment is the only proposal that has been selected. The principle of the schedule has not been selected for debate as it was thoroughly debated in Committee, where the hon. and learned Gentleman's arguments did not find favour.
The amendment is defective in any event if the purpose is to secure attendance every two weeks, because it would apply only to the explanation that the court is required to give a defendant before he can give his consent, and it does not affect that part of the schedule that deals with the periods in question.
I recognise that there can be differing opinions about the length of time that can best be left between appearances in court in these cases. I mentioned the preference of the all-party penal affairs group and the Home Affairs Select Committee. However, the Government feel that, given all the safeguards that we have built into this scheme—the prisoner must consent, he must be legally represented, he may at any time change his mind about being brought to court—a period of four weeks between appearances is not unreasonable. It is neither so long that it could be argued to affect adversely the rights of the individual concerned to know at intervals how his case is proceeding—if he is not visited in prison by his advisers—nor so short that the police and prison service which can be expected to gain from not having to escort prisoners back and forth between prisons and courts lose all advantage that the present scheme offers.
Incidentally, it is not right to say that this is simply a matter of administrative convenience. When I last visited Brixton prison, I saw large numbers of prisoners lining up early in the morning to collect their kits—everything that had been taken from them on admission to the prison—because they were going off on remand. At present that must happen every eight days, but because it is possible that on every occasion their application for bail may be granted they must take all their stuff with them. This elaborate and extremely tiresome procedure of everything being meticulously booked out only to be booked in again when they come back is extremely unpopular with the prisoners and is a source of considerable stress.
There are considerable advantages, it was made clear to me, in not having to do that. I therefore urge the House to resist the amendment, because the period of four weeks, coupled with the safeguards that I have mentioned, is entirely adequate to meet the needs of justice. In those circumstances, I trust that the House will permit the period to stand.

Mr. Edward Lyons: I have asked for a 14-day period. The Minister, in defence of the Government's proposition of 28 days, has quoted two organisations that have suggested 21 days. Twenty-one days strikes me as being equidistant between 14 and 28. Therefore, I do not understand how that argument supports him rather than me. Perhaps he divines some benefit in the argument he adduced.
The hour is late. There will be an opportunity for this important matter to be raised again in the House of Lords, and I have no doubt that it will be because to have such a major change go through at 2.50 am is rather unsatisfactory. The very least the Government should have

compromised by moving towards the suggestion of the two organisations quoted by the Minister with approval. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 9

PROBATION AND AFTER-CARE

Mr. Stevens: I beg to move amendment No. 85, in page 69. line 34, leave out sub-paragraph (a).
This is a slightly more complex issue than some of the others that have been raised. It relates in particular to the four day training centres at Sheffield, Pontypridd, Liverpool and London which were introduced in 1972. They were introduced in order to provide specifically an alternative to custody for petty persistent offenders who had become recidivists. Unlike many attempts at providing such alternatives, they appear to have been successful. They enjoy the respect of the National Association of Probation Officers.
The proposal in the schedule would have the effect of including these four day training centres with others in a more flexible way, and in such a way that they would lose the status which now distinguishes them. They provide an alternative to custody which hon. Members on both sides of the House wish to see.
In Committee, my hon. and learned Friend the Minister suggested that one reason why these four day training centres should be rationalised within other day training centres operating in a different way is that they have been under-used. During 1981, 59 out of the 60 maximum places at Pontypridd were used. In a more recent letter to me, the Minister seemed to suggest that attendance figures were not available for the four special day centres and, therefore, it was not possible to establish a comparison of occupancy with the other centres to which this schedule refers.
I suggest to my hon. and learned Friend that to change the status of the four special day centres would be a retrograde step because they provide—I say it again because it is important—an alternative to a custodial sentence, as should community service orders.
In Committee the Minister stated that the chief probation officer of Mid-Glamorgan supported his view in respect of Pontypridd. It is fair to remind the Minister that the South Wales branch of the National Association of Probation Officers supports my view. It fears that the use of the centre by the surrounding probation areas would decline and the centre would not survive if it ceased to fulfil its original purpose.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendment has already been debated, when it was grouped with new clause 15, but I am grateful for a further opportunity, if it is in order, to say something on the same subject and would wish to do so out of courtesy to my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Stevens). I appreciate that the amendment is intended to retain in use the four existing day training centres. I assure my hon. Friend that arrangements have been made with the four probation areas concerned for the centres to continue in use as an alternative to a custodial disposal by the courts. In other words, that role will continue.
Repeal of section 4 will enable the centres to be used more flexibly as day centres and for a wider range of


offenders. Section 4 limits attendance to 60 days. It will also enable the facilities of the centres to be available to courts from a wider area. Our intention is that the courts will have the power to require offenders to attend the day centres, with their consent, including the four existing day training centres as a condition in a probation order. I explained that new clauses 15 to 18 are to ensure that the courts have that power. When examining the judgment of the House of Lords in the Cullen case the Government are aware of the concern that has been expressed to the effect that the courts will be less inclined to make use of these centres when they become day centres. However, the Government do not share that view. Until the Cullen case arose, courts in 11 probation areas had been making probation orders with a requirement to attend a day centre. Once it is clear that courts have the power to require offenders to attend day centres, there should be no difficulty.
There is nothing to be read into the proposal that is intended to be slighting in any way of those who serve in the day training centres. They have been invaluable. It has been the case that they have not been as fully used as the day centres have, and that may owe something to the restrictions on their use that I have tried to describe. If we have them as day centres they will be more flexible and should be more widely used. We are grateful for the work that they have done and they are an important asset. They will continue to be used as non-custodial alternatives and I do not doubt that their work will be extremely valuable. I hope that that is something of an assurance for my hon. Friend.

Mr. Stevens: I am sorry that, owing to the way in which the new clauses and the amendments to the Bill have been selected for debate, my hon. and learned Friend should have been obliged to refer twice today to the topic that I raised in my amendment.
I take my hon. and learned Friend's point that the Government have had to introduce their own new clauses following the Cullen case in the House of Lords the other day. However, there seems to be an extraordinary element of doubt as to whether these four day centres are now being fully used.
3 am
To discuss and decide on the changing of their status without knowing the level of occupancy of the four centres seems to me to touch on the bizarre. However, as other hon. Members who have brought cherished propositions before the house at a time that is subsequent to the witching hour have not troubled the House by dividing it, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 11

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

Amendment made: No. 39 in page 88, line 4 at end add—

'Vagrancy Act 1824 (c. 83)

In the Vagrancy Act 1824 the words ", subject to section [Vagrancy offences] of the Criminal Justice Act 1982," shall be inserted—
(a) in sections 3 and 4, before the words "it shall be lawful"; and
(b) in section 5—
(i) before the words "be deemed an incorrigible rogue; and

(ii) before the words "it shall be lawful".' [Mr. Mayhew.]

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move amendment No. 75 in page 90, line 20 leave out 'subsection 11 of".

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 76.

Mr. Mayhew: This amendment deals with the relationship between release on parole under sect ion 60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and the partly suspended sentence under section 47 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. In new clause 33, we proposed that the Home Secretary should have the power to lower the minimum threshold for eligibility for parole. If that power is exercised, it would mean that people who are subject to a partly suspended sentence could be released on parole before the expiry of the initial custodial part ordered to be served in prison. That, in turn, would mean that for a period they would be liable, on the commission of a further imprisonable offence, to both restoration of the suspended part of the sentence and revocation of the licence.
There is no difficulty of principle. Dual liability arises in other contexts. But if the court ordered restoration of the suspended part but the licence were left unrevoked—that would be the result in the magistrates' courts, which Lave no power to revoke—there could be the untidy result of the offender subsequently being released on completion of the restored part, which removed all further liability as regards the partly suspended sentence still being subject to a licence that, in practice, could have no practical effect. We therefore think it right to secure automatic revocation of the licence whenever a sentence is restored in these circumstances. I ask the House to accept this minor consequential amendment, which I am sure is as clear as daylight.

Mr. Stevens: I venture on treacherous ground. I wish to take advantage of the amendment moved by my Lon. and learned Friend to slip in a question that is not directly related to it. I can deal with the matter in 30 seconds. I was talking to a man who served a two-year sentence preceded by six-and-a-half months in custody on remand. How is it, in arriving at the date when a defendant can be considered for parole, that the period spend in custody on remand is not taken into consideration?

Mr. Mayhew: "Because the statute so provides" is the answer that I would give immediately. If I find that it is inaccurate, I shall write to my hon. Friend.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 76 in page 90, line 2 l, at end add—
'(a) in subsection (7), after the words "sentence)," there shall be inserted the words "then, except in a case to which subsection (7A) of this section applies,";
(b) the following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—
"(7A) Any such licence shall be treated as revoked where—
(a) the offender—
(i) was sentenced to imprisonment with an order under subsection (1) of section 47 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (sentences partly suspended); and
(ii) was released on licence before the expiration of any part of his sentence which he was required to serve in prison under subsection (1) of that section; and
(b) by virtue of subsection (3) of that section a court restores any part of the sentence held in


suspense, and subsection (9) of this section shall apply to the offender accordingly."; and
(c) in subsection (11).'.

No. 41 in page 92, leave out lines 19 to 22.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Schedule 12

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS SCOTLAND

Mr. Alexander Fletcher: I beg to move amendment No. 62, in page 97, line 24, at end insert—

'Electric Lighting Act 1882 (c. 56)

A1. In section 12(3) of the Electric Lighting Act 1882 (incorporation of certain provisions of Clauses Consolidation Acts), both as enacted in the said Act of 1882 and as set out in the Appendix to the Schedule to the Electric Lighting (Clauses) Act 1899, for the word "thirty-eight" substitute the word "thirty-nine" (this amendment having effect also for the purposes of the said Schedule as incorporated with the Electricity Act 1947 or any other enactment).'

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 63 and 64.

Mr. Fletcher: The purpose of this group of amendments is to increase the penalties in Scotland for interfering with electricity meters and to consolidate and clarify the relevant offence provisions in electricity legislation. The South of Scotland Electricity Board has recently estimated that annual losses from meter interference are running at over £4 million with over 40,000 consumers in its area involved. The existing level of fine of £5, which has been unchanged since 1956, is no longer realistic and cannot be regarded as a suitable deterrent for this type of offence. The amendments would increase the fine to £200 for wilfully interfering with meters and to £50 for the less serious offence of failing to report accidentally damaged meters.
The amendments also update and bring' together in clearer form the relevant statutory provisions governing all forms of meter interference. The present provisions date back to the nineteenth century and are very diffficult to use. I emphasise that no alteration to existing law is involved apart from the increase in penalties. The amendments represent a sensible rationalisation of the present situation without altering the existing law or creating any new offences.

Mr. Foulkes: The comments that I made about the provisions that were introduced earlier by the Under-Secretary of State apply a fortiori to these amendments. The Minister said that one of the provisions with which we are dealing dates back to the nineteenth century. Clearly the Government have had sufficient time to introduce a Scottish Bill to deal with what is purely Scottish legislation and—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh".] It is all very well for hon. Members to say "Oh". That may be the appropriate reaction of English Members, but it is an inappropriate one for the Under-Secretary of State. He knows that on both sides of the House there is a desire that Scottish legislation should be dealt with properly. There should be Scottish Bills that should be considered by Scottish Standing Committees.
The Minister has said that we are merely increasing the level of fines to match the level of inflation. That is clearly not so when there is to be such a substantial increase in the

fines that will be applicable. I agree entirely with the substance of the hon. Gentleman's remarks. Those who are found to be tampering illegally with meters should be dealt with appropriately because otherwise the honest consumer has to pay for the electricity consumed by the dishonest consumer. I support the substance of the amendment, but I regret that it is to be inserted in an English Bill and not in a Scottish Bill.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 65, in page 97, leave out lines 35 and 36 and insert 'statutory maximum'.

No. 66, in page 98, line 26, leave out from first 'the' to 'or' in line 28 and insert 'statutory maximum'.

No. 63, in page 98, line 32, at end insert—

'South of Scotland Electricity Order Confirmation Act 1956 (c. xciv)

5A. For section 51 of the South of Scotland Electricity Order 1956 as set out in the Schedule to the South of Scotland Electricity Order Confirmation Act 1956 there shall be substituted the following section—

Injury to electricity lines, meters, seals etc. and interference with meters.

(1) If any person—
(a) wilfully, fraudulently or by culpable negligence—
(i) injures or suffers to be injured any electric lines, meter or fittings belonging to the Board;
(ii) alters the index to any meter; or
(iii) prevents any meter from duly registering the quantity of electricity supplied; or
(b) wilfully—
(i) injures or detaches or suffers to be injured or detached any of the sealing or locking devices attached to any sealed or locked receptacle, meter or apparatus affixed by the Board to any electric line within a consumer's premises; or
(ii) opens or suffers to be opened any such sealed or locked receptable, meter or apparatus; he shall (without prejudice to any other right or remedy for the protection of the Board or the punishment of the offender) be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(2) The prosecution of any such offence shall not prevent the Board from recovering the amount of any damage caused to them by the offence, and, if the offence involves wilful or fraudulent injury to or interference with any electric lines, meter or fittings belonging to the Board, the Board may also, until the matter has been remedied, but no longer, discontinue the supply of electricity to the person so offending (notwithstanding any contract previously existing).

(3) The existence of artificial means for causing an alteration of the index to any meter or preventing any meter from duly registering the quantity of electricity supplied, when the meter is under the custody or control of the consumer, shall be prima facie evidence that the alteration or prevention, as the case may be, has been fraudulently and wilfully caused by the consumer using the meter.

(4) If any person—
(a) accidentally injures or detaches any seal or locking device referred to in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section; or
(b) accidentally opens any sealed or locked receptacle, meter or apparatus referred to in that paragraph; he shall within 48 hours of doing so notify the Board in writing.

(5) Any person who fails to comply with subsection (4) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.".

5B. In section 55 of that Order (penalty for interference with works) for the words "five pounds" substitute words "level 3 on the standard scale".

North of Scotland Electricity Order Confirmation Act 1958 (c. ii)

5C. For section 36 of the North of Scotland Electricity Order 1958 as set out in the Schedule to the North of Scotland Electricity Order Confirmation Act 1958 there shall be substituted the following section—

INJURY TO ELECTRICITY LINE, METERS, SEALS ETC. AND INTERFERENCE WITH METERS

(1) If any person—
(a) wilfully, fraudulently or by culpable negligence—
(i) injures or suffers to be injured any electric lines, meter or fittings belonging to the Board;
(ii) alters the index to any meter; or
(iii) prevents any meter from duly registering the quantity of electricity supplied; or
(b) wilfully—
(i) injures or detaches or suffers to be injured or detached any of the sealing or locking devices attached to any sealed or locked receptacle, meter or apparatus affixed by the Board to any electric line within a consumer's premises; or
(ii) opens or suffers to be opened any such sealed or locked receptacle, meter or apparatus;
he shall (without prejudice to any other right or remedy for the protection of the Board or the punishment of the offender) be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(2) The prosecution of any such offence shall not prevent the Board from recovering the amount of any damage caused to them by the offence, and, if the offence involves any wilful or fraudulent injury to or interference with any electric lines, meter or fittings belonging to the Board, the Board may also, until the matter has been remedied, but no longer, discontinue the supply of electricity to the person so offending (notwithstanding any contract previously existing).

(3) The existence of artificial means for causing an alteration of the index to any meter or preventing any meter from duly registering the quantity of electricity supplied, when the meter is under the custody or control of the consumer, shall be prima facie evidence that the alteration or prevention, as the case may be, has been fraudulently and wilfully caused by the consumer using the meter.

(4) If any person—
(a) accidentally injures or detaches any seal or locking device referred to in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section; or
(b) accidentally opens any sealed or locked receptacle, meter or apparatus referred to in that paragraph;
he shall within 48 hours of doing so notify the Board in writing.

(5) Any person who fails to comply with subsection (4) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale. '.

5D. In section 40 of that Order (penalty for interference with works) for the words 'five pounds' substitute the words 'level 3 on the standard scale".'

No. 67, in page 99, line 19, leave out from 'words' to end of line 20 and insert -the statutory maximum";'.

No. 68, in page 99, leave out lines 28 and 29 and insert -the statutory maximum'; and'.

No. 69, in page 99, line 34, leave out from 'words' to end of line 35 and insert "'the statutory maximum".'.

No. 70, in page 99, line 44, leave out from 'the' where first occurring to end of line 46 and insert 'statutory maximum; and'.

No. 71, in page 100, line 7, leave out from 'words' to end of line 9 and insert -the statutory maximum".'

No. 72, in page 100, leave out lines 12 and 13 and insert `statutory maximum".'.

No. 73, in page 100, line 17, leave out from 'words' to end of line 19 and insert -the statutory maximum"; and'.

No. 74, in page 100, line 24, leave out from 'words' to end of line 25 and insert -the statutory maximum".'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Schedule 13

REPEALS

Amendments made: No. 64, in page 101, line 9, at end insert—


'62 &amp; 63 Vict, c. 19.
Electric Lighting (Clauses) Act 1899.
In the Schedule, section 38 of the Gasworks Clauses Act 1871 as set out in the Appendix (this repeal having effect for the purposes of the Schedule as incorporated with the Electricity Act 1947 or any other enactment.'.

No. 42, in page 102, line 9, column 3, at end add—




'In section 21, in subsection (1), the words "Borstal training or detention in a detention centre" and subsection (3)(c).'—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Bill to be read the Third time this day.

PROCEDURE (FINANCE)

Ordered,
That Mr. Giles Radice be discharged from the Select Committee on Procedure (Finance).—[Mr. Brooke.]

Orders of the Day — Wallacetown Engineering Company

Motion made, and Question proposed,That this House do now adjourn.—[[Mr. Brooke.]

Mr. William McKelvey: When I applied for this debate it never crossed my mind that it would take place at 3.9 am. Nevertheless, that does not detract from the importance of what I have to say, and it is important to me and to my Labour colleagues in Ayrshire, my hon. Friends the Members for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Lambie) and South Ayrshire (Mr. Foulkes), that we ensure that the record is kept straight and that the history of the events surrounding the occupation of the Wallacetown foundry is recorded in Hansard.
I should like to give the House a brief history of how the occupation came about. The Wallacetown foundry is a subsidiary of Simplex General Electric and has been completely owned by the multinational General Electric America since January 1980. The foundry is part of the Simplex electrical division and is one of three main factories, the others being situated in Brighton and Blythe Bridge. The foundry produces sophisticated electrical equipment, including specialist switchgear for the National Coal Board.
In May last year the employees at Wallacetown were engaged, through their union the AUEW, in the annual round of wage talks. At that time, there were 765 employees. During the wage discussions, the management intimated to the trade union that there were to be redundancies, and a notice of intent was issued. That is not a unique feature in negotiations between managements and trade unions, but it is worth noting that that pressure was applied on union representatives while wage negotiations were taking place.
The union did not oppose the redundancies and enough volunteers came forward to satisfy the management's requirements. The work force was reduced to 678.
The company has been profitable since 1975. Its main customer has been the NCB, and in 1981 more than two-thirds of sales went to the board, totalling about £12 million—a substantial order. The order book at the end of March this year was 2 per cent. above the expected level. The work force has co-operated over the past two years in achieving complete flexibility and there has been a good record of industrial relations. There seemed to be no great problems in that area.
It came as a big surprise to me, my hon. Friends from Ayrshire, the Secretary of State for Scotland, in whose constituency the foundry is located, and the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland that the developments that I am about to outline happened as quickly as they did.
During this year's round of wage negotiations, on the anniversary of the previous redundancies, the management again announced while the trade union was discussing wages that there were to be redundancies. The union had thought that that device might be used, but there was a sinister change in the application of the managerial technique, which took the form of the management arguing that it could not see that the number of volunteers who might have come forward would satisfy the management's requirements and they were, therefore, calling for compulsory redundancies.
As the foundry is under the convenorship of the engineering union, it is important for the House to know

that at national level the AUEW does not accept a policy of compulsory redundancy. However, the management of the firm was aware of that. During the discussions with the shop stewards in which some 14 volunteers had come forward, the management rejected 11 of those and broke the normal negotiating pattern by issuing a list naming those who were to be made redundant. To the dismay of the workers, the shop stewards convenor, Alex Baird, appeared at the top of the list. He is a man who is much respected by workers in the factory and by trade union members in the Ayrshire district. He sits on the district committee of the AUEW.
It became patently clear to the workers of that firm that in seeking the redundancy the management were using it as an excuse to neutralise an effective leader of an effective trade union organisation. The workers felt that the management should withdraw the list. The management refused, and the workers unanimously decided that they should occupy the factory—a technique that has become somewhat commonplace in the difficult industrial relations in Scotland at the moment. On 1 May—an appropriate day—the workers occupied the factory. They have occupied it since, and are still in occupation.
At the divisional level, through the good offices of Willie Aitken, the trade union managed to have some informal discussion with the management yesterday which lasted some seven hours. At the end of that seven hours, I regret to say, the management was intransigent in its attitude to the list. The redundancy hit list was to remain and the workers said that they would stand firm and that the occupation of the factory would continue.
We see in Ayrshire an extremely serious development. First, the firm has previously had a good record of industrial relations. We see a changing pattern which we imagine is the influence of the multinational General Electric. There is certainly a feeling abroad in the factory that there is more to this redundancy operation than meets the eye. Perhaps the Minister will have some answers to my questions.
My hon. Friends the Members for South Ayrshire and Central Ayrshire will have points that they wish to underline and amplify if they catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Before replying to some of my questions, the Minister should consider first that I and my hon. Friends are completely committed to support the workers in their action. Secondly, the AUEW national policy will be to support the workers who are fighting the management's compulsory redundancies.
Since the management was bound to know that the AUEW's national policy would be to resist with the maximum use of whatever force was available to it—it must have known—why did it continue with this line? Can it be, as some of the workers have asked us, that it has jumped the gun in introducing its "get tough" policy, prior to the Employment Bill becoming law. That is now so infamous in Ayrshire as to be referred to as the Tebbit Bill. If it has jumped the gun it is an extremely dangerous ploy. Why is it continuing? What effect will the loss of production have on the National Coal Board? What is the commitment of General Electric to the Ayrshire plant? Does it want to continue it in existence or is it possible that the Ayrshire plant is to be put up for sale? If that is the case, and the General Electric company is disposing of its


firms in the electrical division, would it be more profitable to neuter a trade union organisation within it so that it might appear more attractive to a potential buyer?
Those are the questions that the workers are asking us. They are convinced that the root of the matter is an anti-trade union move by the firm to remove an effective, efficient shop steward. I pose those questions to the Minister in the hope that he has an opportunity to answer them.

Mr. George Foulkes: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. McKelvey) and to the Minister for the opportunity to intervene in support of my hon. Friend. My constituency is seriously affected because a number of my constituents work at Wallacetown. It is an important source of employment because it is the type of industry one would expect to spearhead the industrial revival about which we hear from the Under-Secretary. It has had a good record of industrial relations until recently, and I ask the Minister to speculate as to why matters have deteriorated over the past few years. Is the management muscle flexing? Is it part of the United States management style because of the General Electric company involvement, or is it the effect of the encouragement that the Government are giving to some managements to be more belligerent with their trade unions? If that is the case it is a sorry example that we find at Wallacetown.
As my hon. Friend said, last year during the wage negotiations redunancies were announced. Two months ago I went out of my way to see Jim Pickering because I was worried about potential redundancies. I was assured by him that no redundancies were envisaged for at least six months. I was rather surprised and somewhat annoyed and disappointed when 40 redundancies were announced a couple of weeks ago.
Again, it was during the wage negotiations, but this time the difference was, as my hon. Friend said, the victims were named. I used the word "victims" advisedly. It was no surprise to some people that the chief shop steward was included. The Minister must not underestimate the workers' great respect for Alec Baird. They are 100 per cent. behind him. He showed that he could not be bought off on a previous occasion. He is an effective advocate for the men he represents. That is why my hon. Friend and I are suspicious that something fishy is up. Wallacetown is the only visible plant which Simplex General Electric has in its electrical division. It may be hiving it off. It may have some plans for it that it is not divulging. It wants to soften up resistance in advance by getting rid of the person most able to fight anything that would be detrimental to the workers.
If the Minister knows what is up he should come clean. The management knows what is up and it should come clean. As my hon. Friend said, he, my hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Lambie) and I support the work force wholeheartedly. The present occupation is entirely the result of heavy handed management. I have respect for some—but not all—of the managers involved. There is no doubt that if the management has the sense to withdraw the hit list and to agree to voluntary redundancies—which would go a good way towards achieving the management's aims—the occupation would cease.
I ask the Minister and, in particular, the Secretary of State for Scotland to urge the management to think again. They have the power of Government and can influence the management. I ask them to urge the management to reconsider the matter so that the men at Wallacetown can get down to the work that they do so well. Our country needs the talent and expertise of such workers.

The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Alexander Fletcher): My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I are as concerned as the hon. Members for Kilmarnock (Mr. McKelvey) and South Ayrshire (Mr. Foulkes) about the additional redundancies that the company is now being forced to seek. Redundancies and job losses are always a serious matter. It is a particular matter of regret to my right hon. Friend, because the company is in his constituency of Ayr and many of the workers involved are his constituents.
However, we are even more deeply concerned that the sit-in might put at risk investment decisions and future plans for the company. We have kept closely in touch with the situation at Wallacetown throughout the past few weeks. On 26 April, my right hon. Friend met the managing director to discuss the situation and that was just prior to the start of the sit-in. As a result of the sit-in the situation has become much more serious and we have been in frequent touch with the company during the past week to assess the position.
Following the meeting that my right hon. Friend and I had on Tuesday with the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and his colleagues, we passed their points on to the managment. Obviously it was right to do that. However, that is a far cry from interfering in the direct negotiations that are taking place between management and workers. Indeed, they can only take place between management and workers. I cannot see that the dispute will be assisted by raising the matter in the House tonight. I have no objection to responding to the points raised, but a dispute that can be settled—in any factory—only through the agreed procedures is not helped by such a debate.
In such situations, it is easy to make judgements a; an outsider and to level criticism, but that is counterproductive. In the first place, management must be left to manage. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock will not dispute that. In the second place, negotiations must be between management and the work force and the representatives. They are the people who will have to live with the decisions that they make and they have a shared interest in achieving an outcome. For any of us to seek to interfere in that process—particularly in such a delicate situation—would be highly risky, and might be irresponsible.

Mr. McKelvey: Of course, we accept that management has the right to manage, but it does not have the right to mismanage, particularly when unemployment in Ayrshire fluctuates between just below and just above 20 per cent. That is why we have raised this matter. We are seriously worried that this issue could develop and spread.

Mr. Fletcher: That is all the more reason for management and unions sticking closely to agreed procedures when attempting to settle such a dispute. I cannot imagine that there is anything in the agreed procedures that requires a dispute that management and 


workers are trying to settle to be raised in the House or that requires interference from Members of Parliament or Ministers at this stage. Despite our interest in the matter and our concern about the unemployment rates, the last thing that we want to do is to lecture the company or its workers on how to conduct their affairs.
My information, incidentally, is that the procedures are not being followed and that there is a dispute about procedures in the company. If hon. Members have any influence with the workers, I hope that they will do their utmost to persuade them to stick to the negotiating procedures that have been agreed and practiced over the years. I understand that informal discussions have been taking place involving the employers Federation and full-time union officials aimed at getting proper discussions with agreed procedures under way between management and union representatives at the factory. Every effort should be bent in that direction.
In my capacity as industry Minister in Scotland, part of my job is to see that promotional tours are undertaken and investment encouraged to come to Scotland. I listened with interest to the hon. Gentleman's criticism of multinational companies. In Scotland generally, we are very happy to have a number of highly successful multinational companies creating many thousands of jobs, bringing the latest technology to Scotland and providing great opportunities not just for their employees but for subcontractors and others involved in Scottish industry generally.
Attracting investment to Ayrshire and other parts of Scotland requires the maintenance of the best possible industrial relations record. As I said earlier, the investment decisions and the future of the plant are affected by a dispute of this kind. As I think I advised hon. Members informally, until recently the Department has been involved with the company, not with a view to any takeover or any rubbing of noses into the ground because of trade union legislation. On the contrary, my Department has been involved with the company in the consideration of Government grant for an expansion project which would create more jobs. That is now on the shelf, following the sit-in.
In my view, a sit-in is the worst kind of industrial dispute. From the point of view of bad publicity, it is worse than a strike. I know that sit-ins have become fashionable and one or two of them may have achieved some success as a result of the publicity, but I would say to any work force contemplating such action that it is easier to obtain notoriety than good publicity in such a situation. Moreover, the publicity is not confined to the dispute itself or to the company. It contaminates industrial reputations in the area and in the country generally. We all have a great interest in trying to avoid that.
As I understand it, because proper procedures have not been followed, there is now a sit-in. From what the hon. Gentleman has said, there seems little hope of a settlement at this stage. I hope, therefore, that when he and his hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire talk about giving full support to the workers they will do so objectively, with a view not just to taking sides but to finding a solution to the dispute and to the problems faced by the workers themselves and the damage that they may do to their own

job prospects if they are not prepared to deal with the problem in the correct manner through proper negotiating machinery with the management.

Mr. Foulkes: I assure the Minister that my hon. Friends the Members for Kilmarnock and Central Ayrshire (Mr. Lambie) and I are prepared to say to the workers that they should end their occupation and get back to work on the clear condition that the management withdraws not the redundancies—let it keep the redundancies, however regrettable they are in an area of high unemployment—but the hit list of compulsory redundancies. That is a simple request. If the Minister and his colleagues are willing to ask the management to do that simple thing, we in turn will ask the men to end their occupation so that they can get back to work.
I hope that the Minister will give the assurance that I ask of him, just as we have now given the assurance that he asked of us.

Mr. Fletcher: The information that I have about the so-called hit list is that the management has not been asked to withdraw the list of names. On the outside looking in on such disputes, hon. Members on both sides of the House must ensure that they are fully aware of all the facts and the problems. Frankly, I do not see how we can be fully aware, sitting here in Westminster. It is extremely dangerous to pass judgment on the matter, and the best thing that we can do is to urge the management and the workers to stick to the agreed negotiating procedures in trying to find a solution to their problem.
I have already referred to the fact that the new investment about which the company talked is currently on ice because of the present position. I hope that it can be revived, but clearly it will not help the reputation of the holding company, General Electric of America, if the position is reported, as it must be because the sit-in is in its second week. That cannot be good news for investment plans, because such a large company or any other multinational always has a choice of locations for investment. We should remember also the risk that was taken with Wallacetown and the fact that it has been characterised as having a stable work force. Until this dispute, it had a strike-free record that was second to none in the United Kingdom group of companies. That is the message that we wish to get across to investors at home and abroad. I hope that this is a one-off position that will soon be resolved.
It does not help the position not just to try to solve the problem from a distance but to indulge in kite flying or even spreading rumours about plans for a takeover or for repression of the work force and trade unions. Those were the sort of noises made by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire a few moments ago. They are not justified. I have no information other than that the company wishes to pursue its business in Ayr in the best possible way and seeks the full co-operation of the work force. The hon. Member for South Ayrshire and the hon. Member for Kilmarnock should try, like my right hon. Friend and I, to encourage management and workers to resolve the dispute. The ball is firmly in their court. They are adults and they know the problem better than hon. Members or me. The best message that we can give them tonight is that they should sit down together and resolve their differences.

Mr. McKelvey: I assure the Minister that the information that came directly from the shop stewards' convenor and from the divisional organiser of the AUEW to us as Members of Parliament was that if the firm were to withdraw its list of names and return to negotiations on the question of redundancies—on who was to go—the dispute would be over instantly. That is the fact that will be recorded in Hansard.

Mr. Fletcher: It can be recorded in Hansard, to which one has no objection. If it is recorded in Hansard 100 times, it is no substitute for the fact that workers and management must sit down and resolve the dispute. I hope that that will be the case first thing tomorrow morning.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-two minutes to Four o'clock am.